

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 25, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

After checking with the President, I informed Mr. Bissell that one additional operation may be undertaken, provided it is carried out prior to May 1. No operation is to be carried out after May 1.



A. J. Goodpaster

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12055, Sec. 3-234

MR 78-44 #6
By DTH Date 7/22/80

3
Telephone

Murray Hill 2-0500

Chock Full o' Nuts

REG. U.S. PAT. OFF.

425 LEXINGTON AVENUE

New York 17, N. Y.

May 13, 1958

THE WHITE HOUSE

MAY 14 11 36 AM '58

RECEIVED

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

I was sitting in the audience at the Summit Meeting of Negro Leaders yesterday when you said we must have patience. On hearing you say this, I felt like standing up and saying, "Oh no! Not again."

I respectfully remind you sir, that we have been the most patient of all people. When you said we must have self-respect, I wondered how we could have self-respect and remain patient considering the treatment accorded us through the years.

17 million Negroes cannot do as you suggest and wait for the hearts of men to change. We want to enjoy now the rights that we feel we are entitled to as Americans. This we cannot do unless we pursue aggressively goals which all other Americans achieved over 150 years ago.

As the chief executive of our nation, I respectfully suggest that you unwittingly crush the spirit of freedom in Negroes by constantly urging forbearance and give hope to those pro-segregation leaders like Governor Faubus who would take from us even those freedoms we now enjoy. Your own experience with Governor Faubus is proof enough that forbearance and not eventual integration is the goal the pro-segregation leaders seek.

In my view, an unequivocal statement backed up by action such as you demonstrated you could take last fall in deal-

MAY 26 1958

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

Subject: Meeting of Negro Leaders with the President - June 23, 1958

The President met with: Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., President,
Southern Christian Leadership Conference

A. Philip Randolph, International
President, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car
Porters



Roy Wilkins, President, NAACP

Lester B. Granger, Executive Secretary,
National Urban League

Also present were Attorney General Rogers, Frederic E. Morrow and myself.

After introductions, Mr. Randolph, as the spokesman, laid before the President the attached statement. He prefaced the written statement by commending the President strongly for the many efforts he has made to advance the political and economic status of the American Negro. He said that they would not be present at the meeting if they did not have the firm conviction that the President was a man of courage and integrity who had shown leadership and brought about accomplishment in this field. He spoke strongly and favorably about the President's action in the Little Rock episode. He then proceeded, beginning on page 4, to read the nine recommendations contained in the statement, including the closing paragraphs. Following this, he asked Dr. King to speak.

Dr. King said he wanted to comment about the first three of the recommendations and that, as a minister, he felt these recommendations were designed to help mobilize the emotions of the spirit which, in turn, would aid in the fight for abolishment of segregation. He said that a Presidential pronouncement as called for in the first recommendation would give a moral boost to the Nation. Speaking of the second

recommendation, which calls for a White House conference, he is convinced, he said, as a southern Negro, that the social, political and economic reprisals which exist today in the South prevent the goodwill of white Southerners from being expressed. He felt such a conference would provide the forum for expressions of such goodwill. In urging action on the third recommendation, he said that wider dissemination of government information on this subject would provide the factual basis needed to educate further the communities and localities throughout the South and the Nation. He felt that without action along the lines of these three recommendations there would be a continuation of delaying tactics. He agrees that morals cannot be legislated (only education and religion can do this, he said) and that internal attitudes are hard to change, but that action is possible to attempt to control the external effects of such attitudes.

Mr. Wilkins emphasized the President's own record in the field of improvement of Negro rights, recalling the fact that Armed Services integration is now about complete, and that the President was responsible for the passage of the Civil Rights Bill last year. He then spoke on behalf of recommendation No. 4 and urged that the Administration seek again the inclusion of Part III which had been deleted during the heat of the debate last Fall. This is needed in order that more legal authority be provided the Attorney General. He said that the Justice Department was "inhibited, so it is reported" because they lack this necessary statutory authority. Wilkins then said he was "dismayed, distressed and angered" by the Lemley court decision of last Saturday. He said that the picture had been best described by a porter in New York City as he was leaving to come to Washington. The porter said that the decision has "given them a map," meaning that this decision has explained to the segregationists how best to proceed to defeat school integration. He then spoke of the necessity of protecting the right to vote, explaining that in one community in the South where a college was located, Negro faculty members with Masters and Doctors degrees were unable to qualify to vote because of the rigid tests administered by local registrars. He felt that when more Negroes were able to vote in the South this would bring about peaceable change and adjustment. He said that the right to vote was the "most effective and bloodless way" to solve this whole problem. He said that it was natural for a colored person who felt aggrieved in a local community to want to turn to Washington, the White House and the President for aid. He then related to the President an incident which occurred during the President's visit to Oklahoma City last Fall in which eight high school science scholarship winners were presented to the President. One of them was a colored girl, he said, for whom this would never have been possible if integration had not taken place in that city in recent years.



Mr. Granger recalled to the President that, in his lifetime, he has seen three different phases of Negro activity in the field of civil rights: during his World War I days, during the time of the depression, and today. He said he had not known a period when the bitterness of the Negro showed "more signs of congealing" than today. Mr. Granger continued, saying the Negro had been led to believe that there was hope and that progress was being made when, suddenly, it appears stopped. He said this was the reason for the reaction by the Negroes at last month's Summit meeting to the President's remarks, and because of which he assumed the President might be disappointed. He referred to Agnes Meyer's recent article in the Atlantic Monthly, calling her a person of "goodwill, even though not always of good judgment." He said that in this article she had "misquoted" (meaning misstated, I believe) the New York City School Board efforts. He said this type of article only brings about more confusion by well-meaning white people. He commended the kind of leadership exhibited by Dr. King in the South, who, he said, "kept alive a free spirit."



The Attorney General commented that the reason, in his mind, for any bitterness which might exist, is the very fact that progress is being made today, pointing out that in prior years speeches were made but progress did not follow, and so hope never really built up. Now, with the progress of the past recent years, some of the hopes have become realized; occasional setbacks or delays should be regarded only as temporary. Mr. Rogers said that we are defending the laws by aggressive court action whenever and wherever it appears that the legal facts are sufficient to bring them to a successful conclusion. He emphasized that it would be extremely unwise and damaging to institute court action in every individual complaint situation. He then said that he thought the statement lacked a written preface of the type which Mr. Randolph had just made orally (commending the accomplishments of this Administration) and gave no appearance of appreciation for the gains of recent years. He also recalled Mr. Wilkins' willingness to abandon Part III of the proposed Civil Rights Bill during the heat of last year's debate.

The President then spoke, saying that he was extremely dismayed to hear that after 5 1/2 years of effort and action in this field these gentlemen were saying that bitterness on the part of the Negro people was at its height. He wondered if further constructive action in this field would not only result in more bitterness.

Mr. Granger, seconded by Mr. Randolph and Mr. Wilkins, hastily assured the President that the bitterness they referred to was not directed to the President or the Administration but only to the communities in which apparent though slow progress was being made and then stopped; that the bitterness consisted of individual reactions to obstacles met.

The President spoke forcefully about the need for diligent and careful perusal by the Federal Government of any actions in this field. He did not comment in any way on the Judge Lemley decision or the Little Rock affair. He said he did not propose to comment - and knew they did not expect him to - on the recommendations which he had before him, but said that he would obviously be glad to consider them. He then said that there might be at first blush some value in convoking a White House conference, but added that he was doubtful if it would be productive of anything.

Mr. Randolph answered this last observation by saying he thought the President might give it a high moral tone, to which the President replied there was only so much any President could do in opening such a meeting. Mr. Rogers agreed with the President and said this could only serve as a sounding board for the reaffirmation of previously announced positions by spokesmen (acknowledged and otherwise) in this area. Mr. Rogers emphasized again that the President had directed him to take aggressive actions in all matters affecting the Federal authority. The President agreed and then emphasized the importance of voting rights.



The meeting concluded with the President indicating his appreciation of meeting with the group.

In the press conference which followed the meeting, it appeared to me that the positions taken by the four leaders were basically very honest and favorable recitals of what had occurred at the meeting. The news accounts speak for themselves, but I took note of one significant question asked by Louis Lautier (only Negro member of the National Press Club Association) of Mr. Wilkins: he asked what had occurred in the meeting which had changed his attitude. He repeated this to mean Mr. Wilkins' attitude toward the President from the position taken a month ago by him. Mr. Wilkins was very indignant and didn't really respond to the question. Efforts were made to bait Wilkins in the press conference inasmuch as he seems to be the most militant of the group, but I would say that he held himself under control.


Rocco G. Siciliano

~~TOP SECRET~~

November 24, 1954

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
0810 24 November 1954



Others present: Secretary of State
(for part of meeting)
Secretary of Defense
Mr. Allen Dulles
Secretary of Air Force
General Twining
Lt. General Cabell
Lt. General Putt
Colonel Goodpaster

Authorization was sought from the President to go ahead on a program to produce thirty special high performance aircraft at a cost of about \$35 million. The President approved this action. Mr. Allen Dulles indicated that his organization could not finance this whole sum without drawing attention to it, and it was agreed that Defense would seek to carry a substantial part of the financing.

The Secretary of Defense sought the President's agreement to taking one last look at the type of operations planned when the aircraft are available. The President indicated agreement.

To a question by the President, the Secretary of State indicated that difficulties might arise out of these operations, but that "we could live through them."

In summary, the President directed those present to go ahead and get the equipment, but before initiating operations to come in for one last look at the plans.


A. J. Goodpaster

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-204

MR 80-234 #1
By DJH Date 3/11/82

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The President

Page 2

May 13, 1958

ing with Governor Faubus if it became necessary, would let it be known that America is determined to provide -- in the near future -- for Negroes -- the freedoms we are entitled to under the constitution.

Respectfully yours,

Jackie Robinson
Jackie Robinson

JR:cc

Authority MB 77-149 #4
By jc NLE Date 9/11/78~~TOP SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

October 29, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY:

Yesterday, Sunday morning, President Kennedy called me on the phone to tell me about certain messages that he had received from Khrushchev dealing with the efforts to solve the Soviet-American differences in the Cuban situation. He did not quote to me the exact language of the messages that he had received from the Kremlin but did give their substance. The basic proposal was that Russia would dismantle all its bomb sites in Cuba if, in return, the United States would guarantee that it would not invade Cuba.

The messages received from the Russians contained different provisions but the final one seemed to be a very simple and, the President thought, quite acceptable in general intent. I concurred but told him that I thought our Government should be very careful about defining exactly what was meant by its promises. I observed, since we make a point of keeping our promises, that they should not imply anything more than we actually meant. It would be a mistake, I said, to give the Russians an unconditional pledge that we would, forever and under all conditions, not invade regardless of changing circumstances. For example, I said that if Castro should attack Guantanamo, or if he became active with agents and provocators in Latin American countries, it might become necessary for us to occupy the island.

My impression was that the President understood this and would make certain that we would not be over-committed. ...

I then called John McCone, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, who is normally my contact with the President on matters involving national security and gave him the gist of the conversation, particularly about the reservations that I thought should accompany any all-out promise of ours.

- more -

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- 2 -

I said to the President that my own estimate of what might happen would be a Russian effort to drag negotiations to such an extent that we would feel stymied and might be, by world opinion, held on dead center. I therefore said that, in my opinion, the Government should by all means hold the initiative that it had finally seized when it established the quarantine.

He obviously agreed with this thinking because he said this was probably just the first step in a long series of efforts that will have to come about before the thing is settled.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER



~~TOP SECRET~~

"In case of failure" message drafted by General Eisenhower
in case the D-Day invasion failed

Our landings in the
Cherbourg - Have over
have failed to gain a
satisfactory foothold and
~~I have with given~~
~~the troops have been~~
~~withdrawn.~~ | ~~This particular~~
~~operation~~ | my decision to
attack at this time and place
was based upon the best
information available, ~~and~~
the troops, the air and the
navy did all that ~~was~~
Bravery and devotion to duty
could do. If any blame
is fault attached to the attempt
it is mine alone.

July 5

Personal and Confidential

stooped to dragging in young and innocent children in order to serve their own purpose.

The action of these people has exposed to greater danger of death literally millions of our citizens. The very real question becomes how far can this be permitted by a government that, regardless of every consideration of mercy and compassion, is also required to be a just government in serving the interests of all its citizens. That their crime is a very real one and that its potential results are as definite as I have just stated, are facts that seem to me to be above contention.

Another factor that appeals, quite naturally, to Americans is that one of these criminals -- indeed the more strong-minded and the apparent leader of the two -- is a woman. But the question presents itself -- if the Executive should interfere because of this fact, would we be justified in encouraging the Communists to use only women in their spying process?

I assure you that I appreciate receiving your thoughts on the matter. You not only have the right of any citizen to submit your suggestion, but, of course, our old friendship at Columbia assures that I would give special attention to your convictions. But when it comes to the decision to commute such a sentence -- which would mean that these arch criminals would be subject to parole at the end of fifteen years -- I must say I have not yet been able to justify such an action.

I have answered your letter at some length, because I know that you wrote it out of a deep sense of duty and friendship. I realize that your desire to protect America is as great as mine, but I doubt that you have had to consider some of the results that could spring from the action you recommend.

Personal and Confidential

I believe a way to secure coordination would be to put this whole business under the authority of the theatre commander. Because of the special political and psychological conditions existing in Korea, there is added reason not only for doing this through a single office, but of charging the military with this responsibility.

If you think well of this idea, I believe we should promptly have a conference between you, Stassen and Wilson -- and any others directly concerned. We could have it in my office, at your convenience.

D.D.E.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1953.

Personal and Confidential

Dear Clyde:

Thank you very much for your thoughts on the Rosenberg conviction. It is extremely difficult to reach a sound decision in such instances. Not all the arguments are on either side.

I started studying the record of the case immediately after Inauguration, and have had innumerable conferences on it with my associates.

Several of the obvious facts which must not be forgotten are these. The record has been reviewed and re-reviewed by every appropriate court in the land, extending over a period of more than two years. In no single instance has there been any suggestion that it was improperly tried, that the rights of the accused were violated, that the evidence was insufficient, or that there was any factor in the case which justified intervention on the part of the Executive with the function of juridical agencies.

As to any intervention based on considerations of America's reputation or standing in the world, you have given the case for one side. What you did not suggest was the need for considering this kind of argument over and against the known convictions of Communist leaders that free governments -- and especially the American government -- are notoriously weak and fearful and that consequently subversive and other kind of activity can be conducted against them with no real fear of dire punishment on the part of the perpetrator. It is, of course, important to the Communists to have this contention sustained and justified. In the present case they have even

Personal and Confidential

July 27, 1953.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE**



Subject: Assistance to Korea

As I see it, there will be many ways in which help, during the coming months, can be rendered to the Republic of Korea.

(a). We are committed to a policy of helping to train, equip and organize at least four more divisions, and to give some help in organizing other forms of military units.

(b). The MSA Bill will contain some funds for direct help of that country.

(c). We expect the Congress to authorize the use of some two hundred million dollars out of savings brought about by the cessation of hostilities to help in economic rehabilitation.

(d). With the cessation of fighting, there will be available in Korea certain technical formations of the Army, Navy and the Air Force, whose services as technical advisers, overseers, and in certain cases, actual constructors of needed facilities, would be invaluable. The cost will be little, because in any case we must maintain these troops in that region so long as we must keep fighting divisions there. I speak of the various classes of engineers, single troops, quartermaster troops, motor vehicle experts, medical organization, and so on. In many ways help rendered in this fashion could be almost more valuable than under any other authorization, and certainly will be important enough to indicate at once the vital need for real coordination.

Personal and Confidential

We shall, of course, have another clemency petition presented this week, from which we will see whether there are additional considerations to take into account.

With personal regard,

Sincerely,



Professor Clyde Miller
Butler Hall
Columbia University
New York 27, New York

Personal and Confidential

COPY

May 6, 1953

PERSONAL

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

The situation in Indo-China continues to be one of grave concern to all who are striving to increase the strength and stability of the free world. ~~To the people of the United States, conditions there seem to be worsening rather than improving, despite our outlays for material strength.~~

~~After much thought on this subject,~~ ^{X X} My associates and I have arrived at two convictions, a knowledge of which may be of some value to you in your contacts with French officials.

The first is that an outstanding leader is needed, empowered with the means and authority to win victory -- a man who is at once eminently qualified in the training and organization of military forces, and who is at the same time a forceful and inspirational leader. With such leadership in the person of the late Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny, French Union forces made extensive progress against the insurgents and I believe the progress would have been maintained had this outstanding soldier lived.

The second requirement, as I see it, is for a clear and unequivocal public announcement on the part of the French Government, repeated as often as may appear desirable, that France seeks self-rule for Indo-China and that practical political freedom will be an accomplished fact as soon as victory against the Communists is won. ~~(France would, thereafter, have such relationships with the peoples of Indo-China as are agreed between the two peoples to be of mutual benefit.)~~ Such a declaration would place this tragic conflict in an appealing perspective and win millions of friends for France, not only in Indo-China but throughout the world.

A short time ago, I mentioned to our State Department my views as to the urgent requirement for a top-flight commander in Indo-China. I specifically referred to General Guillaume as the type of man capable of providing the leadership required. Yesterday I had the pleasure of seeing Lieutenant General Jean E. Valluy. I understand he is receiving consideration for appointment as Commander in French Indo-China. Based on my personal impression of him, and on reports reaching me of his work at SHAPE, I feel that General Valluy may well be the man who can perform this critical task successfully. If such be the decision of the French authorities,

Letter to Clarence Dillon - 2. (May 6, 1953)

I strongly urge that he be sent as early as practicable and that he be given powers and support equal to the great task that will be his.

With warm personal regard,

Sincerely,

The Honorable Clarence Dillon,
American Ambassador
American Embassy,
Paris, France.

TOP SECRET

Denver, Colorado.
September 8, 1953.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE

I

With respect to your outlined argument for reconsideration of security policies, I am in general agreement with the points you make. The following are specific comments:

A. I am doubtful whether we can, as a practical matter, greatly increase the emphasis we are now placing upon assuring our lead in non-conventional weapons.

B. While it is true that the semi-permanent presence of United States Forces (of any kind) in foreign lands is an irritant, any withdrawal that seemed to imply a change in basic intent would cause real turmoil abroad.

C. I note that you say the United States has put thirty billion dollars of economic aid into Europe during the six years - 1946-51. I assume you have looked up these figures, but I have often heard Paul Hoffman say that the total was something on the order of fourteen billion under ECA.

D. I am in emphatic agreement that renewed efforts should be made to relax world tensions on a global basis. Mutual withdrawals of Red Army Forces and of United States Forces could be suggested as a step toward relaxing these tensions.

E. I agree also that whatever move we make in this field should be done at a reasonably early date.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-204

MR 80-287-41

By DTH Date 7/15/81

A general comment is that programs for informing the American public, as well as other populations, are indispensable if we are to do anything except to drift aimlessly, probably to our own eventual destruction.

There is currently much misunderstanding among us. Our own people want tax relief; but they are not well informed as to what drastic tax reduction would mean to the security of the country. They have hoped, and possibly believed, that the Armistice achieved on the Korean battlefield is a prelude to an era of better relations between ourselves and Russia. The individual feels helpless to do anything about the foreign threat that hangs over his head and so he turns his attention to matters of immediate interest -- farm supports, Taft-Hartley Act, taxes, drought relief, and partisan politics. Abroad we and our intentions are suspect because we are known to be big and wealthy, and believed to be impulsive and truculent.

If we are to attempt real revision in policies -- some of which may temporarily, or even for a very extended time, involve us in vastly increased expenditures, we must begin now to educate our people in the fundamentals of these problems.

Among other things, we should describe the capabilities now and in the near future of the H-bomb, supplemented by the A-bomb. We should patiently point out that any group of people, such as the men in the Kremlin, who are aware of the great destructiveness of these weapons -- and who still decline to make any honest effort toward international control by collective action -- must be fairly assumed to be contemplating their aggressive use. It would follow that our own preparation could no longer be geared to a policy that attempts only to avert disaster during the early "surprise" stages of a war, and so gain time for full mobilization. Rather, we would have to be constantly ready, on an instantaneous basis, to inflict greater loss upon the enemy than he could reasonably hope to inflict upon us. This would be a deterrent -- but if the contest to maintain this relative position should have to continue indefinitely, the cost would either drive us to war -- or into some form of dictatorial government. In such circumstances, we would be forced to consider whether or not our duty to future generations did not require us to initiate war at the most propitious moment that we could designate.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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I realize that none of this is new to you -- in fact, we talked it all over the other day. I put it down here merely to emphasize the fact that a re-study of our position, and even the adoption on a unanimous basis of radically revised policies by the President, the Cabinet, and the bi-partisan leaders of the Congress, would not, in themselves, be sufficient to assure the accomplishment of the resulting objectives. We must have the enlightened support of Americans and the informed understanding of our friends in the world. Moreover, all of these people would have to understand that increased military preparation had been forced upon us because every honest peaceful gesture or offer of our own had been summarily rejected by the Communists.

I well realize that the procedures and plans for accomplishing all that I have hinted at above, will first require intensive study by the ablest group of individuals we can possibly assemble. We are already overworking the staff of the Security Council, the only group presently established to study these questions on the broadest, inter-departmental, scope. But if your memorandum proves nothing else, it proves that we must get our thinking on these vast problems organized and coordinated so that as a first step all in responsible positions can have confidence that our conclusions are essentially correct. After that a carefully thought out program of speeches, national and international conferences, articles, and legislation, would be in order.



II.

With respect to the draft of your speech to the United Nations, I started out on page one to suggest certain editorial corrections. However, I then remembered that you had said that you had done no editing whatsoever, and so I abandoned that effort.

I think, of course, that the speech will be timely and informative. My chief comment is one of a rather general character. As I read it,

~~TOP SECRET~~

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I had the impression, particularly in the first part, that the speech is intended as a new indictment of the Bolshevik Party, the USSR, and the Communist Governments in the world. Now I have no quarrel with indicting and condemning them, but I wonder whether or not, in front of the United Nations Assembly, this would be the proper approach. Realizing that you must recite certain facts and instances of guilt on the part of the Soviets, I rather feel that it would be well to state flatly in the beginning that you have no intention of producing a Phillipic -- that your purpose is to advance the cause of conciliation and understanding and not to be concerned merely with excoriation. The recital, therefore, of past misdeeds, including broken faith, calumny, or anything else, would be made -- let us say -- regretfully, and only to establish the basis for proceeding more constructively in the future.

I shall not belabor this point further. You can decide whether or not it has any validity. But I think that the speech can be made positive and clear without giving the impression to our opponents or to our friends that we are merely concerned with showing that we have been very nice people, while the others have been very wicked indeed.

As for the rest, I have no detailed comments to make, but because of my respect for Cabot Lodge's judgment and his familiarity with these problems, I would suggest that he be consulted before your text reaches its ultimate form.

III.

It was fine to have you out here. I am amused, in reading my morning papers, to find that the reporters who had insisted that you and I are at odds, found new evidence to support their contentions in the fact that we visited for several hours together.

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- 5 -

It is amazing to find such little regard for fact in a nationally known member of the Press. I rather think that he got out on a limb and has been busily engaged in trying to show that he was correct all the time.

I assure you that I thoroughly enjoyed your visit; my only regret was that you had to take such a long trip in order that we could go over together the critical international problems that cry out for study and contemplation and action. I am truly obligated to you for the time and trouble you took to make the trip.

As ever,



TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~
Security Information

November 4, 1953

~~TOP SECRET~~



Dear Mr. President:

There is a matter which I must take up with you in the interest of our future close cooperation. I want you to know that such cooperation is my sincere purpose. However, to achieve it, I must know your purpose also.

I recall that your agreement of August eighth with Secretary Dulles provided that, until the Mutual Defense Treaty between our two nations could be expected to come into force -- which we then thought might be about sixty days after the Senate reconvenes in January -- you will keep your forces under the United Nations Command which would comply with the armistice terms.

Time is fast running out on this period. I need now to be thinking and planning ahead beyond this period in political, security, and economic terms.

From a political standpoint, the important thing is the ratification of our Mutual Defense Treaty. We shall face many questions from the Senators when they meet again and begin considering this Treaty. I hope for prompt and favorable action from the Senate. But to get that, I shall have to be able to assure the Senators that this Treaty will actually promote peace and mutual defense. If I should be forced to conclude that after the coming into force of the Treaty, you might unilaterally touch off a resumption of war in Korea, I could not recommend its ratification and I am certain that the Senate would not ratify it. When I formally submit the Treaty to the Senate next January, I must be in a position personally to give a clear assurance on this point.

From a military standpoint, I have heavy responsibilities for the safety of the United States forces in Korea as their Commander-in-Chief, and for the safety of the other United Nations forces as President of the United States which exercises the unified command for the United Nations

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 11

~~TOP SECRET~~
Security Information

MR 77-79 DOCUMENT M1
By MAA/DAW Date 5/11/77

~~TOP SECRET~~

action in Korea. We are, of course, now committed to react instantly if the Communist forces violate the armistice. Planning for this contingency involves the assumption that your forces and those of the United Nations will continue to act in coordination. But if you should decide to attack alone, I am convinced that you would expose the ROK forces to a disastrous defeat and they might well be permanently destroyed as an effective military force. Therefore, I must know whether or not we are to stand united so that our military leaders may make appropriate plans.

In signing the armistice, the United States has pledged itself not to renew hostilities in Korea. We mean to carry out that commitment fully. Moreover, we will not directly or indirectly violate or evade that commitment by assistance in any form to any renewal of such hostilities by ROK forces. If you were to plan to initiate military action while the Communist forces are complying with the Armistice, my obligation as to both United States forces and other United Nations forces would be to plan how best to prevent their becoming involved and to assure their security.

To turn now to economic matters, we are making plans for the future which will require me to ask for further appropriations from the Congress during the next session. When I request those appropriations, I shall surely be asked whether I have confidence that the expenditure will promote a long-term restoration of the Republic of Korea. If I believed that these funds would merely create new targets in a war renewed by you, I could not, consistently with my duty, request Congress to authorize this appropriation.

I am sending you this frank letter to take you into my confidence about pressing problems of great concern to both our countries. I count upon our loyal cooperation. However, I cannot, as you see, leave that to assumption and speculation. I must have explicit confirmation from you, in order to reach my own decisions and to be able to answer the questions which the Senate and the Congress will properly ask before they make their indispensable contribution to the cooperative plans which you and Secretary Dulles and I have been developing.

~~TOP SECRET~~

I have asked the Vice President to hand this note to you when he calls on you with Ambassador Briggs and General Hull.

He has my complete confidence and you can talk to him as you would to me. As you know, he is not only Vice President but the President of the Senate and a former member of the House and Senate. As such, he will be consulted by many Senators and Representatives when our Treaty comes before the Senate for ratification and when economic appropriations are sought. He is conversant with my views on the matters covered in this letter.

You can, if it is convenient to you, hand to him your reply to this letter. Otherwise, you can deliver it to our Embassy for transmission to me.

I extend to you and to Mrs. Rhee my very best wishes and the assurance of my continuing regard.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Syngman Rhee
President of the Republic of Korea

cc: State Dept.
V. Pres. Nixon

November 5, 1953.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET



I definitely approve of taking credit in this year's budget for anticipated operational savings. Also, as I have earlier instructed all responsible officials, necessity rather than desirability must be the yardstick by which we defend every estimate we make.

The real difficulty will, of course, come in distinguishing always between necessity and desirability.

For example, I consider it a necessity for this Administration to announce broad and liberal objectives in certain fields that affect our whole country directly or indirectly, and which serve also to fix in the public mind the character of our political thinking. So in (a) slum clearance and public housing, (b) utilization of America's water resources, (c) extension of social security and old age benefits, I should like to put ourselves clearly on record as being forward-looking and concerned with the welfare of all our people. In addition, to give substance to our words I should like to see no reduction -- possibly even a slight increase -- in housing appropriations. The same applies to a few small public works projects -- and also I would like to see initiated one of the planned and project major conservation projects, even though we would plan for a very modest appropriation for the first two or three years in such a project.

Incidentally, I am anxious to see, within the Defense Department, some little increase in appropriations for the Air and Continental Defense, even though we may make considerable over-all savings in that Department.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget - 2.

These things I tell you merely to try to give you some line on my thinking with respect to policy and the current budget. It is essential that we understand each other very clearly, because necessarily you must act as my authoritative agent in working on these problems. While, of course, each Department head always has direct access to me, I think it vastly important that if any appeal from your decisions is made, that you must be present at that time -- and even more important, that you and I approach these problems so definitely from the same viewpoint that the occasion for such appeals will be minimized.

I like your suggestion that you come to see me periodically during the course of the budget's preparation -- we can always squeeze in an opportunity to talk about it.

Thank you very much for your memorandum of the fifth. I am keeping the attachments, but returning that part of it which describes your approach to the 1955 budget proposals with an indication of my approval.

D.D.E.



November 4, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL



I refer again to a message I had some time ago from Arthur Sulzberger and which I referred to you for comment by J. Edgar Hoover. The reason for suggesting re-study of this case is that Mr. Hoover obviously answered under the misapprehension that I was concerned with Communists. I am in full agreement with what he says about anyone who is now or who has ever been a Communist.

The Communists are a class set apart by themselves. Indeed, I think they are such liars and cheats that even when they apparently recant and later testify against someone else for his Communist convictions, my first reaction is to believe that the accused person must be a patriot or he wouldn't have incurred the enmity of such people. So even when these "reformed" Communists have proved useful in helping us track down some of their old associates, I certainly look for corroborating evidence before I feel too easy in my mind about it.

The object of my concern is not a Communist -- he is another individual entirely. He -- or she -- is the younger person who in the late thirties and early forties was inclined toward leftish thinking, and particularly toward giving expression to his sympathy for the Soviets. This individual may have done this through joining organizations that later came to be classified as subversive, or in any number of other ways.

Let us remember this. Many prominent officials of the Allied Governments were at that time talking in terms of support of the Soviets; witness Winston Churchill's comment when the Soviets came into the war on the allied side. In Washington there was much of the same. In fact, starting in December 1941, it was a policy of our government

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL - 2.



to foster friendship with the Soviets. So the individual of whom I am speaking (who must have depended on people high in government for information and judgment) could very easily and very honestly have said many things that today would indicate or imply an unjustified support of Communism.

I assume, then, that any American could have been excused for statements or actions favorable to the Soviets during the war and even as late as 1948.

But I also believe that anyone who, after the blockade of Berlin began, (or some other equally revealing incident), continued to speak in support of the Soviets or in terms of sympathy for them, is either very stupid or very dangerous.

All this points up to this one thing -- the finding of some formula that could be applied to cases of individuals who have never been Communists, but who did in earlier years speak favorably of the Soviets, and who now, as teachers, preachers, professional people of all sorts, or workers in non-sensitive positions of government, may feel themselves under suspicion and are consequently living in doubt and fear.

So the original question to which I sought an answer was, "Could we not choose some specific act of the Soviets that left no doubt as to their intentions with respect to the free world, and let that moment of time normally be decisive in forming current judgments as to the real leanings, sympathies, and thinking of an American who has during his lifetime shown some sympathy for these leftist or Communist causes?"

I realize that a thing like this is very difficult to answer in specific fashion and with a categorical "Yes" or "No". I also know that no "formula" could be considered infallible. But I am sending you here-with my little file on this subject, with the request that you and Mr. Hoover look it over once more, with the thought that some day soon the three of us might have lunch together and chat over the whole thing.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL - 3.

From this rambling, vague sort of paper, you can see that my mind is far from made up -- but I repeat that we must search out some positive way to put ourselves on the side of individual right and liberty as well as on the side of fighting Communism to the death. We might decide that this is a matter on which I or someone else should make a speech. We might decide that we needed to bring in two or three outstanding individuals of the caliber of Learned Hand to help us devise a policy or "formula."

If you consider that there is no value in this suggestion whatsoever, then don't take up Mr. Hoover's time in asking him to consider it again; but if he does study it, then won't you please set up with Tom Stephens a lunch date here at the White House?



D.D.E.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DDE
12/10/53

SPEECH BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS

On the 8th of December I delivered my second major speech in the field of foreign relations, this time before the UN. The first one was delivered on April 16th last before the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

There has been much speculation on what I was trying to do in a talk that dealt principally with the field of atomic energy and atomic warfare and made definite proposals for international action in promoting the peaceful use of atomic science and materials.

The reasons were several. Of these the first and principal one was exactly as stated -- to make a clear effort to get the Soviet Union working with us in some phase of this whole atomic field that would have only peace and the good of mankind as a goal. ¶ (b). If we were successful in getting even the tiniest of starts, it was believed that gradually this kind of talk and negotiation might expand into something broader -- that at least a faint possibility existed that Russia's concern, bordering upon fright, of the certain results of atomic warfare might lead her, in her own self interests, to participate in this kind of joint humanitarian effort. ¶ (c). Another important objective was to call the attention of the small nations of the world that they likewise had an interest in the uses to which

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UN SPEECH - 2.

the world would put its limited available supply of raw material, out of which the atomic bomb is made.

Too many of these small nations have looked upon this matter as one of concern only to the USSR and to the US -- except, of course, as some of them felt that they would be certain targets in the event of atomic warfare breaking out.



The hope of the talk was to awaken in these small nations an understanding that there were steadily opening up new and promising opportunities for using these materials and these skills to the benefit rather than to the destruction of men. Thus it was hoped to help build up a world opinion for turning ^{attention} toward these constructive purposes.

(d). Another reason was that even in the event that the USSR would cooperate in such a plan for "propaganda purposes" that the US could unquestionably afford to reduce its atomic stock pile by two or three times the amounts that the Russians might contribute to the UN Agency, and still improve our relative position in the cold war and even in the event of the outbreak of war.

(e). Another important reason was to give the population of our country the feeling -- the certain knowledge -- that they had not poured their substance into this whole development with the sole purpose and

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UN SPEECH

possibility of its being used for destruction. This effort also gave the opportunity to tell America and the world a very considerable story about the size and strength of our atomic capabilities, but to do it in such a way as to make this presentation an argument for peaceful negotiation rather than to present it in an atmosphere of truculence, defiance and threat.

Underlying all of this, of course, is the clear conviction that as of now the world is racing toward catastrophe -- that something must be done to put a brake on this moment. Certainly there is none so foolish as to think that the brake can be composed only of words and protestations, however eloquent or sincere. But ideas expressed in words must certainly have a function in getting people here and elsewhere thinking along these lines and helping to devise ways and means by which the possible disaster of the future can be avoided.

* * * * *

~~TOP SECRET~~



December 24, 1953.

Personal and Confidential

Dear Swede:

Your most recent letter to me was written on November twenty-sixth, more than a week before I went to Bermuda. The period has been one of the busiest of my life; but, though at times I have felt almost at the point of exhaustion, there have still been moments of real satisfaction that have made all the rest of it seem worthwhile.

I shall not attempt to give you a personal diary covering the past three weeks. I cannot set down in chronological order all of the ideas, actions and impulses that have been part of the innumerable conferences, meetings and discussions that have, at times, seemed to be never ending. But introductions and alibis will get me no further along. So without further ado, I shall try to give you a decently coherent account of the things that come immediately to memory.

First in order would be the Bermuda meeting. With respect to that trip, my initial observation is that it provides a good example of how useless it is to tell the full truth to the press -- at least when the representatives of that estate want to believe otherwise. On two occasions I informed the individuals at White House press conferences that there was no purpose of the Bermuda meeting that could be defined in terms of agreements sought or arrangements to be definitely fixed. I told them that the purpose was purely that of meeting in an informal way with friends in order that we could discuss together our common interests in various portions of the globe and compare our approaches to the problems that confront us daily. I warned that there would be no agenda -- an error of omission was that I failed to say there would be no "final communique."

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As a result of that failure, all other officials at the conference, influenced by routine and custom, and needled by some two hundred press, radio, television and newsreel representatives, spent a great deal of time on the exact wording of a final, "combined" statement. It bored me immeasurably and struck me as typifying futility. When people get to arguing heatedly over such details, I inevitably recall the old saying "picking nits with boxing gloves."

In spite of this frustrating item, the meeting as a whole was productive, especially in providing opportunity for necessary conversations with the British. This was not as true in the case of the French because of the known certainty that this particular French government would not be of long life.

At times Winston seemed to be his old and hearty self, full of vim and determination. At others he seemed almost to wander in his mind. I must confess that occasionally I suspected this latter was almost a deliberately adopted mannerism rather than an involuntary habit. At least it seemed to come over him only when the subject under discussion or the argument presented was distasteful to him.

The French situation, currently symbolized by their almost futile effort to elect a President, was clearly felt also at Bermuda. The answers were always "Yes, but" or "No, unless."

Actually, France's situation is merely symptomatic of what is happening to the entire world. There is the extreme Right. In France these people are the deGaullists, while in the world scene they are Fascist dictatorships, largely found now in Spanish-speaking or in the Arab countries.

There is the extreme Left, in France and in the world, Communistic.

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In between these two extremes is a vast center group which in basic beliefs has much in common, and, for this reason, should be a closely knit organization. In point of fact this vast center or "Middle of the Road" group prefers to shut its eyes to the dangers represented in the extremes -- in the current state of affairs, the only threatening extreme is Communism. The group of nations of which this center is constituted constantly indulge in all kinds of divisive arguments and name-calling that grow so important in their cumulative effect as to nullify any attempt toward unity in working against the common enemy.

So -- just as the French cannot agree upon firm policies respecting the prosecution of the Indo-China war nor decide what they want to do with respect to EDC, we find that the world cannot agree on basic policies concerning trade with the Communists, firming up cooperative plans that would permit us all to advance economically and politically, nor even decide how we can best protect ourselves along the sensitive European front.

India would rather see Pakistan weak and helpless in front of a Russian threat than to see that country grow strong enough to give substance to its hope of annexing Kashmir. France would rather see Germany weak and helpless in Europe than to see that country strong enough to serve as an effective bar against possible Russian invasion. In the latter event, France is fearful that German strength might again be used against her. Of course to us this particular fear seems senseless, in view of our guarantees that no country admitted into the combined European defensive system would be allowed to attack another.

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There is no use belaboring the point nor pursuing the analogy too far. The fact is, however, that while we get almost disgusted with the picture that France currently presents, we need only to look at the rest of the world -- indeed to ourselves -- to see many points of similarity.

I think I have digressed sufficiently far from Bermuda that I should come back there just long enough to say that I left the Islands one morning, flew to New York, and that afternoon made a talk to the UN.



That particular talk had been evolving in our minds and plans for many weeks. Quite a while ago I began to search around for any kind of an idea that could bring the world to look at the atomic problem in a broad and intelligent way and still escape the impasse to action created by Russian intransigence in the matter of mutual or neutral inspection of resources. I wanted, additionally, to give our people and the world some faint idea of the size of the distance already travelled by this new science -- but to do it in such a way as not to create new alarm.

One day I hit upon the idea of actual physical donations by Russia and the United States -- with Britain also in the picture in a minor way -- and to develop this thought in such a way as to provide at the very least a calm and reasonable atmosphere in which the whole matter could again be jointly studied. Once the decision was taken to propose such a plan in some form, the whole problem became one of treatment, choice of time, place and circumstance, and the niceties of language. I had, of course, a lot of excellent help -- but I personally put on the text a tremendous amount of time.

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Throughout the friendly world reactions have been good; our official messages have been much like the public statements you have seen in the press. The Soviets have now, at last, moved toward a meeting, though not without their customary grumbling, griping, and some sneering. We will see now what the next step brings forth! But all in all I believe that the effort up to this point has been well worth while, and has done something to create a somewhat better atmosphere both at home and abroad.



A week after finishing the UN talk, my Cabinet and I had to be ready to meet the Republican legislative leaders and go over with them the legislative program we had prepared during these past months. We knew exactly where we wanted to go in the matter of principle and we were quite sure of the basic direction that we would take in each of the several important fields that together would make up an entire program. But it was very necessary to get together with the legislative leaders for several purposes:


- (a). To gather from the legislative leaders their impressions of the sentiment of the country, compare their reactions with ours, and thus arrive at an order of precedence or priority in the presentation of the program.
- (b). Under the principles and purposes laid out by the Administration, to work out applicable legislative methods, as well as modifying small details to add to the attractiveness or popularity of the particular program.
- (c). To renew the habit of cooperative effort between the Executive and Legislative Departments.

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(d). To bring out that the Republican Party, headed by the President, had reached that point where a combined, concerted effort to put over a progressive, enlightened legislative program was mandatory!



It is, of course, necessary for all to understand that success will lead to continuing governmental responsibility. Failure would lead to an adverse result which would be exactly what was deserved in the circumstances. Since the President, under our system, must take the lead in the presentation of such programs, the simple truth is that the mass of Republican and independent supporters have got to be behind the Administration -- or else.

The meetings were on the whole successful -- so far as we can determine -- far beyond our expectations. Of course only the stress of actual Congressional debate and voting will tell the final story, but I am hopeful.

I do not mean by any of the above that mere partisan Republican support is, under the existing circumstances in Congress, sufficient to the success of a legislative program. We have got to have the support of reasonable and enlightened Democrats and I shall certainly do all I can to deserve that support and to act, personally, in such a way as to encourage the Democrats to give it to us.

When last Saturday night arrived and the three days of conferences, luncheon meetings and arguments had become history, I was so weary and tired that I doubt that I could have spoken pleasantly to my best friend. However, I did have the distinct feeling that we could look forward to truly intelligent and cooperative work in both Executive and Legislative branches during the next session of the Congress. If that comes about, I will, a few months later, be reaching the halfway mark in my political career with some sense of real accomplishment, to say nothing of legitimate reason to hope that improvement and progress will characterize our country and the world during the approximate future.

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I started this letter in the hope and the belief that it would really be informative. I have just glanced through what I finished yesterday and find that it is almost a dud, especially for one who makes a habit of reading the daily papers. In an effort to include a piece of news -- but after all it will not be news to you -- I shall tell you what would be classed as "Secret Intentions." It involves 1956, and January 20, 1957. With respect to the political campaign of '56, my position will be exactly as I determined it would be when finally I gave way in '52 to the convictions and arguments of some of my friends. I shall never again be a candidate for anything, and I so told my friends two years ago. This determination is a fixed decision (subject to modification only in the case of some world-wide cataclysm that I cannot now foresee and which would make political change at such a moment almost catastrophic for our country). Of course I realize that American politics demands that a President keep his intentions secret in this regard; otherwise, it is assumed his whole influence on the political scene would disappear and he could not possibly lead in the development of a legislative program. So, for the moment, I shall observe this so-called political axiom, but this will certainly in no way affect my intentions!

Meanwhile, I am doing my part to make certain that the policies in which I firmly believe will have younger and abler champions when I step off the stage. As I have more than once told you, the man who, from the standpoint of knowledge of human and governmental affairs, persuasiveness in speech and dedication to our country, would make the best President I can think of is my young brother, Milton. Under no circumstances would I ever say this publicly because, in the first place, I do not think he is physically strong enough to take the beating. In the second place, any effort to make him the candidate in 1956 would properly be resented by our people. So he is out so far as I am concerned. Anyway, I am certain that such a thought has never crossed his mind and, if it ever did, he would reach the same obvious conclusion that I have just stated.

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But here are some names of people that I am constantly trying to keep in the public eye so as to let the American people know more and more about them. Each is able, clean and energetic, and also important, relatively young. Each is a good executive -- and would certainly have my support -- if, at that time, my support would be helpful. Lodge, Nixon, Brownell, Stassen, Rogers, Stevens, and one or two others in the Executive Department. In Congress, Charlie Halleck is a standout, and along with him there are a number of young men developing who could easily become headliners before 1956. They include Potter, Goldwater, possibly Knowland and others.

All I am saying here is that, far from trying to keep young men out of the spotlight, it is my hope to push them into it and so have ready a group of young men who are not only able but who will have the publicity value that a political party always seeks in its candidate.

Of course I have no fear that you will ever reveal this information to anyone -- but I want you personally to have it so that if a time ever comes when you see me even appearing to waver from strict adherence to this pledge -- you are to take drastic steps to see that I do not become more of a damned fool than I was in '52.

Merry Christmas and Happy New Year to Ibbey and your nice family.

As ever,

~~DE~~ Ike

Captain E. E. Hazlett
109 Boundary Street
Chapel Hill
North Carolina

December 10, 1953.

Personal and Confidential

Dear Emmet:

I cannot remember when any letter has intrigued me as much as yours of December first. Even after making all the allowances for the over-generosity springing from your friendship, I still found a lot in it that seemed to me objective, logical and reasonable.

There is no need to describe for you the conditions that prevent my preparation of the kind of answer that such a letter deserves. But in spite of the paucity of leisure in which to ponder a reply to your words, I think I shall first indulge in a digression from a logical main theme in the hope that it will describe the kind of approach in which I believe. Please read the entire letter before you draw the erroneous conclusion that the story immediately following has any application to your comments.

On December 12, 1941, I was called to the War Department and given a task that had much to do with the concentration of our troops -- ground and air -- to utilize them for various projects throughout the world. Within a surprisingly short time after the beginning of the war, well-meaning people were springing up all over the country to urge "action." It was un-American to be passive under attack; it was shameful that we had apparently deserted the Bataan garrison to its fate; it was unthinkable that the Germans could come over to our Florida coast line and sink our tankers within sight of our shores; it was criminal that the War Department was allowing our cities to be exposed to attack by clandestine bombing which could come from Iceland or the Hudson Bay or a submarine. In short, it was implied that while the people occupying the responsible directive positions in our armed services were probably not traitors or really criminal, it was obvious that they were too deliberate, too cautious, too fearful to be mentioned in the same breath with the red-blooded writers of these various exhortations and diatribes.

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Actually the time had to be used, and was used effectively, to build the teams of leadership and of combat units necessary to win the war. At the same time there was fought a series of delaying and reconnoitering secondary and probing actions by land, sea and air.



This story was repeated in slightly different terms and tones after I landed in London in June of '42. Our first attack could not be made until November of that year, and even then it was not one that was intended to involve and employ all of the magnificent forces that America was then building and which Great Britain had already built.

After our first landing in Africa, the old chatter of "inaction" soon built up again. My staff urged that I personalize the operation by calling it "Eisenhower's Headquarters." They wanted me out in the open with statements and all kinds of gestures and postures, in all of which I refused to participate. I was too busy working at the job of creating an effective staff, finding and training subordinate commanders, and developing the skill and morale and material strength of units.

When we finally captured the last Italian and German forces in Italy in the following May, great joy swept over the allied world and the allied commanders were heroes, far-seeing soldiers, virtual supermen.

It was all of two or three weeks before the old anvil chorus got again into full play; in fact we were lucky to have the chance to take the little island of Pantelleria, which stilled the chorus long enough for us to get off our attack against Sicily in July. But that campaign was only days old when the "red blooded" Americans were again showing their disdain for commanders in the field.

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The story was repeated in Italy and reached new heights during the spring months following my January return to Britain. That was in 1944, when I went back to prepare the Overlord Operation. The development of new staffs and teams, the job of planning, of accumulation of forces and supplies -- all the thousands of things that must be done in managing an intricate human operation -- was not finished until early June. By that moment I had long since learned to avoid reading the newspapers. They stormed that success had gone to my head and I was not ready to risk my phony reputation on the outcome of the great battle that now alone could defeat the Germans and save democracy -- the battle on the shores of northwest Europe.

I learned one lesson through all these many months and many experiences. It is that in war there is scarcely any difficulty that a good resounding victory will not cure -- temporarily. And I learned that there is a priority of procedure in the preparing for and carrying forward great tasks that the leader ignores at his peril. People close to a respected or liked commander fear he is losing his stature and urge the "squelching" of a Montgomery or a Bradley or a Patton; the seizing of the limelight in order to personalize the whole campaign for the troops and the public. But obviously in the hurly burly of a military campaign -- or a political effort -- loyal, effective subordinates are mandatory. To tie them to the leader with unbreakable bonds one rule must always be observed -- Take full responsibility, promptly, for everything that remotely resembles failure -- give extravagant and public praise to all subordinates for every success.

The method is slow -- but its results endure!!

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Personal and Confidential

Not for one moment am I classing your constructive comments with the kind of never-ending columnist criticism that bears a startling familiarity to the kind of military castigation that I learned to ignore in wartime. What I am drawing attention to is that much of our so-called "public opinion" is merely a reflection of some commentator's reports which, as you so well know, bear little relation to the truth. By the same token, I believe that public opinion based on such flimsy foundations can be changed rapidly; and I agree with you most heartily that it must be changed by deeds.

This brings us to the discussion of methods necessary to assure accomplishment.

One man can do a lot -- he can especially do a lot at any particular given moment, if at that moment he happens to be ranking high in the public estimation. By this I mean if at that moment he is dwelling in the ivory tower and not in the dog house.



But in our complicated political system, even with such an individual standing, success is going to be measured, over the long term, by the skill with which the leader builds a strong team around him.

It seems scarcely necessary to recite to you the rather discouraging conditions that existed last January. The old-time leaders of the winning party heaved such a great sigh of relief, when they imagined themselves again free to dip their arms to the elbows in the patronage trough, that it was difficult indeed to get them to listen to any word that did not include "appointment or nomination." They did not look upon the results of the election as the threshold of opportunity; rather it was the end of a long and searing drought, and they were at least revelling again in luxurious patronage.

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A team of leaders is made up of people who believe in certain things -- often simple things -- very deeply. This consolidation of intellectual approach to the Administration's problems has been going on in the Cabinet and on the Hill for almost a year. It would have been fantastic to suppose that such people as Foster Dulles, Oveta Hobby, Herbert Brownell, Harold Stassen and Ezra Benson -- each extremely able in his own right -- should have been so close in their thinking on every critical question that they would automatically, on first meeting, begin to work together smoothly and efficiently as a single team.

This morning we examined in the Cabinet meeting the plans of the Federal Housing Administrator for expanded activity in the business of providing housing of decent standards for every American citizen. We likewise examined the plans that the Secretary of Labor intends to bring forward for a vast expansion in unemployment insurance. After the meeting was over, it happened that George Humphrey dropped into my office. His face fairly glowed as he talked about the possibilities that were unfolding in these great humanitarian directions.



Of course you will instantly say that George Humphrey has always been a great human. To this, of course, I agree, but I must point out that he has not been in this kind of business and his instinct, just as mine, is toward a great belief in self-dependence. Since his official job is to save money and balance the budget and cut taxes, you would think that his first reaction to these particular problems would be adverse.

This is one small example to show you that I believe the right kind of team is evolving and that things will be done which will not only be classed as effective programs for the benefit of the plain citizen,

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but which will operate in such a way as to gain the respect even of those who too often in the past have opposed such measures.

I could expand this kind of explanation into personal terms; I could talk about literally hundreds of individuals with whom I have discussed policy and its application. I have said enough to show you what I think I am trying to do.

I fully recognize that the responsibility is mine. Occasionally I must go on the air to let the people have direct knowledge of the important and comprehensive programs that are in the mill. But I also take the responsibility for producing a legislative-executive team that will not be too dependent upon the mere presence, words, or even the counsel of the chief, but which will, because of its complete solidarity of faith in ideas and ideals, be capable of functioning both collectively and in all of its parts. If I cannot do this, there is no question that the entire effort I have put into the political game has been wasted, and it would have been far better had I never been put into this office.

On the other hand, if I am successful, that success will have a permanence that will be far greater than if it were traceable in the public mind and in fact only to an individual.

Thanks again —
Sincerely
DE



November 20, 1954.

A resume of my conversation with Lucius Clay, held November 18, 1954. (One copy of this material is filed in Confidential file under Clay, the other in Diary of this date).

A drive to force from me a commitment that I will be a candidate for the Presidency in 1956 has suddenly developed into a full-blown campaign. For some time, even extending back for some months before the 1954 elections, I have had numerous hints, inquiries, suggestions and obdurations, all designed to get me to express myself definitely and favorably on this point.

Clay approached the matter circumspectly and even in round-about fashion, but when he once got on to the real purpose of his visit, he pursued his usual tactics, aimed at overpowering all opposition and at settling the matter without further question.


Incidentally, the Clay approach was interesting; it was on the question of my health. There is a feeling, he said, among my friends that General Snyder, being 73 or 74 years old, is really not capable of providing the medical care and advice that a President of the United States should have. After making certain suggestions as to what I should do in this matter, it came out that he was interested not only in my health at the moment and for the next two years, but on beyond that date.

The next step in the proposition is that the Republican Party must be completely reformed and revitalized into an "Eisenhower Republican Party." While I do not like this name, nevertheless the idea he has is correct. The Republican Party must be known as a progressive organization or it is sunk. I believe this so emphatically that I think that far from appeasing or reasoning with the died-in-the-wool reactionary fringe, we should completely ignore it and when necessary, repudiate it. I refer to the kind of person and thinking that

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12/20/54 - 2.

that is represented by Robert Wood, Fred Hartley, several of our old generals, two of whom are my classmates, Malone, McCarthy, and Bertie McCormick. The political strength that these people could generate in the United States could not elect a man who was committed to giving away \$20 gold pieces to every citizen in the United States for each day of the calendar year! But entirely aside from their political significance is the fact that their thinking is completely uncoordinated with the times in which we live. With them labor is merely an item in their cost sheets, and labor is guilty of effrontery when it questions the wisdom or authenticity of any statement of management or of financiers. They are isolations who believe that the United States alone could live and prosper in a world gone Communist -- in which belief they are the most ignorant people now living in the United States. (Possibly I should have taken in more territory!).



Clay says that he belongs to a group, many of whom were involved in the successful effort to get me nominated in July of '52, whose present purpose is to do several things:

- (a). Bring about this rejuvenation of the Republican Party, beginning both at the top and at the grass roots level.
- (b). Find and provide the money to keep this kind of effort on the rails.
- (c). To watch closely the reform in the Republican Party so as to make certain that in every area we have fine,

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11/20/54 - 3.

young, precinct, county and state chairmen, and the same kind of candidates for public office. In doing this particular work, they would serve as sort of an advisory committee for Len Hall. Likewise, they would try to work effectively in stirring up interest at the grass roots level so that the entire organization would be highly effective and in each case would be in the hands of these forward-looking, dynamic people of whom I speak.

- (d). Undertake to provide a better publicity program in support of the "Eisenhower" program.
- (e). Elect me as President in 1956.



Now, of course, anyone who is so interested as I am in establishing moderate government in this nation cannot possibly object to the non-personal parts of this program. Since the men who are associated with Clay both in and out of government are committed to opposing the efforts both of the reactionaries on the one side and the ADA's (represented by Senators Douglas and Humphrey, Brannan, Carroll, Truman, Stevenson and Mitchell), it is clear that their efforts would be directed exactly along the lines in which I firmly believe. In fact, I think that unless the population of the United States is given an opportunity to embrace this kind of government, that eventually we are going to lose much of the

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individual liberty, initiative and rights that we now enjoy.

I tried to make Clay see that what we must all do is to work for this kind of idea, principle or doctrine. I admitted that it was probably easier to personalize such an effort and therefore to use my name as an adjective in describing it. But I pointed out that if we focused the whole effort on me as an individual, then it would follow that in the event of my disability or death, the whole effort would collapse. This, I pointed out, was absurd. The idea is far bigger than any one individual.

Here is where we parted company.



Clay said, "I am ready to work for you at whatever sacrifice to myself because I believe in you. I am not ready to work for anybody else that you can name."

I argued and reiterated again that this was not "working for any individual. If anyone wanted to work for me in a personal sense, they would work for my opportunity to go golfing, shooting, fishing and loafing, until there overcome s me the urge once more to go to work. Against this kind of argument, he insisted that he did not mean working for me in the personal sense; but he also insisted that he and his friends needed now the assurance that I would not "pull the rug out from under them." This is exactly the phrase they used on me in 1951, and I well know how such a foot in the door can be expanded until someone has taken possession of your whole house.


SECRET

11/20/54 - 5.

This whole group has always played upon my sense of duty. All that an individual has to say to me is "the good of the country" and even where I am involved in things that I dislike and even resent, I probably yield far too easily to generalizations instead of demanding proof of their assertions.

I pointed this out to him and insisted that while I hoped that I would always make every decision based on what I believed to be for the good of the country, yet I carefully warned him that his idea of what is good for the country and my idea -- at least so far as it involved my personal participation -- could differ widely indeed.

There seems little reason for me to set down here again all of the considerations that in a normal case would argue against my running again for the Presidency. I think I have put them in letters to friends, which are probably of record in my files. But a few of them, stated without any attempt at argument, are:



- (a). Age, and the greater likelihood that a man of 70 will break down under a load than a man of 50.
- (b). The need for younger men in positions of the highest responsibility so as to symbolize the youth, vigor and virility of the Republican Party.
- (c). The growing severity and complexity of problems that rest upon the President for solution.

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11/20/54 - 6.

(d). The old political truism that Presidents lose much of their political effectiveness the instant that they announce they will not again be candidates for office. (This is important because of the Constitutional amendment that now prohibits more than two terms to any President. Consequently from the first day of a second term, a President's own party would presumably be more interested in trying to name their next candidate than in carrying out their particular program.) Incidentally, I have never been convinced that the President can lose his influence as easily as this, but since it is sort of an accepted conviction in American political life, it becomes important in this argument.

All this we went over time and again, but Clay was not convinced. On the other hand, he had to be satisfied with my simple statement that when the time came I would decide on what I thought was best for the country, and the mere fact that my decision might not agree with theirs could not be fairly taken as any evidence that I was "running out" on my friends or playing false with anybody.

I don't think that this completely satisfied him, but he would be even less satisfied if I just flatly gave him my convictions as of this moment, which would be wholly adverse. However, I think I am still fair enough to say that I think certain types of emergencies could alter what now appears to be fixed decisions.

July 22, 1954.

EYES ONLY - TOP SECRET

Dear Winston

I have been thinking over some of the conversations we had during your recent visit, particularly those dealing with our joint pronouncement on the principles and purposes which will guide our international behavior. I have in mind also your confidential statement that within a reasonable time you want to shift the responsibility of the Premiership to other shoulders -- one reason being that you wish to give to your successor a chance to establish himself politically before the next elections.

Considering these two matters together, I am certain that you must have a very deep and understandable desire to do something special and additional in your remaining period of active service that will be forever recognized as a milestone in the world's tortuous progress toward a just and lasting peace. Nothing else could provide such a fitting climax to your long and brilliant service to your sovereign, your country and the world.



I am sure that some such thought of your conscious or subconscious mind must be responsible for your desire to meet Malenkov and to explore, so far as is possible, the purposes of his heart and the designs of his brain.

As you know, while I have not been able to bring myself to believe wholeheartedly in the venture, I most earnestly pray that you may develop something good out of what seems to me the bleakest of prospects. This I say not primarily because of my deep affection and respect for an old and valued friend and

EYES ONLY - TOP SECRET

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BY DJH DATE 9/24/85

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The Prime Minister - 2.

the satisfaction I would take in such a personal triumph of yours, but because the world so desperately needs to be strengthened in hope and faith and confidence that anyone who would not pray for the success of your venture would indeed be wicked.

Having said this, I must also say that because of my utter lack of confidence in the reliability and integrity of the men in the Kremlin and my feeling that you may be disappointed in your present hopes, my mind has been turning toward an exploration of other possibilities by which you could still give to the world something inspiring before you lay down your official responsibilities. It should be something that would so well serve the cause in which we believe that it would indeed be considered one of your finest contributions.

Another factor to be considered is that in far too many areas the Kremlin is pre-empting the right to speak for the small nations of the world. We are falsely pictured as the exploiters of people, the Soviets as their champion.

I suggest to you a thoughtful speech on the subject of the rights to self-government, so vigorously supported in our recent joint communique.

At first glance, this seems a thorny nettle to grasp. But I believe that by looking closely we can find that this is not necessarily so.

In our conversations, we agreed that in a number of areas people are not yet ready for self-rule and that any attempt to make them now responsible for their own governing would be to condemn them to lowered standards of life and probably to communistic domination. At the same time

EYES ONLY - TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY - TOP SECRET

The Prime Minister - 3.

time, we must never allow the world to believe that we are ready to abandon our stated purposes merely because of this obvious, negative, truth.

Colonialism is on the way out as a relationship among peoples. The sole question is one of time and method. I think we should handle it so as to win adherents to Western aims.

We know that there is abroad in the world a fierce and growing spirit of nationalism. Should we try to dam it up completely, it would, like a mighty river, burst through the barriers and could create havoc. But again, like a river, if we are intelligent enough to make constructive use of this force, then the result, far from being disastrous, could redound greatly to our advantage, particularly in our struggle against the Kremlin's power.

To make use of the spirit of nationalism, we must show for it a genuine sympathy; we must prove that the obstacles that now prevent self-government in certain regions genuinely concern the free world and engage our earnest purpose to work for their elimination. This you and I stated in our joint communique. But to make it a real and vital thing in the lives of so many peoples throughout the world, we ought, I think, to make the whole matter a subject of more detailed explanation both as to objectives and as to methods for attaining them.

A speech on the matter -- and no other could so well do it as you -- should deal with the need for education and announce the cooperative purpose of great nations in the Western World to bring educational opportunities to all peoples we are able to reach.

EYES ONLY - TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY - TOP SECRET

The Prime Minister - 4.

The talk would not, of course, ignore the economic requirements of independent existence and would certainly dwell at length upon the advantages of voluntary agreements and associations in order to promote the freest and most fruitful kind of commerce. There would have to be discussed the burdensome responsibilities of self-rule; internal and external security; proper systems for the administration of justice; the promotion of health and the general welfare.

Finally, it seems to me that such a talk should announce a specific hope or aim in terms of the time limit for the attainment of announced objectives. Possibly it might be said that our two nations plan to undertake every kind of applicable program to insure that within a space of twenty-five years (or by some other agreed upon, definite, date), all peoples will have achieved the necessary political, cultural and economic standards to permit the attainment of their goals.

If you could then say that twenty-five years from now, every last one of the colonies (excepting military bases) should have been offered a right to self-government and determination, you would electrify the world. More than this, you could be certain that not a single one of them would, when the time came, take advantage of the offer of independence. Each would cling more tightly to the mother country and be a more valuable part thereof.

Equally important with this particular announcement would be the outline of the program we propose jointly to undertake to help these nations achieve this level of progress.

EYES ONLY - TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY - TOP SECRET

The Prime Minister - 5.

The kind of talk that I am thinking of would seek to put this whole matter in such a light as to gain us friends -- to be positive rather than negative. The attitude should be that we recognize great difficulties, some of which will take time to overcome, but that we know the job can be done.

Of course, in developing such a subject, one would want to contrast, if only by passing reference, this great purpose and development with the practice of the communists in Eastern Europe and wherever their evil power reaches. A good bit of cold war campaigning could be carried on in such a talk without ever making that particular objective an obvious one. For the same reason, reference could be made again to the plan for making nuclear science serve the peaceful interests of all nations, particularly in those areas where people are starved for adequate power.

I long to find a theme which is dynamic and gripping, and which our two countries can espouse together. In this way, we can exercise the world leadership to which the communists aspire. Also by working together for concrete constructive goals, we can cement our relationship in a way which is only possible if there is fellowship in deeds. We found that fellowship in war, and we must equally try to find it in peace.

The theme I outline seems to me to be the one which best fills the need. It is, however, not a theme which the United States can develop alone without seeming to put the United States into opposition to Britain, which is the very result we do not want. Therefore, I bespeak your cooperation and indeed your initiative in opening what could be a great new chapter in history.

EYES ONLY - TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY - TOP SECRET

The Prime Minister - 6.

It seems to me that to say anything more in this letter would merely be repetitive or redundant. I am sending this through the mails rather than by cable because I want no other to see it except you and me.

With warm personal regard,

As ever

Ike



The Rt. Hon.
Sir Winston Churchill,
K.G., O.M., C.H., M.P.
The Prime Minister,
London.

EYES ONLY - TOP SECRET

July 20, 1954.

Personal and Confidential

Dear Chyn:

In the middle of your letter you said you would be specific. But except for a hasty reference to "social security" you did not do so.

Perhaps a life such as I lead tends to place too high a value on opinions and recommendations directed toward specific projects. I have no doubt that being a bit on the pragmatic side by inclination, I possibly become more so as I find my day absorbed by conferences, discussions, arguments, and even connivance -- all of which are directed at some specific item of governmental purpose or effort.

You used the term "radical Republican" but you didn't define it. You call Lincoln a radical, but every bit of reading I have done on his life convinces me that in many ways he was the greatest compromiser and the most astute master of expediency that we have known. Now, of course, this agrees with my definition of "radical" but from what I can gather from reading your letter, not with yours. I believe that the true radical is the fellow who is standing in the middle and battling both extremes.

You decry the teachings of Rousseau and I must say that I share your dislike for the man's writings, although obviously I have not read him as deeply or thoroughly as you have. I waded through his initial essay, called, I think, "Origin of Inequalities Among Men," and read also through the six books on "The Social Contract."

Personal and Confidential

Personal and Confidential

General Chynoweth - 2.

To me it is useless to read about Rousseau unless first you read something of his life. He seems to me to be a bundle of contradictions -- a sort of frustrated man who was constantly changing professions and localities through fear or similar motive; but who discovered that he had a considerable facility in dealing with abstractions.

He read a number of ancient philosophers and historians and from this reading began to picture "the world as it ought to be."

While I never thought about it before, it is entirely possible that his writings have had a far greater influence with our so-called "intelligensia" than would seem reasonable. By the way, did you ever hear that definition of a member of the intelligensia that runs, "One who uses more words than necessary to tell more than he knows."

In any event, I have to deal with the tax system and how the government can derive from the economy the needed revenue, yet doing the least damage to that economy. I have to battle people who want to run the government without appearing to be taxing the great mass of the voters.

I have to deal with the TVA and with the people who believe that any attempt to place a limit on the responsibility of the Federal government in building additional power plants in the Tennessee Valley is reactionary, if not criminal. I have to fight against people who want to increase price supports for farm products, but who have no plan for managing the resulting surpluses except, I suppose, dumping them in the ocean.

Personal and Confidential

Personal and Confidential

General Chynoweth - 3.

I have to combat those who want every wage adjustment in the huge Federal services to be on a flat, across-the-board, basis. This worship of the mediocre pervades everything. It is a potent influence because it appeals to the most voters.

In my former letter, I think I must have misused the word "security" when I referred to the existence of free land in the 19th century. Of course that land did not necessarily mean security of body, but it did constitute a reserve of hope. I find myself in enthusiastic agreement with your rebellion against the reduction of every value, every incentive to the materialistic. If man is only an educated mule, we should eliminate him and turn the earth back to the birds and the fishes and the monkeys.

But the very fact that man is a spiritual thing makes it impossible for any durable governmental system to ignore hordes of people who through no fault of their own suddenly find themselves poverty stricken, and far from being able to maintain their families at decent levels, cannot even provide sustenance. Mass production has wrought great things in the world, but it has created social problems that cannot be possibly met under ideas that were probably logical and sufficient in 1800.

What I mean by the "Middle of the Road" is that course that preserves the greatest possible initiative, freedom and independence of soul and body to the individual, but that

Personal and Confidential

Personal and Confidential

General Chynoweth - 4.

does not hesitate to use government to combat
cataclysmic economic disasters which can, in
some instances, be even more terrible than con-
vulsions of nature.

As ever,



Brigadier General Bradford G. Chynoweth,
832 San Luis Road,
Berkeley 7,
California.

Personal and Confidential

In two more days I complete my first year as President. As I look back on my hopes of a year ago, I have mixed feelings. In some instances progress has been greater, associations more agreeable, and problems really easier than I had anticipated. In many other instances, the exact reverse has been true.

It would be difficult in a hurriedly written memorandum accurately to classify as satisfying or disappointing all of the incidents of the past year, or the personalities with whom I have dealt. However, since events and personalities are rarely disassociated one from the other, it would perhaps be easier to talk about personalities -- individually and collectively -- and in so doing speak both of the gratifying and the discouraging parts of my year's experience.

First, to be completely personal in the sense that the vertical pronoun implies.

When Mamie and I came to the White House, we probably had a fairly good understanding of what living in it would be. The prominent military positions I had occupied for some years had given me some experience that definitely, even though faintly, resembles that through which a President is compelled to live. This was especially true when I was abroad Commanding at SHAEF in World War II, and later as Commander at SHAPE. In both those positions, I led a fairly lonely life, the first time living only with my aides, and the second time with Mamie at Marnes-la-Coquette. We could not visit in restaurants, theatres, or ^{other} public places with the same freedom that is enjoyed by the ordinary citizen; problems of security, of protocol, and of autographing were always with us. The finding of time necessary for health and recreation was always difficult.

We knew all of these difficulties would be multiplied in White House existence, but at least we were psychologically prepared for them.

The other side of this particular picture is that after discharging normal hospitality and entertainment obligations, the President and his Lady have the privilege of inviting anyone to the White House and have accommodations there to take care of quite a number of people. Since most people like to visit the place at least once, it is normally easy to call upon old friends to come in and share a bit of personal life with the occupants.

So much for that.

* * * * *

The members of the Cabinet and heads of principal supporting agencies were selected before the Inauguration. The only one of my selectees of last year who proved to be a disappointment to me was Secretary Durkin. He could never free himself of the feeling that he was placed in the Cabinet to be a "trade unionist." He referred to his conferences here as "collective bargaining." I liked him personally and did my best to get him to adopt an attitude of serving the entire people, and to do so with his rich background and experience in the whole labor movement. This he could not do, and so I suppose it was inevitable that finally he should become unhappy and leave. His replacement, Mr. Mitchell, measures up, in my opinion, to the caliber of the other members of the Cabinet.

As for the Cabinet as now constituted, I cannot think of a single position that I could strengthen by removal of the present incumbent and appointing another. I trust this will be so for the next three years, but, of course, in human affairs of this kind one sometimes is compelled to change his mind.

By no means do I mean to imply that anyone of my associates is perfect in his job -- any more than I deem myself to be perfectly suited to my own! I merely mean to say that I have had a good many years of experience in selecting people for positions of heavy responsibility, and I think that the results so far achieved by this Cabinet and by other close associates, justify my conviction that we have an extraordinarily good combination of personalities.

This group has played a big part in legislative accomplishments of the past year. The list of those accomplishments is rather long and in many respects very gratifying. The record has been given in numbers of talks; I mentioned them specifically in a television talk only a couple of weeks ago. For the record, I list below -- taken from that talk -- what I consider the major achievements of the last year:

- "1. The fighting and the casualties in Korea have come to an end.
- "2. Our own defenses and those of the free world have been strengthened against Communist aggression.
- "3. The highest security standards are being insisted upon for those employed in Government service.
- "4. Requests for new appropriations have been reduced by 13 billion dollars.
- "5. Tax reductions which go into effect this month have been made financially feasible by substantial reductions in expenditures.
- "6. Strangling controls on our economy have been removed.
- "7. The fantastic paradox of farm prices, on a toboggan slide, while living costs soared skyward, has ceased.
- "8. The cheapening of inflation of every dollar you earn, every savings account and insurance policy you own, and every pension payment you receive has been halted.
- "9. The proper working relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches of the Federal Government has been made effective.

- "10. Emergency immigration legislation has been enacted.
- "11. A strong and consistent policy has been developed toward gaining and retaining the initiative in foreign affairs.
- "12. A plan to harness atomic energy to the peaceful service of mankind, and to help end the climate of suspicion and fear that excites nations to war, has been proposed to the world."

Above and beyond those achievements, everybody has worked tirelessly to have a program ready for submission to the Congress when it convened this month. I outlined that program in my State of the Union speech on January 7th, and special parts of it have been amplified in almost daily messages sent to the Congress. All in all, I deem it to be a program that is sound and progressive, and I believe that a large part of it will be enacted by the Congress.

Beyond all this, I think that the individuals in the Cabinet and in other important offices like each other. At least, I can detect no sign of mutual dislike among the group. I know that I like them all; I like to be with them; I like to converse with them; and I like their attitude toward their duty and toward governmental service. All together, therefore, my experiences with the Cabinet members have been gratifying officially and most satisfying personally.

* * * * *

It could not be expected, of course, that my relationship with legislative leaders would be on quite as satisfying a plane as those with the Cabinet. In the latter case, I was personally responsible for the selections, and naturally chose no one whose political philosophy I found to be diametrically opposed to my own, and certainly I chose no one whose personality I thought would clash with those of his associates. On the other hand, legislative leaders,

being elected in their own right, feel a certain independence in thought and in indulging their own particular theories of government. Particularly in late years the ties of party allegiance have been weakened. Occasionally, during the year, differences with members of my own party were even more pronounced and deep-seated than with some of the others.

Having said this, it is, however, only fair also to say that relationships with these people have been on the whole better than I anticipated. Before I announced publicly (January 1952) that I adhered to a Republican philosophy (which admittedly may have been my own interpretation of Republican philosophy), I was quite well aware of some of the deep-seated differences that would separate me, in the event of a successful election, from some of the House and Senate leaders.

Others were aware of these deep-seated differences. In the years between 1946 and 1952, whenever I was approached by Democrats urging that I declare political allegiance to that party, one of their arguments was that I would be further separated in political philosophy from such people as Senators Jenner, McCarthy, Millikin, Bridges, Langner, and others than I would from the Democratic leaders.

Of all the legislative leaders with whom I thought, in advance, that I would have constant trouble, there was none with whom incessant difficulty seemed more probable than with Senator Taft. While Senator Taft was, as I saw him, far more personal in his attitude toward politics than I could ever be, yet in his case the exact reverse came about.

For many weeks before he died last July, I considered him my ablest associate on the Hill, and indeed one of the stalwarts of the Administration.

His loyalty was given as a matter of intellectual agreement and, as he once told me, in the spirit of fair play and in his conviction that we were in general trying to travel the same road. I found him to be far less reactionary than I had judged him to be from a reading of his speeches and public statements. In some things, I found him extraordinarily "leftish." This applied specifically to his attitude toward old-age pensions. He told me that he believed every individual in the United States, upon reaching the age of 65, should automatically go on a minimum pension basis, paid by the Federal Government. He wanted us to proceed more rapidly than we actually did in revising military planning and policy and resulting organization; nevertheless, his actual recommendations closely paralleled the conclusions that we reached as a body. The difference is that we feel we have statistical analyses for sound conclusions on which to base our program, whereas he wanted to do it because it was "different" from what "that man Truman advocated."

In actual practice, whenever differences developed between the White House and some of our Republican Senators on matters of importance, we could count on Senator Taft to assert his great influence to bring them into line.

After his death, no one of real strength has shown up on the Senate side. Knowland means to be helpful and loyal, but he is cumbersome. He does not have the sharp mind and the great experience that Taft did. Consequently, he does not command the respect in the Senate that Senator Taft enjoyed. Senator Dirksen seems radically to have changed his attitude toward international affairs and is now seemingly disposed to go along with the Administration as its supporter and lieutenant. If this continues, he may well soon become the most effective man, from our standpoint, in the Senate. Senator Bridges,

Senator Millikin, Senator Saltonstall and other experienced legislators are men of good will toward the Administration, but they are not natural leaders -- and their theory of legislation is by "trading" and therefore modifying and placating. They do not seem to realize when there arrives that moment at which soft speaking should be abandoned and a fight to the end undertaken. Any man who hopes to exercise leadership must be ready to meet this requirement face to face when it arises; unless he is ready to fight when necessary, people will finally begin to ignore him.

In the House, the situation is considerably different. People there are more organizational-minded and seemingly look with some scorn on the "individualistic" attitude of the average Senator. We have two splendid men in Joe Martin and especially in our Majority Leader, Charlie Halleck. He is smart, capable, and courageous. On top of this, he is a team player and is a loyal one. A number of the Committee Chairmen are far below his standard, but so great are his powers of persuasion that it is rarely indeed that he cannot produce for us a good showing on any proposition that is important to us.

One-third of the Senate and all of the Congress will be up for election this fall.

Right now it seems to me that the Republicans are going through an anxious period. They are watching the public to see how it reacts to the program that has been sought by the Administration and whether, through that program, my personal popularity will suffer a decline in the country. By and large, they will soon have to make the choice to support or to defy that program -- which means to support or to defy me.

This is a tough one for some of them because the program cannot please everybody, and no attempt was made to have it do so. But the entire Administration is devoted to the task of selling this program to the people in general -- we hope that we shall be sufficiently successful so that these hopeful Congressmen and Senators will see that their bread is buttered on the Administration side.

* * * * *

Another group to be considered is the Press Corps, in which I include not only representatives of the newspapers, but of television, radio, and newsreels. The members of this group are far from being as important as they themselves consider, but, on the other hand, they have a sufficient importance -- and particularly in the eyes of the average Washington office holder -- to insure that much government time is consumed in courting favor with them and in dressing up ideas and programs so that they look as salable as possible. (For example, I am right now scheduled to go to a cocktail party -- something I have not attended in twenty years -- for the Washington Press Corps and given by the Senatorial Committee on Elections. I am to drop in for the purpose, I suppose, of showing that I am not too high-hat to do so.)

On the whole, the press group violates the old adage, "Always take your job seriously, never yourself." This old saw they largely apply in reverse. As a result, they have little sense of humor and, because of this, they deal in negative criticism rather than in any attempt toward constructive helpfulness.

I once heard that human minds are divided into three great classes, depending upon the kind of subject in which the greatest intellectual interest is

taken. The essayist contended that the highest type of mind was concerned with philosophies and ideas and their application to the problems of life. He thought the second class of mind was concerned with the physical things about us, the products of our industry, the natural resources of the country, the machines we use, the food that we eat, and so on. The third class he thought was concerned primarily with personalities. This kind of mind is the one, he said, that enjoys gossip.

If this kind of thing has any semblance of truth in it, I would say that it does not speak well for the average writer of the press. They love to deal in personalities; in their minds, personalities make stories.

I suspect that most of these men took up writing as a career for a peculiar purpose. Everybody loves distinction. If a writer can achieve a by-line in the paper for which he writes, he gets a certain thrill out of seeing his name in black type at the head of his own column every day. Beyond this, everybody likes the feeling of authority. There is a quality that has been described as authorial omnipotence. When the author succeeds in having his words published, there is normally no chance for refutation by anyone. Consequently, the author feels that his word is authoritative and that, as a result, he has a great influence on world events. (At least both words come from a common root.)

If any or all of these things are true, it could account for the extraordinary amount of distortion and gross error that characterizes so much of what appears in the newspapers. For more than 12 years, I have been, in one capacity or another, at spots in the world that have been considered newsworthy.

Consequently, I have seen, when they occurred, the actual incidents reported, or I have clearly understood the motives of the individuals written about. Rarely is such writing accurate.

I have had opportunities in the busy years to read only a few newspapers, so I do not generalize too far. In the papers that I have read, it seems to me that the Herald Tribune of New York observes higher standards in this regard than do most others. From what I have seen of the Philadelphia Bulletin, it has very high standards too -- and there are undoubtedly others in the country. But the Herald Tribune is one that I have had the opportunity to watch closely.

Other papers -- the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, and many others -- have larger and more widespread reporting staffs, have bigger circulations, and in many ways are more elaborate and better done newspapers than is the Herald Tribune. But in this one basic qualification -- the degree of accurate reporting -- these others do not, in my opinion, approach the Herald Tribune.

As there are differences in papers in this regard, I think there are, of course, differences in individuals. I have known some people whom I consider very great reporters. Some I have known only slightly; some almost intimately. In Washington today, I think certain ones observe the very highest standards of fairness, accuracy, and objectivity. Among them are Drummond, Krock, Arrowsmith, Clark, Lucey, Darby, and a chap named Donovan. Others who seem to me to be very good are Merriman Smith, Leviero, and one or two more.

In past years, I have known such people as Virgil Pinkley, Charlie Wertenbecker, Thor Smith, Wes Gallagher, Drew Middleton, and a few others who I always felt were unimpeachably honest and straight-forward. The fact remains, however, that today I believe the newspaper profession and the public it serves are getting a very poor return in accurate reporting out of the very great amount of money that they must devote to meeting, in the aggregate, the costs of the Washington Corps.

Most Washington officials learn enough eventually that they stop reading articles about themselves and their departments, whether favorable or unfavorable.

I think I might recite a story that I heard yesterday from my minister, Dr. Elson:



"Some years back, a prominent Bostonian felt that he had been maligned by a writer in a local newspaper. He was angry and determined to avenge himself against the offender. To determine what action to take, he went to see his friend, Dr. Edward Everett, and told him of the circumstances.

"He ended his account with a question, really several questions. He asked, 'Should I call the man out? Should I sue him? Should I sue the newspaper? Just exactly what is the best way to go about the matter?'

"After some thought, Dr. Everett answered, 'Do nothing. Ignore him.'

"He went on, 'This paper is not very widely read. Of those that read it, half will not read this story. Of those that read the story,

half will not understand what this man is driving at. Of those that understand it, half will not believe it. Of those that believe it, half will be people whose opinion means nothing whatsoever to you. So why worry?"

* * * * *

Scarcely could I end this particular memorandum without saying something of my personal staff. Yesterday someone brought to me an article by a man who criticized my staff severely (me also, of course). His castigation of the staff was that it was completely undistinguished and lacking both color and wisdom. Moreover, he said that it was nothing but an assembly here in Washington of the various characters who had travelled my campaign train with me in '52. In a sense, this last may be true. But I wonder if the writer thought that I should have selected for travelling on my campaign train people whom I despised and for whom I had no respect intellectually or otherwise.

Actually the staff (and I have been used to, for many years, really brilliant staff work) has performed magnificently. Sherman Adams has grown into the job that he has, and in a very definite sense has created it as he went along. Honesty, directness, and efficiency have begun to win him friends among people who initially were prone to curse him because he had no time for flattery or cajolery, or even pleasantries over the telephone. Supporting him is a group composed of Persons, Shanley, Hauge, Stephens, Hagerty, Cutler, and Jackson.

Each of these men is an extremely capable individual, apt, loyal, and energetic. Immediately supporting them is another layer of such people as Martin, Morgan, Harlow, Minnich, and so on.

Going even further, I have, so far, heard not a single complaint as to misconduct, disloyalty, or any other kind of indiscretion or offense on the part of any of the people that we brought to the White House with us last January. On the contrary, I have heard them consistently praised and complimented by legislators and by a vast army of friends throughout the country.

(So again I must ignore the conclusions of a critical writer.)

During the year we lost Emmet Hughes, who was very capable in assisting me in all the chores having to do with reports, letters, and public talks. Soon we are to lose C. D. Jackson, who has been my personal adviser in the field of psychological warfare.

A real tragedy has been the sickness of General Carroll. Liked and respected by every member of the staff, he was responsible for establishing a secretariat, which the White House had never had and which was badly needed. Now he is in the hospital with a heart attack and will probably be away from duty for a matter of several months. But no matter how long I have to wait, I shall still have a place for him.

#



March 26, 1954

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



Dear Governor Craig:

The question you raise in your letter of the nineteenth is one to which I have devoted many hours of thoughtful consideration. As you know I have often stated my views as to acceptable, or American, procedures in investigation. I have spoken out against unfairness and accusations made from behind a cloak of immunity.

Many of my good friends and associates in government apparently agree with you and a large segment of the American people, that I should, as you put it, "discipline the recalcitrants." Yet to attempt this, publicly, could react adversely on the legislative program, for the American people don't seem to like "purges." In addition, it would be in direct violation of a principle to which I have adhered all my adult life.

To explain the development of this, to me, fundamental rule, I have to go back to war experiences and certain lessons I learned throughout those years. Of these, the first and foremost is that the support and teaching of a constructive program or policy is a long-term thing. Moreover, it is seldom, if ever, that a worthwhile conception can be advanced by indulging in hateful or hypercritical remarks concerning some other individual. Out of those experiences, I developed a practice which, so far as I know, I have never violated. That practice is to avoid public mention of any name unless it can be done with favorable intent and connotation. This, of course, means that whatever criticism is necessary must be done in the private conference.

What I am trying to say to you is that I would not have you believe that I have acquiesced in, or by any means approve, the methods of which you rightly disapprove! I despise them. Nevertheless, I think that were I to stand up in public and label him with derogatory titles, I would make a serious error. I still feel that such an attempt would advertise him still more. It would make the Presidency ridiculous and so, in the long run, make the citizens of our country very unhappy indeed.

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Governor Craig -- 2.

At the same time, I assure you that I have not made and shall not make any effort to appease, or to "win over."

On the positive side, I feel that there is a dawning realization that the Republican Party has to get itself squared away in the public mind. I hope soon to make a talk to help this idea along. The Republican Party has got for once and for all to make up its mind whether to follow the ludicrous partnership of the Old Guarders and the McCarthyites (one of my friends has called it a "marriage of convenience"), or whether it is going to stand behind the program of the Administration and the middle-of-the-road philosophy in which we firmly believe. I have done, and continue to do, everything in my power, both as President and as titular leader of the Republican Party, to urge adherence to that middle-of-the-road philosophy and to the program we have advanced. In that effort I need the help of leaders such as yourself.

I hope sometime we can talk this whole matter over.

With warm regard,



Sincerely,

P.S. Charlie Halleck has really performed!

The Honorable George N. Craig
Governor of Indiana
Indianapolis 4, Indiana

Letter from President Eisenhower to E. E. "Swede" Hazlett
Dates 04/27/1954

This document relates to the Press, Vietnam, the French,
the British, and McCarthyism.

April 27, 1954.

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Dear Swede:

A few nights ago I made a talk before the American Newspaper Publishers' Association. In the course of the talk I urged the need for better understanding in America of today's domestic and world problems; I likewise urged the need for a greater two-way flow of information between us and nations abroad. I tried to point out that regardless of other means of developing understandings and providing information, the most effective vehicle was still the publicity media of the several nations. The consequence of this kind of thinking is that newspapers have a very definite responsibility to our country to inform it accurately and adequately, and that while we must sustain the rights of a free press, it seems clear that the free press must try to promote reader-understanding as well as to cater to reader-interest.

To this talk I have had no adverse reactions from outsiders or laymen; but I have received a number of criticisms from publishers themselves. The central theme of the criticism has been "Why should he attempt to tell us about our business?" Personally I thought I was rather mild in expressing my feelings in the matter, but where I have made any attempt to reply to the friendly publishers who have shared this critical view, I have said only two things -- first, "Are you operating a grocery store for immediate profit or do you regard the publishing of a newspaper as partaking of a public service? If the latter is the case, then you certainly assume responsibilities the discharge of which are of great interest to governmental officials."

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Captain Hazlett - 3.

been that the French have failed entirely to produce any enthusiasm on the part of the Viet Nameese for participation in the war. (Incidentally, did you ever stop to think that if the British had, in our War of the Revolution, treated as equals the Americans who favored them -- whom they called Loyalists and we called Tories -- the job of Washington would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. I have read that when the entire colonial forces in the field numbered not more than twenty-five thousand, that there were fifty thousand Americans serving in some capacity with and for the British. Yet no really effective service was rendered by these people because the British persisted in treating them as "colonials and inferiors.")



In any event, any nation that intervenes in a civil war can scarcely expect to win unless the side in whose favor it intervenes possesses a high morale based upon a war purpose or cause in which it believes. The French have used weasel words in promising independence and through this one reason as much as anything else, have suffered reverses that have been really inexcusable.

The British are frightened, I think, by two things. First, they have a morbid obsession that any positive move on the part of the free world may bring upon us World War III. Secondly, they are desperately concerned about the safety of Hong Kong. For the moment the Chinese Communists are not molesting Hong Kong and the British are fearful that if they should be identified as opponents of the Communists in the Indo-China affair, they might suffer the loss of Hong Kong at any moment. All this is conjecture, but in respect to this particular point, my own view is in almost direct opposition. I personally feel that if the Communists would take a good smacking in Indo-China, they would be more likely to leave Hong Kong severely alone for a long time. Moreover, if a "concert of nations" should undertake to protect Western interests in this critical section of the globe, it would appear that Hong Kong would almost automatically

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My second observation has been, "When have you hesitated to tell me how to run my business? Admittedly I am a public servant and therefore subject, in all my public actions, to criticism. But, again, assuming that you do admit that the publishing of a newspaper should be as much a public service as a 'commercial venture' you are also to that degree a public servant and I have a right to criticize you."



Beyond this, I did not, of course, make any sweeping allegations against the American press. Consequently any hurt feelings must be because someone felt that the shoe fit -- but uncomfortably.

In my last letter I remember that I mentioned Dien Bien Phu. It still holds out and while the situation looked particularly desperate during the past week, there now appears to be a slight improvement and the place may hold on for another week or ten days. The general situation in Southeast Asia, which is rather dramatically epitomized by the Dien Bien Phu battle, is a complicated one that has been a long time developing. It involves many talks on the international level and the frantic desire of the French to remain a world power, but at the same time defeating themselves through their deep divisions and consequent indecisiveness at home.

For more than three years I have been urging upon successive French governments the advisability of finding some way of "internationalizing" the war; such action would be proof to all the world and particularly to the Viet Nameese that France's purpose is not colonial in character but is to defeat Communism in the region and to give the natives their freedom. The reply has always been vague, containing references to national prestige, Constitutional limitations, inevitable effects upon the Moroccan and Tunisian peoples, and dissertations on plain political difficulties and battles within the French Parliament. The result has

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Captain Hazlett - 4.

fall within the protected zone.

Just what the outcome will be, of course, is still largely a guess, but in any event I feel that the situation is a shade -- but only a shade -- brighter than it was a week or so ago.

The McCarthy-Army argument, and its reporting, are close to disgusting. It saddens me that I must feel ashamed for the United States Senate. Other than that, I doubt that I have any opinions on the subject that are greatly different from your own, so I will pass it up for the moment.



One of the features of service life that I miss in this job is an "Inspector General's" service. Visitors here -- usually meaning to be helpful -- are quite apt to leave with me a hint that something is wrong here or wrong there, and sometimes these allegations or charges are of a grave nature.

In the Army it was so simple to turn to a properly trained and dedicated group any inspection job ranging from suspected peculation to plain incompetence, and it never occurred to me that a similar or equivalent agency would not be available in the Federal government. But there is no readily available agency to look into hints of this character. Even when they are referred to the interested departments of government, they are very likely to be handled in a rather lackadaisical manner for the simple reason that people are not accustomed to the standards of administrative accounting and responsibility that prevailed in the armed services.

* *

I had two other subjects -- but I stop here in desperation.

* *

Love to the family.

As ever,

Captain E. E. Hazlett.

July 26, 1954. 9:50.

9.43 President talked to Secretary of State, after Dulles had called Jim Hagerty and informed him that two American search planes, looking for survivors of the British plane shot down near Hainan, had themselves been shot down.

President: "Well, it didn't take long for that to happen. The question is how to handle." Dulles said that if President approved he would make a protest against further barbarities in attempting to shoot down rescue type planes. Eisenhower said that the Chinese would undoubtedly claim that they, the Chinese, were out on rescue missions too. President said that he had told the leaders in the Congressional meeting about the news, asked them to keep it confidential. Dulles said categorically our planes were fired upon first.

President agreed Dulles should protest. He felt that generally speaking the feeling at the Congressional meeting was one of complete approbation. President had already told the leaders (before this news arrived) that the two carriers had been ordered to the scene; and that Congress, reported the President to Dulles, was "very proud of the fact that we had covered ourselves" and approved of action in sending carriers. He said Congress is in a belligerent mood about this. Dulles said that he himself was glad that something has happened, more than just an exchange of notes.

President said that in addition to the protest, which has to go through the British since we have no diplomatic representation with the Red Chinese, that Dulles should send a very earnest and stiff note to Eden about the whole situation, saying that we were going to have to take a very stiff line -- and we hoped they would do the same. If we adopt a stiff one and the British not, it will cause more friction between our countries.

Dulles will immediately make public protest; Eisenhower will make no statement at moment.

11:09. President called Secretary. They are to meet at 2:45 this p.m. President said at last press conference, he had hinted around about a white paper on the Indo China situation, wondered what Sec. thought of it. President thought matter should go back to 1951, when he had personal contact with trying to get French to internationalize the war. Brought deLattre over here to make appeal. Secretary said that he had instructed a staff officer to go about making such a paper ready, but he had not thought going back to before present Administration took over. President said as long as Secretary had matter under consideration, it was all right.

12:25. President called Secretary. Said he thought search should be done by destroyers, since exact location of destroyers can be ascertained at any moment.

Dulles decided to come to lunch since discussion would be of Korea.



June 18, 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR

GOVERNOR ADAMS



Two subjects that I discussed with Mr. Hoover at lunch this noon were: the possibility of using him in some way to "investigate" the CIA; the other was the wisdom of proceeding with the Upper Colorado River project.

With respect to the first:

He was quite clear that some kind of examination into the CIA would be valuable to the President. He thought that the personnel of any group conducting such an examination should command the admiration and respect of the Congress as well as the public; that the report would necessarily be a secret one, to be made only to Mr. Hoover himself and to the President; and that only its conclusions could be in turn transmitted to proper individuals in the Congress, by the President, in order to reassure them as to the general efficiency, integrity and loyalty of CIA personnel, of the organizational set-up in the bureau, and the general effectiveness of the whole unit in accomplishing the purposes for which established.

He of course remarked that he could not undertake the task in his capacity as Chairman of the Governmental Organization Committee. He would have to do so as an individual.

However, he brought up to me, as he did to you, the possibility of his appointing a trustworthy Senator and a trustworthy Congressman to any such committee. This proposal brings up two points that possibly should be carefully studied:

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a. While any member of the Congress would be placed on the committee in a personal rather than in an official capacity, still the requirement for keeping functions of the Legislative and the Executive Branches clearly separate might be violated by including Congressional members on such committee.

b. The assumption by Mr. Hoover that he would appoint the other members of the committee, while perfectly satisfactory in any process where he is setting up task forces to work under a parent committee would scarcely be applicable in a situation where each of the members was presumably of co-equal status and with co-equal responsibility in reporting to me.

In view of Mr. Hoover's great preoccupation with the job on which he is now working, it might be best for us to appoint a board with another chairman and completely independent of the Hoover Reorganization Commission.

Mr. Hoover further suggested that if he should undertake this job, he would probably try in advance to contact Senator McCarthy to secure the permission of the Chairman of the Senate Investigating Committee that no further effort would be made by that body to investigate CIA, on the assurance by Mr. Hoover that he and his Commission would do a good job.

With respect to the Colorado River project:

Mr. Hoover thinks the project should not be pressed in this session of Congress. He believes that it would represent a needless waste of government money, and is far from justified by the conditions in the region. He is much in favor of allowing both the Hoover Commission and the Cabinet Committee on Water Resources to study the whole matter and make recommendations, one to me and the other to Congress, before any action is taken. He is disposed to agree, in general, with Admiral Moreell who, in visiting me yesterday, was much more vehement and emphatic than was Mr. Hoover today in his opposition to the whole project.

I believe it would be a good thing to go into this matter at once, not only with the members of the Cabinet Committee on Water Resources, but possibly next Monday with the Legislative Leaders. We had better decide quickly what we want to do.

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Incidentally, I have already asked Senator Watkins, who is the great advocate of this project, to appear before Admiral Moreell with the same arguments that he, Senator Watkins, has previously presented to me. It does appear strange that after all these years of study and investigation and to this particular project, there should be such violent disagreement in conclusions among individuals who are not only of our own political party, but are presumably of the same political philosophy in the field of conservation and use of water resources.



D.D.E.

July 13, 1954.

Personal and Confidential

Dear Chyn:

I answered your note with one equally short, but remembering your statement that you "differ sharply" with my philosophy of the Middle Way, I was reminded of the very fine and heated arguments we used to have some thirty years ago in Panama, and I decided to write just a little bit further.

Frankly I think that the critical problem of our time is to find and stay on the path that marks the way of logic between conflicting arguments advanced by extremists on both sides of almost every economic, political and international problem that arises.

To start with, our Constitution represented nothing else so much as an effort to find a middle way between political extremists of that particular time. On one side were the individualists -- the fanatical believers in a degree of personal freedom that amounted almost to nihilism. On the same side were others who refused to accord to a central authority any power whatsoever in controlling and directing the activities of any of the several states. At the other extreme were the great believers in centralized government -- those who mistrusted the decisions reached by popular majorities.

Although that document has been considered by practically all Americans as one of the greatest set of governmental principles ever devised, yet ever since its adoption there have constantly arisen in the political and economic fields people who take extreme positions with respect to questions of the moment. Until the conclusion of the Civil War, one

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General Chynoweth - 2.

of the items on which these extreme views were taken was slavery. So we had a Calhoun on one side and a Sumner on another. Lincoln, even more than Clay, stood halfway between.

Coming down to our own day, we have those individuals who believe that the Federal government should enter into every phase and facet of our individual lives, controlling agriculture, industry and education, as well as the development of every natural resource in our country. These people, knowingly or unknowingly, are trying to put us on the path toward socialism. At the other extreme we have the people -- and I know quite a number of them -- who want to eliminate everything that the Federal government has ever done that, in one way or another, represents what is generally classified as social advance. For example, all of the regulatory commissions established in Washington are anathema to these people. They want to abolish them completely. They believe that there should be no trade union laws and the government should do nothing even to encourage pension plans and other forms of social security in our industry.

When I refer to the Middle Way, I merely mean the middle way as it represents a practical working basis between extremists, both of whose doctrines I flatly reject. It seems to me that no great intelligence is required in order to discern the practical necessity of establishing some kind of security for individuals in a specialized and highly industrialized age. At one time such security was provided by the existence of free land and a great mass of untouched and valuable natural resources throughout our country. These are no longer to be had for the asking; we have had experiences of millions of

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people -- devoted, fine Americans, who have walked the streets unable to find work or any kind of sustenance for themselves and their families.

On the other hand, for us to push further and further into the socialistic experiment is to deny the validity of all those convictions we have held as to the cumulative power of free citizens, exercising their own initiative, inventiveness and desires to provide better living for themselves and their children.

On this subject I once made a speech -- on September 3, 1949. While I do not recall the details of it, I probably discussed it more exhaustively than I can in a letter I can possibly write at this moment. But I shall conclude with this one general observation or aphorism, even though I well recall the old statement of the Frenchman that "all generalities are false, including this one." The generality that I advance is merely this, "Excluding the field of moral values, anything that affects or is proposed for masses of humans is wrong if the position it seeks is at either end of possible argument."

Please remember me to Mrs. Chyn, and with warm regard to yourself,

Sincerely,



Brigadier General B.G. Chynoweth, Ret'd.,
832 San Luis Road,
Berkeley 7,
California.

Personal and Confidential

Denver, Colorado
September 30, 1954

Dear Earl:

Thank you for sending me, via the Vice President, the booklet on social security. I quite agree that there has been far too much politics in this question and too little sound thinking. I do not believe, however, that the politicians have been entirely at fault -- I think that, in the past, many business men were far too slow to understand the implications of the continuing social revolution and were far too apt to take a completely indefinite, if not essentially a selfishly cruel, attitude toward the whole question.

The actual fact is that by and large the productivity of a national economy must, at any given time, support the people then living in that nation. This means that, roughly, the people from twenty to sixty bear the burden of supporting themselves, and, in addition, support those from birth to twenty years of age, and those from sixty to eighty. The problem is how to get this done without going so far in the direction of socialism that a centralized bureaucracy gains excessive control over the lives of all of us.

I personally think there has been far too much loose thinking on this matter. I think that pamphlets such as the one you sent me will help clarify some of this thinking and will help us reach sounder answers than we will without the critical studies and advice from people who are expert in this field.



Incidentally, I am sending the pamphlet on to those officials in the present Administration who are largely responsible for the Federal part of these great programs.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,



P.S. I dictated this before your letter of the 27th arrived. I am glad you liked what I said at the A. F. of L.

P.P.S. I am now tentatively planning the Abilene trip for November 11th.

Mr. J. Earl Schaefer
Boeing Airplane Company
Wichita, Kansas

cc: Mrs. Hobby

**Recipe of Dwight D. Eisenhower
for Vegetable Soup**

as published in The Marion Sentinel,
Linn County, Iowa

The best time to make vegetable soup is a day or so after you have fried chicken and out of which you have saved the necks, ribs, backs, un-cooked. (The chicken is not essential, but does add something.)



Procure from the meat market a good beef soup bone -- the bigger the better. It is a rather good idea to have it split down the middle so that all the marrow is exposed. I frequently buy, in addition, a couple pounds of ordinary soup meat, either beef or mutton, or both.

Put all this meat, early in the morning, in a big kettle. The best kind is heavy aluminum, but a good iron pot will do almost as well. Put in also the bony parts of the chicken you have saved. Cover it with water, something on the order of 5 quarts. Add a teaspoon of salt, a bit of black pepper and, if you like, a touch of garlic (one small piece). If you don't like garlic, put in an onion. Boil all this slowly all day long. Keep on boiling till the meat has literally dropped off the bone. If your stock boils down during the day, add enough water from time to time to keep the meat covered. When the whole thing has practically disintegrated, pour out into another large kettle through a colander. Make sure that the marrow is out of the bones. I advise you to let this drain through the colander for quite a while as much juice will drain out of the meat. (Shake the colander well to help get out all the juice.)

I usually save a few of the better pieces of meat to be diced and put into the soup after it is done. The rest of it can be given to your dogs or your neighbor's chickens. Put the kettle containing the stock you now have in a very cool place, outdoors in the winter time or in the ice box; let it stand all night and the next day until you are ready to make your soup.

You will find that a hard layer of fat has formed on top of the stock which can usually be lifted off since the whole kettle full of stock has jelled. Some people like a little bit of the fat left on, and I know a few who like their soup very rich and do not remove more than about half of the fat.

Put the stock back into your kettle and you are now ready to make your soup.

In a separate pan, boil slowly about a third of a teacupful of barley. This should be cooked separately since it has a habit, in a soup kettle, of settling to the bottom and if your fire should happen to get too hot it is likely to burn. If you cannot get barley use rice, but it is a poor substitute.

One of the secrets of making good vegetable soup is not to cook any of the vegetables too long. However, it is impossible to give you an exact measure of the vegetables you should put in because some people like their vegetable soup almost as thick as stew, others like it much thinner. Moreover, sometimes you can get exactly the vegetables you want; other times you have to substitute. Where you use canned vegetables, put them in only a few minutes before taking the soup off the fire. If you use fresh ones, naturally they must be fully cooked in the soup.

The things I like to put into my soup are about as follows:

- 1 quart of canned tomatoes
- 1/2 teacupful of fresh peas. If you can't get peas, a handful of good green beans cut up very small can substitute
- 2 normal sized potatoes, diced into cubes of about half-inch size
- 2 or 3 branches of good celery
- 1 good-sized onion (sliced)
- 3 nice-sized carrots diced about the same size as potatoes
- 1 turnip diced like the potatoes
- 1/2 cup of canned corn
- A handful of raw cabbage cut up in small pieces

Your vegetables should not all be dumped in at once. The potatoes, for example, will cook more quickly than the carrots. Your effort must be to have them all nicely cooked but not mushy, at about the same time.



The fire must not be too hot, but the soup should keep bubbling.

When you figure the soup is about done, put in your barley which should now be fully cooked, add a tablespoonful of "Kitchen Bouquet" and taste for flavoring, particularly salt and pepper and, if you have it, use some onion salt, garlic salt and celery salt. (If you cannot get "Kitchen Bouquet," use one teaspoonful of Lee and Perrin's Worcestershire Sauce.

Cut up the few bits of the meat you have saved and put about a small handful into the soup.

While you are cooking the soup, do not allow the liquid to boil down too much. Add a bit of water from time to time. If your stock was good and thick when you started, you can add more water than if it was thin when you started.

As a final touch, in the springtime when nasturtiums are green and tender, you can take a few nasturtium stems, cut them up in small pieces, boil them separately as you did the barley, and add them to your soup. (About one tablespoonful after cooking.)



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

October 29, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We are faced with some vital decisions concerning the 1956 budget and its preparation. These relate to how to make the best use of the dollars available this year.

1. An individual in his own affairs is not infrequently up against a problem similar to that the Government now faces. When the demands upon his funds, made up of items which are desirable for his protection and well-being and which each can claim some degree of urgency or necessity, total up to more than he can pay, he has certain alternatives (ruling out theft or fraud):

a. He can borrow, providing he is not already too far in debt to make that possible and providing he has some program and expectation of paying it back within a reasonable period of time.

b. He can work out some way of increasing his income if there is an opportunity to do that, as by getting a better job, trying to manage taking on a supplementary job, or through some other way, such as having his wife also take a job.

c. He can, by making certain choices, decide which items have priority and reduce the total of expenditures to the amount that he can handle properly. This alternative, when chosen, is often a last resort.

2. The Government today is facing very much the same problem as that described above for the individual. The demands are:

(a) Those racked up by the military services in their presentation of their needs for 1956.*

(b) Those being considered for such related defense items as stockpiling increases, defense mobilization measures, and continuation at approximately 1955 levels of atomic expenditures and foreign aid.

* If some of the programs under consideration for early NSC review are approved for inclusion in the budget and become "add-ons" to present programs, the total demands in this category would be substantially increased.



(c) The requests for 1956 of non-defense agencies which are now being reviewed are at a level which shows prospects for 1956 of being somewhat higher than lower, compared with 1955.

(d) Prospective demands under new legislative programs (many of which have been strongly advocated by the administration). Examples are: the bill to authorize medical care for dependents of military personnel; medical care insurance; the survivor benefits bill for the military; and the new highway program.

(e) Demands for new public works and reclamation projects, some of which have strong support.



3. These all total up to a prospective expenditure for 1956 that would result under present revenue prospects in a sharp increase in the deficit to \$8/10 billion or more for 1956 and correspondingly high figures for subsequent years.

4. To adopt solution a - to borrow, as through deficit financing - would run us way over the present debt limit authorized by the Congress and would require legislation on that point. Moreover, it would entail, as it has in the past, eventually stealing the money from savings accounts, pensions, insurance policies and the like, through inflationary pressures and cheapening of the dollar with all the spiraling detrimental effects which follow in the wake of such actions. Probably of most importance is that it would lead to loss of the confidence which has supported the tremendous expenditures of the private sector of the economy the past twenty months with possible results that would not only endanger our prosperity but could directly reduce the Government's income, thus actually increasing the deficit that had to be overcome.

5. To choose alternative b at the present level of taxation certainly is a threat to our prosperity as well as involving a major fight on taxes in the Congress. If necessity can be proved, it of course is a far better solution than alternative a.

6. To adopt the remaining alternative c is not going to be easy; it involves certain choices, certain determinations as to the necessity under present conditions, of some of the money requested for expenditures in the major defense category. It requires weighing on a priority basis of demands in connection with maintaining the welfare and economic productive power of the civilian side of our Nation. Both military and non-military needs will obviously take substantial amounts under any program and there is also obviously not enough money available to meet all the demands of both. There must therefore needs be some wise, discriminating, and substantial reductions in present proposals if the total of expenditures is to be brought under control. That could only be accomplished by teamwork and devotion to the objective throughout the Administration. At present that seems lacking in our budget discussions with many of the agencies.

7. If we adopt a hypothesis that general war is likely to be precipitated within some quite short period, we would be justified in crisis actions irrespective of cost and of future consequences. We have, however, no basis for such a conclusion. Furthermore, the Chinese are orientals and the Russians have definite oriental characteristics. My experience of over ten years in the Orient and my observations based on dealings with the orientals since then confirm strongly what I infer are your general views that the oriental makes his moves on the basis of a patient, long-time view unless something specifically precipitates action. He thinks in terms of decades and generations rather than what he despises as the unconsidered and unwise haste of the occidental to force conclusions.

8. If we accept the hypothesis that general war is not imminent, our basic problem is one of avoiding precipitous actions which, while strengthening us temporarily, so over extend us as seriously to weaken our long-term strength. Our objective, as you have stated so clearly in your speeches, must be to maintain a continuing posture of strength both militarily and economically, with concomitant moral and spiritual stamina. We may, of course, expect irritations and provocations in many forms which will try us to the utmost while we are maintaining such strength.

9. All of this points up the necessity of some unpleasant and even painful choices in our budget decisions. You have expressed yourself very strongly concerning the use of debt and inflation as a means of solving the problem. That leaves us with a choice between alternative c (reducing the demands for expenditures) and alternative b (raising taxes), or some combination of the two.

10. There is a time factor in meeting the legal requirements for presentation of the budget to the Congress. A timetable of the latest dates for various parts of the work that would meet that requirement is attached. Under these circumstances, I would appreciate an opportunity to have some discussion with you concerning general budget policies as shortly after November 2 as possible.

Director

Attachment

October 23, 1954

Dear Swede:

Your judgment on the spinning reel coincides exactly with mine. Since 1944 when I first encountered these gadgets in France, I have been the recipient of various types of spinners -- I should say one arrives about every sixty days. I leave them to those who like them. For my own fishing, I keep half a dozen fly rods ranging from about 1-1/2 ounces to 4-1/2, and I keep three favorite casting rods. I think this combination ought to see me through the fishing seasons left to me.

I skip over your comments on the election campaign. I have appeared before a number of audiences, but I strive to deal only with substantive matters -- with fact and logical deduction -- while staying out of political bickering.



When you mention Adlai, I again find myself in complete agreement with you, except that I doubt that he is a very dangerous opponent. However, if he should slip into a position of real responsibility, he would represent a great risk for the country.

As to "four-headed" foreign policy, the Democrats never succeeded in keeping people like McCarran from sounding off when they so chose. So if a Republican Senator lets go once in a while, I don't know what we can do about it, even though I deplore the misunderstandings they create.

So far as Dulles is concerned, he has never made a serious pronouncement, agreement or proposal without complete and exhaustive consultation with me in advance and, of course, my approval. If your friend Senator Ervin would take the trouble to look up the record, he would see that Nixon belonged in the same school, although he admittedly tries to put his pronouncements into more colorful language.

Captain Swede Hazlett - 2

You are somewhat wrong in your statement, "I know that at one time you contemplated some really drastic action in Indo-China." What I really attempted to do was to get established in that region the conditions under which I felt the United States could properly intervene to protect its own interests. A proper political foundation for any military action was essential. Since we could not bring it about (though we prodded and argued for almost two years), I gave not even a tentative approval to any plan for massive intervention.

You are right in your conclusion that the European situation looks somewhat better. By no means have I made up my mind finally on Mendes-France. For the moment, I accept your instinctive impression as my own.

As to appointments on the Supreme Court, I think one or two observations are applicable. Your implication seems to be that Governor Warren was a "political" appointment. It was most emphatically not.

That particular vacancy occurred most unexpectedly, and the particular qualifications in the individual that should fill it were something that I studied and lived with for a number of weeks. The Chief Justice has a great many administrative tasks, as well as obvious responsibilities involving personal leadership. Along with this, he must be a statesman and, in my opinion (since I have my share of egotism), I could not do my duty unless I appointed a man whose philosophy of government was somewhat along the lines of my own. All this finally brought me down to Warren, especially as I refused to appoint anyone to the Supreme Court who was over 62 years of age. It seems to me completely futile to try to use a Supreme Court vacancy as a mere reward for long and brilliant service. If I should be succeeded by a New Deal President, a judge who is now 69 or 70 would probably create a vacancy very soon to be



Captain Swede Hazlett - 3

filled by the left-wingers. So -- it seems to me that prudence demands that I secure relatively young men for any vacancies that may occur. I wish that I could find a number of outstanding jurists in the low 50's.

The segregation issue will, I think, become acute or tend to die out according to the character of the procedure orders that the Court will probably issue this winter. My own guess is that they will be very moderate and accord a maximum of initiative to local courts.

Give my love to the family.

As ever,



Captain E. E. Hazlett, Jr., U.S.N. (Ret.)
Forest Hills
Chapel Hill, North Carolina

November 16, 1954

Dear Earl:

I was very much interested in the questions you raised in your letter of October twenty-eighth, for they are problems to which, as you know, I too have given a good deal of thought.

I was glad to read the little pamphlet you sent on the creating of new jobs. That estimate of \$12,000 of investment needed on the average to create each new job shows the seriousness of the challenge. Certainly if we are going to have expanding abundance for an expanding population, we must make it possible for a large and steady flow of additional investment to be channelled into American industry. I hope the tax legislation which was put through last year will be of major value in facilitating this.

This creation of new job opportunities is, in my opinion, the right and the sound way to eliminate unemployment conditions, and I hope that steady progress can be made along these lines. In this, I believe, lies the heart of what is not just "the American dream" but the reality of American growth and prosperity.

In this connection, there are elements in your proposal to relate employment and wage policies to family requirements which would strike some responsive chord in every human; yet I believe that the complexities of individual requirements, objectives and potentialities would weigh against the establishment of any hard and fast policy. Certainly, the danger would exist that the limitations resulting from such an approach would infringe upon the traditional rights and freedoms of the individual and contravene the principles on which America has grown great. I am referring to governmental action. I have no doubt that there are already many individual employers who give careful personal consideration to the specific weight of family responsibilities of their individual employees.



Your specific reference to the situation of the widows of retired service personnel again draws attention to a very troubling problem indeed. For a long time I've been urging action upon the Defense Department. Fortunately, I believe we are now making real headway toward a fair solution. The general principles for a "survivorship" program are well established, and more detailed work is well advanced. A specific proposal has been developed and is now being reviewed and refined. There is good prospect for legislation in the next session of Congress. When placed in effect, I think that the program will go far toward correcting the situation that has concerned us so much.

Your interest in this question has helped to keep it alive, and I am grateful for it.

Warm personal regard,

Sincerely,



Mr. J. Earl Schaefer
Boeing Airplane Company
Wichita 1, Kansas

November 8, 1954.

Personal and Confidential

Dear Ed:

I think that such answer as I can give to your letter of November first will be arranged in reverse order -- at least I shall comment first on your final paragraph.

You keep harping on the Constitution; I should like to point out that the meaning of the Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is. Consequently no powers are exercised by the Federal government except where such exercise is approved by the Supreme Court (lawyers) of the land.

I admit that the Supreme Court has in the past made certain decisions in this general field that have been astonishing to me. A recent case in point was the decision in the Phillips case. Others, and older ones, involved "inter-state commerce." But until some future Supreme Court decision denies the right and responsibility of the Federal government to do certain things, you cannot possibly remove them from the political activities of the Federal government.

Now it is true that I believe this country is following a dangerous trend when it permits too great a degree of centralization of governmental functions. I oppose this -- in some instances the fight is a rather desperate one. But to attain any success it is quite clear that the Federal government cannot avoid or escape responsibilities which the mass of the people firmly believe should be undertaken

Personal and Confidential

Mr. Edgar Eisenhower - 2.

Personal and Confidential

by it. The political processes of our country are such that if a rule of reason is not applied in this effort, we will lose everything -- even to a possible and drastic change in the Constitution. This is what I mean by my constant insistence upon "moderation" in government. Should any political party attempt to abolish social security, unemployment insurance, and eliminate labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of that party again in our political history. There is a tiny splinter group, of course, that believes you can do these things. Among them are H. L. Hunt (you possibly know his background), a few other Texas oil millionaires, and an occasional politician or businessman from other areas. Their number is negligible and they are stupid.



To say, therefore, that in some instances the policies of this Administration have not been radically changed from those of the last is perfectly true. Both Administrations levied taxes, both maintained military establishments, customs officials, and so on.

But in all governmental fields of action a combination of purpose, procedure and objectives must be considered if you are to get a true evaluation of the relative merits.

You say that the foreign policy of the two Administrations is the same. I suppose that even the most violent critic would agree that it is well for us to have friends in the world, to encourage them to oppose communism both in its external form and in its internal manifestations,

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Mr. Edgar Eisenhower - 3.

Personal and Confidential

to promote trade in the world that would be mutually profitable between us and our friends (and it must be mutually profitable or it will dry up), and to attempt the promotion of peace in the world, negotiating from a position of moral, intellectual, economic and military strength.

No matter what party is in power, it must perforce follow a program that is related to these general purposes and aspirations. But the great difference is in how it is done and, particularly, in the results achieved.

A year ago last January we were in imminent danger of losing Iran, and sixty percent of the known oil reserves of the world. You may have forgotten this. Lots of people have. But there has been no greater threat that has in recent years overhung the free world. That threat has been largely, if not totally, removed. I could name at least a half dozen other spots of the same character.

This being true, how can anyone be so unaware of what is happening as to say that this Administration has conducted foreign affairs under the same policies as did the former Administration? As a matter of fact, if you will press any individual who brings to you all these strictures and comments, I venture that your experience will be the same as mine. That experience is that these individuals have no idea of what the "foreign policy" of the previous

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Mr. Edgar Eisenhower - 4.

Personal and Confidential

Administration was and what the present one is. They have heard certain slogans, such as "give away programs." They have no slightest idea as to what has been the effect of these programs in sustaining American security and prosperity. Moreover, they have no idea whatsoever as to comparative size of them now as compared to even two or three years ago.



You say that these critics also complain about the continuance of "controls," presumably over our economy. There is nothing in your letter that shows such complete ignorance as to what has actually happened as does this term. When we came into office there were Federal controls exercised over prices, wages, rents, as well as over the allocation and use of raw materials. The first thing this Administration did was to set about the elimination of those controls. This it did amid the most dire predictions of disaster, "run away" inflation, and so on and so on. We were proved right, but I must say that if the people of the United States do not even remember what took place, one is almost tempted to regret the agony of study, analysis and decision that was then our daily ration.

You also talk about "bad political advice" I am getting. I always assumed that lawyers attempted accuracy in their statements. How do you know that I am getting any political advice? Next, if I do get political advice, how do you know that it is not weighted in the direction that you seem to think it should be -- although I am tempted at times to believe that you are just thrashing around rather than thinking anything through to a definite conclusion? So how can you say I am getting "bad" advice; why don't you just assume I am stupid, trying to wreck the nation, and leave our Constitution in tatters?

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Mr. Edgar Eisenhower - 5.

Personal and Confidential

I assure you that you have more reason, based on sixty-four years of contact, to say this than you do to make the bland assumption that I am surrounded by a group of Machiavellian characters who are seeking the downfall of the United States and the ascendancy of socialism and communism in the world. Incidentally, I notice that everybody seems to be a great Constitutionalist until his idea of what the Constitution ought to do is violated -- then he suddenly becomes very strong for amendments or some peculiar and individualistic interpretation of his own.

Finally, I must assure you again that I am delighted to get your own honest criticisms, particularly if you will only take the trouble to lay down the facts on which you reach what seem to me to be some remarkable conclusions. But the mere repetition of aphorisms and political slogans and newspaper headlines leaves me cold.

I am sorry you are not going to be at Abilene. It would be easier to tell you these things than to write them -- except that by this method I hope to make you do a little thinking rather than devote yourself just to the winning of a noisy argument.

As ever,



P.S.: I attach a paragraph and a cartoon that came to me in the same mail as did your letter. At least it represents a different viewpoint. Incidentally, it comes from one of the most successful businessmen in the nation.

Personal and Confidential

November 3, 1954

~~TOP SECRET~~



Dear General Collins:

The threat to the independence and security of Free Viet-Nam has reached such a critical stage that emergency measures are required to assist Free Viet-Nam to maintain itself, and to promote United States policies regarding Viet-Nam. Accordingly, I am designating you as Special United States Representative with personal rank of Ambassador to go to Saigon for a limited period to coordinate and direct United States activities in Viet-Nam in support of United States policy objectives. I am hereby instructing you to undertake this mission with broad authority to direct, utilize and control all the agencies and resources of the United States Government in Viet-Nam.

Your mission is undertaken on behalf of the United States Government and all its agencies will assist you as required in this difficult and essential task. I have complete confidence that your wide experience will enable you decisively to assist in dealing with the urgent problems which confront not only the Vietnamese Government but the free world in Viet-Nam. In your conversations and dealings with local French and Vietnamese authorities, you are authorized to speak with complete frankness and full authority on behalf of myself and the Government of the United States. You should keep the United States Government fully and currently informed of the progress of your mission through the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense where appropriate regarding military matters.

For your guidance, the basic policies of the United States with respect to Viet-Nam are as follows:

1. To maintain and support a friendly and independent non-Communist government in Viet-Nam and to assist it in diminishing and ultimately eradicating Communist subversion and influence.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.204

MR 80-356⁷²

By DJH Date 10/22/81

TOP SECRET



General J. Lawton Collins - 2.

2. To assist the Government of Viet-Nam to develop and maintain forces necessary for internal security and to foster economic conditions which will strengthen and promote the survival of a Free Viet-Nam.

3. To provide United States assistance directly to the Government of Viet-Nam and to coordinate information and exchange of views on such assistance with Vietnamese and French authorities.

4. To encourage expanding relationships between Free Viet-Nam and its non-Communist neighbors, and support for Free Viet-Nam by the free world.

The immediate and urgent requirement in carrying out these policies and in meeting the deteriorating situation in Viet-Nam is to assist in stabilizing and strengthening the legal government of Viet-Nam under the premiership of Ngo Dinh Diem. Accordingly, the principal task of your mission is to coordinate and direct a program in support of that government to enable it to: (a) promote internal security and political and economic stability, (b) establish and maintain control throughout the territory, and (c) effectively counteract Viet Minh infiltration and paramilitary activities south of the military demarcation line. As an initial framework for a concrete program of action you should (a) use the joint instructions which the Departments of State and Defense transmitted to the American Embassy in Saigon on October 22 and (b) take into consideration the latter's reply of October 27, 1954.

As this immediate program progresses, I will expect to receive your recommendations.

You will in these matters seek, and I hope obtain, the cooperation of the French authorities. Their cooperation will greatly facilitate the discharge of your mission.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

General J. Lawton Collins - 3.

You are of course advised of the United States position and policy with respect to the agreements of the Geneva Conference on Indochina and to the United States Declaration made there and in these matters you should conform to such position and policy.

I appreciate your undertaking this difficult and delicate mission which is of such great importance to the United States. This assignment and these instructions are convincing evidence of the firm intention of the Government of the United States to help the Vietnamese people preserve and promote their liberty and welfare.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,



General J. Lawton Collins,
U. S. Representative, Military Committee, NATO,
Department of Defense.

TOP SECRET

Personal

July 27, 1953.

Dear Bill:

I had no idea that you were taking so seriously my gripes about the press. At the particular moment when I was speaking to you, I was rather resentful of the fact that the very agencies who had made McCarthy were the ones most offended by his practices and methods, and were loudest in their demands that I be the one to cut him down to size. Actually, there is little in your letter with which I would not completely agree. I am particularly certain that I dislike "collusion" in almost any form that it can appear, especially in public life.

There is only one spot where I feel I must still register a mild protest against your conclusions. When you speak of columnists and include "For the most part they mean to be fair and they mean to be honest," you must be feeling more than normally charitable.

Anyway, many thanks for writing to me.

As ever,



Mr. William E. Robinson,
New York Herald Tribune,
230 West 41st Street,
New York, New York.

Personal

March 4, 1953

At this moment in history, when the Soviet ruler lies gravely
ill, the thoughts of ^{all} America go out to the Russian people - the men and
women, the boys and girls, in the cities, ^{villages} farms, and factories of their
homeland.

They are the children of the same God who is the Father of all
peoples everywhere. ^{and} Like all ^{peoples} ~~the~~ ^{Russian millions} ~~the Russian people~~ share
the ^{longing for} ~~hope~~ of a friendly ^{and peaceful} ~~and prosperous~~ world.

It is the prayer of us Americans that the Almighty will watch
~~with~~ ^{that our country} over ~~all those~~ people and bring them, in his wisdom, ~~the~~ free opportunity
to ^{live} ~~enjoy~~ their lives in a world where all men and women and children
^{live} ~~live~~ in liberty and peace. ^{and comradeship}



November 24, 1953.

Dear Oveta:

Within a few minutes I am taking off for a few days' vacation in Georgia. This reminds me that when I spoke to you the other day about taking a short breather, you said you would take Thursday off -- meaning Thanksgiving Day.

Now I admit that when anyone gets as high ranking as you are, such a person has gotten beyond the place where he or she can be "ordered about." But I would deem it a very great personal favor if you would get out of this place no later than tomorrow morning (Wednesday) and not be back before Monday. My whole purpose in making this request would be defeated if you would lug off with you a brief case full of papers (anyway brief cases belong only to the diplomatic service) or if you continue in contact with your office by telephone. This request is based on purely selfish reasons -- on reasons that are shared by the entire Cabinet and your other associates. Briefly stated, they are nothing more than our conviction that you are absolutely necessary to this Administration, and we want you to get enough variation, recreation and rest in your life that you don't become bored, sick, or just plain tired of your job.

With all the best -- and remember me warmly to the Governor.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Oveta Culp Hobby,
The Secretary of Health, Welfare
and Education,
Washington, D. C.

Longhand letter written on green White House stationery.

Dear Dick:

Proud as I am of the record you -- and Pat -- established on your recent visit to a number of Asian countries, yet I must say I'm glad to have you home.

We, by which I mean all the principal figures in the Administration, have missed your wise counsel, your energetic support and your exemplary dedication to the service of the country.

On the purely personal side, it was fine to see you both looking so well after the rigors of a trip that must have taxed the strength of even such young and vigorous people as yourself. I look forward to some quiet opportunity when I can hear a real recital of your adventures and accomplishments.

With warm personal regard,

Sincerely,



Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The Vice President

December 14, 1953.

DDE handwritten notes, week of Feb. 7th, 1954:



"Man's right to knowledge and the free use thereof."

An intriguing phrase -- it rings in the ears almost as if we could hear Patrick Henry's immortal call to liberty or death. Merely to claim this resounding slogan as our own gives us a feeling of superiority over the demagogues, the jingoes, the tyrants who thrive in the ignorance of others and employ curtains of iron or of oratory to deepen and prolong that ignorance. We thrill ourselves by our own insistence on academic freedom -- the teacher's right to knowledge and his privilege of imparting his own interpretations thereof. We point with pride to American schools from primary to graduate level and, comparing them to institutions of learning in Prague, Budapest, and Moscow, we emphasize the extent and scope of our freedoms and the enrichment of human life deriving therefrom.

We are proud of our guarantees of freedom in thought and speech and worship. Of such value are all these things to us that, unconsciously, we are guilty of one of the greatest errors that ignorance can make -- we assume that our standard of values is shared by all other humans in the world.

We are not sufficiently informed.

Probably have more need for education than any other.

21 P. O. W.'s chose Communism.

Farm problems

Foreign problems.

January 25, 1954

Dear Senator Knowland:

In response to your inquiry, I give the following as my attitude toward the proposal for amending the treaty-making functions of the Federal Government.

I am unalterably opposed to the Bricker Amendment as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee. It would so restrict the conduct of foreign affairs that our country could not negotiate the agreements necessary for the handling of our business with the rest of the world. Such an amendment would make it impossible for us to deal effectively with friendly nations for our mutual defense and common interests.

These matters are fundamental. We cannot hope to achieve and maintain peace if we shackle the Federal Government so that it is no longer sovereign in foreign affairs. The President must not be deprived of his historic position as the spokesman for the Nation in its relations with other countries.

Adoption of the Bricker Amendment in its present form by the Senate would be notice to our friends as well as our enemies abroad that our country intends to withdraw from its leadership in world affairs. The inevitable reaction would be of major proportion. It would impair our hopes and plans for peace and for the successful achievement of the important international matters now under discussion. This would include the diversion of atomic energy from warlike to peaceful purposes.

I fully subscribe to the proposition that no treaty or international agreement can contravene the Constitution. I am aware of the feeling of many of our citizens that a treaty may override the Constitution. So that there can be no question on this point, I will gladly support an appropriate amendment that will make this clear for all time.

Sincerely,



The Honorable William F. Knowland
The United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Delivered by hand, DDE to Sen. Knowland.
Copy to: Atty. Gen. Brownell.
Jim Hagerty

June 18, 1954.

Dear Cliff:

No matter how the National Open finally comes out, I find this morning that two of my favorite golfers are well up. Billy Jo is leading and Ben is not far off the pace. If Billy Jo could only do as well in this tournament as he did in the Masters, I think we ought to design a special medal for him.

While we are talking about good golfers, I should tell you about my eagle. This eagle might not be important to anyone else, but it is my first -- and it came on a hole where one day I had an eagle in my grasp and just kicked it out of the window by means of a completely inexcusable putt. I was hitting the ball fairly long and straight the other day and on Burning Tree's #10 banged my second one about six feet from the pin (on the former occasion I was twenty inches away). This time I decided to take no chances so I shut my eyes, gave it a prayerful stab -- and sure enough, there it was.



Nothing else of great moment happened except that my side lost -- and this in spite of the 10th hole and a gross 79. As you know, this also is a near miracle.

This weekend I have to go down to Quantico for at least one day. Next weekend I will have our British friends on my hands. But maybe some time after that we can fix up a Camp David bridge game. Of course I never plan such things very specifically because minor emergencies are always occurring -- but if you are going to be available the early part of July, you might let me know when you get a chance.

As ever,

Mr. Clifford Roberts,
120 Broadway,
New York, New York.

COPY

June 14, 1954

Dear Mrs. Green:

I have heard of the tragic misfortunes that you have suffered during and since World War II. To lose a son is heart-breaking; to lose a son on a battlefield has a special tragedy of its own because of the inescapable conviction that man, long ago, should have found a way to eliminate such conflicts. You have my deepest and most sincere sympathy. I wonder if I may be bold enough to tell you a little bit about one of my most profound beliefs.

I abhor war as much as I know you do. But we in America cherish the freedom we have had throughout the 178 years of our existence as a nation; we cherish it above all else and we have never hesitated when necessary to fight to preserve it. In recent years there have risen fanatical individuals, possessed of greed and lust for power, who have managed for a time to threaten our security, our safety and our freedom. To stop these aggressors, America has had to make tremendous sacrifices, both as a nation and as individuals. We have succeeded in thwarting those who have attempted to destroy us; we always will.

Now, science has provided us with weapons of unprecedented power. But I know that if we are wise enough and strong enough and courageous enough, we can eventually -- and in our lifetime -- turn that force toward constructive efforts for the betterment of mankind everywhere, and not permit it to be used -- at least exclusively -- for mankind's destruction.

I feel impelled to express my belief that the sacrifices you and thousands of other mothers have made are bringing us -- in a slow and painful process to be sure -- but steadily bringing us to the place where man's freedom and personal dignity will forever be secure. That is my hope and my deep faith, and I pray that it is in some measure shared by you.



Sincerely,

/s/ Dwight D. Eisenhower

Mrs. Marie Green
c/o Green Realty Company
Cheyenne, Wyoming

cc: Bertha Adkins

C
O
P
Y

July 21, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A basic policy of the Administration continues to be to place our financing on a sound, pay as you go, basis. Because of the size of the defense expenditures, efforts to achieve the above purpose are certain to include constant direct attention toward the desirability of further reductions in those particular appropriations.

We must, of course, continue to seek every kind of saving that is possible in overhead and administration of our defense forces; they must be operated on an austerity basis. There are still substantial sums to be saved through this kind of reform. But in the present state of world affairs, I do not deem it wise to attempt any cutback, beyond that currently planned, in the combat strength of any of the armed forces. Slight adjustments can, and of course will naturally, be made. But as of now, it is clear that prudence will not allow any major deletions from presently planned forces.

These same observations apply to:

- a. Production of atomic weapons.
- b. Civil defense activities.
- c. Necessary stockpiling and filling in other gaps in our mobilization base.



CC: Secretary of the Treasury
Director of the Budget
Director of Defense Mobilization

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Augusta, Georgia.
December 27, 1954.

Dear Oveta:

The other day I told the Director of the Bureau of the Budget that I thought we should go ahead with assistance to the states, to take care of the indigent, with an appropriation limited to 20 million dollars this year. I must tell you personally, however, that this proposition worries me very much.

I find it hard to lay down a real reason for further assistance for the five million involved, while ignoring the other twenty-five million who cannot afford health insurance. We may be, here, opening up a Pandora's box. I am always uneasy when I start on something I cannot at least faintly see the end of the road.

I wish you would think some more on this subject and be ready to talk to me soon. If the French situation does not look better, I shall probably come on back in a day or so. On the other hand, if we have a favorable vote there, I may stay here until January second. In the latter event, won't you give me a call some morning around 8:30 to 9:00, and we can chat on the phone about this matter?

I do hope you are getting some rest during this holiday season, but I very much doubt it, knowing what the breadth and scope and difficulty of your program is.

With all the best,

As ever,



The Honorable Oveta Culp Hobby,
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,
Washington.

December 22, 1954.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

I have pondered for a long time over the subject presented in your memorandum of December 20th, "medical care to public assistance recipients."

On balance I believe that we should go ahead with Secretary Hobby's program, but limit this year's expenditure to 20 million dollars. I recognize clearly the dangers that are outlined in your memorandum, but I am quite certain that the pressures to do something of this nature will eventually be irresistible. The philosophical question of whether or not the federal government or the states should be completely responsible seems to have been really resolved many years ago when the federal government first began entering this field.

In any event, it seems that it would be best to try to establish a moderate program in this field while there is in the Executive Department a clear comprehension of the dangers as well as the anticipated advantages and a determination to oppose, and even to veto, any project that to us would seem to be reckless disregard of correct principles.



D.D.E.

December 15, 1954

Dear Mr. Rockefeller:

An outstanding characteristic of our nation, I believe, is a constant endeavor to insure each citizen the fullest possible opportunity to develop himself spiritually, socially and economically. Faith in the individual, in his dignity and in his capacity for achievement is a basic principle of our system. The history of America is the story of men and women who came to these shores from all parts of the world and who have made full use of their opportunities, not only for themselves but in order that others might benefit. Of such is our strength.

It is my conviction that all the peoples of the world share the same human cravings for freedom and for opportunities to win economic and social advancement. In keeping with our heritage we seek to join with all peoples in a common effort to achieve and sustain the basic essentials of human dignity.

It is time for all of us to renew our faith in ourselves and in our fellow men. The whole world has been far too preoccupied with fears. It is time for people throughout the world to think again of hopes, of the progress that is within reach.



So that these matters may have the increased degree of attention they deserve, not only in the Departments and agencies but especially within my immediate staff, I hereby appoint you as Special Assistant to the President. I shall look to you for advice and assistance in the development of increased understanding and cooperation among all peoples. I shall also look to you for assistance in reviewing and developing methods and programs by

which the various Departments and agencies of the government may effectively contribute to such cooperation and understanding.

You are requested to attend the meetings of the Cabinet, the National Security Council, the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, and the Operations Coordinating Board.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller

December 9, 1954.

Dear Oveta:

Today I was visited by a good friend of mine from New York. He has devoted some years of his life to the problem of drug addiction and the suppression of the narcotics traffic.

He has many criticisms to make of Federal agencies charged with this responsibility, but he has nothing but praise for a man in your Department named Dr. Victor H. Vogel. He gives the names of one or two other people whom, he says, will vouch in the same all-out way for Dr. Vogel's integrity and his competence in this field. He named Dr. Herman Hilleboe, of the State Health Service of New York, and Governor George Craig of Indiana.

Dr. Vogel has written several documents, including one sizeable book on this general subject. He maintains that the problem of minimizing drug addiction in our country is largely a health problem. He makes the further statement that during the former regime Dr. Vogel incurred the displeasure of Mr. Ewing and others in authority and was really "submerged" and the government thereby deprived of his great knowledge and competence.

My friend believes that if you should bring in Dr. Vogel as your principal adviser on this matter in connection with your work as a member of the Narcotics Commission, you would be doing a tremendous favor to the entire Commission. My friend believes further that this problem is growing by leaps and bounds, far beyond the comprehension of most laymen. He reiterates his belief that the Federal government is not doing a good job, but could easily do so if only they would get the right people in charge and use the knowledge of experts like Dr. Vogel.

If you would like to talk to me further about this matter, drop in to see me or give me a ring on the phone.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Oveta Culp Hobby,
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,

Washn

PERSONAL

December 7, 1954

Dear Mr. Collord:

Your letter turned my mind back many years; unfortunately my recollections of 1905 and 1906 are not always clear, except with respect to particular incidents.



However, I was a member of the Knights of Honor Boys' Club in Abilene, organized, as I remember, by a local newspaper editor named Howe. Your name seems to ring a bell, but I must confess that I can't recall your appearance.

That is scarcely, however, as important as the subject matter of your letter. You mention the "little business man" -- an individual who has engaged the earnest attention of this Administration for the past two years. You said he was having a hard time trying to stay in business, but did not specify the type of difficulty he was encountering. So I cannot comment on that part of your letter. If you wish to pursue the subject, why not write to Mr. Wendell B. Barnes, Head of the Small Business Administration, saying in your letter that I asked you to do so?

With respect to teachers and our schools, I agree that there has been too little emphasis, in the general case, placed upon instruction in American history and development. The spiritual, intellectual and political background of our Founding Fathers should unquestionably be better understood today, so that we can more clearly discern the threats to our way of life and devise the most effective ways of combatting them.

Frankly, I think we have spent far too much time on bitter personal and partisan fights. These occupy our headlines and our attention. There is so much to do of a positive character, and you have placed your finger on one of those tasks - better education.

As carefully spelled out by our Founding Fathers, the function of education was left primarily to the cities and to the states. However, I am so sure that the Federal Government should help in coordination and in leadership along this line that this conviction furnished one of the reasons why I insisted upon the establishment of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Likewise, in special instances, Federal help and programs should be of a material kind. The real key to the growth and stability of our country is an understanding of the world, and of our form of government and what we need in material, intellectual and moral programs.

It was good to hear again from someone from our section of Kansas. Incidentally, I must remark that the particular group of high school students you have been interviewing really upset me when they didn't know the location of KANSAS.

Sincerely,



Mr. H. Tom Collord
President, Lynx-Line
Box 3985
Detroit 27, Michigan

PERSONAL

January 31, 1955

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

Admiral Radford visited me at the White House in the late afternoon of January 28th. The purpose of the visit was to discuss the instructions going to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Area, with relation to activity in the Formosa area. The basic document for discussion at the conference was the operational order to the Commander in Chief Pacific which was sent to him by the Chief of Naval Operations.

- a. It was agreed that if called upon by the Chinese Nationals, the American forces would assist in the evacuation of the Tachens.
- b. It was further agreed that if any attack was made against this operation, the American forces were, of course, fully authorized to defend themselves as necessary.
- c. It was agreed that there would be no attack on Chinese bases unless this was essential to the success of the operation. It was further agreed that if such attacks became necessary, they would be carried out only against airfields positively identified as contributing forces to the attacks against us.
- d. It was finally agreed that the United States Commander could attack the airfields from which the Chinese Communist air forces were operating if necessary in defense of his own forces engaged in the operation.



D.D.E.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3.204

TOP SECRET

JCS Letter 4/22/76

By EAT/UKS Date 9/17/76/7/24/80

cc: Adm. Radford

Book

January 5, 1955



Dear Mr. Secretary:

Responding to your request I shall, in this note, briefly summarize the views on our general needs in military strength, including personnel, that I expressed verbally to you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in December. Needless to say, these convictions on how best to preserve the peace were formed after earnest consideration of the oral and written views of our military advisers.

In approaching this problem, we should keep ever before us the realization that the security of the United States is inextricably bound up with the security of the free world. For this reason, one of our tasks is to do everything possible to promote unity of understanding and action among the free nations so that each may take its full and proper part in the cooperative process of establishing a lasting and effective security.

Certain considerations, applying more specifically to our own country's military preparations, are these:

First, the threat to our security is a continuing and many-sided one -- there is, so far as we can determine, no single critical "danger date" and no single form of enemy action to which we could soundly gear all our defense preparations. We will never commit aggression, but we must always be ready to defeat it.

Second, true security for our country must be founded on a strong and expanding economy, readily convertible to the tasks of war.

Third, because scientific progress exerts a constantly increasing influence upon the character and conduct of war, and because America's most precious possession is the lives of her citizens, we should base our security upon military formations which make maximum use of science and technology in order to minimize numbers in men.

Fourth, due to the destructiveness of modern weapons and the increasing efficiency of long-range bombing aircraft, the United States has reason, for the first time in its history, to be deeply concerned over the serious effects which a sudden attack could conceivably inflict upon our country.



Our first objective must therefore be to maintain the capability to deter an enemy from attack and to blunt that attack if it comes -- by a combination of effective retaliatory power and a continental defense system of steadily increasing effectiveness. These two tasks logically demand priority in all planning. Thus we will assure that our industrial capacity can continue throughout a war to produce the gigantic amounts of equipment and supplies required.

We can never be defeated so long as our relative superiority in productive capacity is sustained.

Other essential tasks during the initial period following a possible future attack would require the Navy to clear the ocean lanes, and the Army to do its part in meeting critical land situations. Our forces in NATO and elsewhere could be swiftly engaged. To maintain order and organization under the conditions that would prevail in attacked areas of our country would of itself constitute a major challenge. Improved Reserve programs would help greatly -- in fact might prove the decisive margin -- in these as in other major tasks.

To provide for meeting lesser hostile action -- such as local aggression not broadened by the intervention of a major aggressor's forces -- growing reliance can be placed upon the forces now being built and strengthened in many areas of the free world. But because this reliance cannot be complete, and because our own vital interests, collective security and pledged faith might well be involved, there remain certain contingencies for which the United States should be ready with mobile forces to help indigenous troops deter local aggression, direct or indirect.

In view of the practical considerations limiting the rapid deployment of large military forces from the continental United States immediately on outbreak of war, the numbers of active troops maintained for this purpose can be correspondingly tailored. For the remainder we may look primarily to our Reserves and our mobilization base, including our stockpile of critical materials.

All these capabilities have a double value -- they serve our aim in peacetime of preventing war through their deterrent effect; they form the foundation of effective defense if aggressors should strike.

Both in composition and in strength our security arrangements must have long-term applicability. Lack of reasonable stability is the most wasteful and expensive practice in military activity. We cannot afford intermittent acceleration of preparation and expenditure in response to emotional tension, inevitably followed by cutbacks inspired by wishful thinking. Development of sound, long-term security requires that we design our forces so as to assure a steadily increasing efficiency, in step with scientific advances, but characterized by a stability that is not materially disturbed by every propaganda effort of unfriendly nations.

It is, of course, obvious that defensive forces in America are maintained to defend a way of life. They must be adequate for this purpose but must not become such an intolerable burden as to occasion loss of civilian morale or the individual initiative on which, in a free country, depends the dynamic industrial effort which is the continuing foundation of our nation's security.

It is at this point that professional military competence and political statesmanship must join to form judgments as to the minimum defensive structure that should be supported by the nation. To do less than the minimum would expose the nation to the predatory purposes of potential enemies. On the other hand, to build excessively under the impulse of fear could, in the long run, defeat our purposes by damaging the growth of our economy and eventually forcing it into regimented controls.

It is for the reasons so briefly touched upon above that I have decided to present to the Congress, on behalf of the Administration, a program which has been under development during the past two years. That program contemplates an active personnel strength of the Armed Forces at June 30, 1955, of approximately 3,000,000, within which the Air Force will be increased to about 975,000.

Experience will determine to what extent the personnel strengths set for June 1955 can be further reduced. It would not be wise at this time to fix rigid targets for 1956. As a goal, I suggest a strength of the order of 2,850,000 -- with any further material reductions dependent upon an improved world situation. To reach such figures without injuring our combat strength will require continuing close scrutiny of all defense elements, with particular emphasis on administrative overhead.

Essential to this entire program is economy in operation. If we are to support active and effective forces of the order indicated over a period which may last for decades, we must practice a strict austerity in day-to-day operations. This is an insistent and constant mission of every responsible official, military and civilian, in the Defense Department.

In this time of rapidly developing technology and frequent changes in the world situation, we should in our efforts for peace and security continuously re-shape our programs to changing conditions and avoid fixed or frozen ideas. The threat of modern war calls for constant modernization.

Since your request to me and this reply both deal with matters on which our citizenry ought to be as fully informed as considerations of security permit, I am directing the public release of the two documents.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Charles E. Wilson
The Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C.

TOP SECRET

October 15, 1956.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

The Secretary of State, accompanied by Mr. Hoover and Mr. Rountree of his office, came to see me about the deteriorating situation in the Israel-Jordan area.

It seems to be taken internationally as a foregone conclusion that Jordan is breaking up, and of course all the surrounding countries will be anxious to get their share of the wreckage, including Israel. In fact, there is some suspicion that the recent savage blows of the Israel border armies against the strong points within Jordan territory are intended to hasten this process of dissolution.

On the other side of the picture, there is some indication that Britain is really serious in her announced intention of honoring her Pact with Jordan, which requires her to help defend Jordan in the case of outside invasion.

Should this occur, we would have Britain in the curious position of helping to defend one of the Arab countries, while at the same time she is engaged in a quarrel -- which sometimes threatens to break out into war -- with Egypt over the Suez question.

All this brings to the fore one particular thing we must bear in mind. It is this: As of this moment we are dealing with the existing situation -- that is, with Jordan enjoying the rights of a sovereign country. At the same time, in view of the possible disintegration of the Jordanian government, we must be ready to deal with the situation in which the people and territory of that country would be absorbed by others.

For the moment we can deal only with the first problem.

The Secretary of State is having a long conference with the Israeli Ambassador to this country, Mr. Eban. The Ambassador is about to return to his own country and is visiting Foster to discuss some of the factors in the above problem.

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-201

MR 78-130 #5

By DJH/kcc Date 11/20/80

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - 2.
(October 15, 1956).

I have told the Secretary of State that he should make very clear to the Israelis that they must stop these attacks against the borders of Jordan. If they continue them, and particularly if they carry them on to the point of trying to take over and hold the territory west of the Jordan River, they will certainly be condemned by the United Nations, and not only Arab opinion but all world opinion will be brought to bear against this little country. Moreover, should there be a United Nations Resolution condemning Israel, there will be no brake or deterrent possible against any Soviet move into the area to help the Arab countries. They could bring considerable forces in under the guise that they were carrying out a United Nations mandate, the ultimate effect of which would be to Sovietize the whole region, including Israel.



There has been some disposition to believe that Ben Gurion's obviously aggressive attitude is inspired, at this moment, by three things:

- (a). His desire to take advantage of the gradual deterioration in Jordan and to be ready to occupy and lay claim to a goodly portion of the area of that nation;
- (b). The preoccupation of Egypt and the Western powers in the Suez question, which would tend both to minimize the possibility that Egypt would enter a war against him promptly, while at the same time it would impede Britain's capability of reinforcing Jordan.
- (c). His belief that the current political campaign in the United States will keep this government from taking a strong stand against any aggressive move he might make.

Secretary Dulles will warn the Ambassador that while, of course, we would hate to create misunderstandings and needless passion in this country over this question, at this moment he should inform his government that no considerations of partisan politics will keep this government from pursuing a course dictated by justice and international decency in the circumstances, and that it will remain true to its pledges under the United Nations.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - 3.
(October 15, 1956).

Ben Gurion should not make any grave mistakes based upon his belief that winning a domestic election is as important to us as preserving and protecting the interests of the United Nations and other nations of the free world in that region. The Secretary is to point out, moreover, that even if Ben Gurion, in an aggressive move, should get an immediate advantage in the region, that on a long term basis aggression on his part cannot fail to bring catastrophe and such friends as he would have left in the world, no matter how powerful, could not do anything about it.

Foster will make this attitude clear and unmistakable to Mr. Eban.

At the same time I have Foster's promise to have ready a policy or plan that would guide our action in the event that the dissolution of Jordan would actually take place and thus create a new situation in the world.

D.D.E.



Appendix:

It is believed that one of the recent Israeli raids against Jordan involved two or three battalions of infantry, artillery, and jet airplanes. Incidentally, our high-flying reconnaissance planes have shown that Israel has obtained some 60 of the French Mystere pursuit planes, when there had been reported the transfer of only 24. Jordan has no aviation.

D.D.E.

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DIARY -- August 8, 1956



The current Suez crisis.

The Suez affair has a long and intricate background and at this moment the outcome of the quarrel is so undetermined that it would be difficult indeed to predict what will probably happen.

Unlike the Panama Canal, which was built as a national undertaking by the United States under the terms of a bilateral treaty with Panama, the Suez Canal was built by an international group. There seems to have been felt the need for clarifying rights and privileges of the several nations in the use of the Canal, and so in 1888 a Convention or Treaty was signed, among a group of nations (about 10, I think) and which was left open for the purpose of permitting other nations to sign later should they so choose. That Treaty, among other things, made the waterway an international one forever, open to the shipping of all countries both in peace and war.

The Canal was originally constructed under a concession from Egypt, which expires in 1968, but the 1888 Convention specifically provided that the international character will continue no matter what the future ownership or concession arrangements might be.

Originally, I believe the stock was held largely by Egypt and by Frenchmen, but during the course of the years Egyptian rulers sold theirs. In any event a large block was acquired by the British Government. I am

not certain, but it is possible that the British Government may have owned some of the original stock. In any event, as of today the British own about 400,000 shares.



On the morning of July 27th, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the President of Egypt, made a very inflammatory speech, in which he announced the nationalizing of the Canal Company. This meant that the Egyptian Government took over the entire resources of the Suez Canal Company wherever they might be located. He also issued an extraordinary order to the effect that all people working for the Canal would be required to continue in their present employment under penalty of imprisonment. A further statement indicated that he expected to realize something on the order of one hundred million dollars profit a year out of the Canal and this undoubtedly meant a steep increase in Canal tolls since today after the payment to Egypt of the normal ground rental of some seventeen million dollars, there is only about thirty-five million dollars' profit. Another point in this connection is that the volume of traffic and the size of vessels is increasing so rapidly that very soon an extra three-quarters of a billion dollars must be spent to deepen and widen the Canal.

Nasser said he was doing these things because of the refusal of the United States to help him build the Aswan Dam.

When we made our first offer, I think more than a year ago, to help build the Aswan Dam, it was conceived of as a joint venture of ourselves and the British, which, once accomplished, would enable the World Bank to go in and help Nasser to completion of the work. It was felt that under this basis, the project would be feasible but would require all the resources that Egypt could donate to public affairs.

Egypt at once did two things:

(1) They sent back to us a whole list of conditions that would have to be met before they would go along with this plan and some of these conditions were unacceptable.

(2) They began to build up their military forces by taking over equipment provided by the Soviets, and they went to such an extent that we did not believe they would have a sufficient balance of resources left to do their part in building the Dam.

We lost interest and said nothing more about the matter.

Suddenly, about a month ago, Nasser sent us a message to the effect that he had withdrawn all of the conditions that he had laid down, and was ready to proceed under our original offer. Since conditions had changed markedly and we had thought the whole project dead, we merely replied we were no longer interested.



DIARY

April 20, 1956.

All day long I have been receiving advice to the effect that all of us must do our best to keep the Packard-Studebaker combine from liquidating, which it seems to be on the point of doing. For more than a year I have been working on this particular matter, especially urging the Defense Department to give this firm some defense contracts, in the items in which it had already established a fine production record.

The whole thing has come to the point where few people are holding out any great hope for success. However, the Defense Department is now seeking to place a contract for some five thousand trucks; manifestly this would be of some help if it could be given to Studebaker, which has a good record in truck production. Moreover, Charlie Wilson has agreed to talk to the larger automobile companies in Detroit with two things in mind: (a) to determine whether some contracts they now have might be shifted to Packard-Studebaker (either prime or sub-contract); and (b) whether it might not be possible for one of the big companies to buy up one or two of the less efficient production units in the Packard-Studebaker combine.

It is manifestly to the interests of the big companies, as well as to the economy as a whole, to keep Packard-Studebaker operating.



* * * * *

This afternoon Paul Hoffman came in to see me about another matter. But since he had been so long identified with Studebaker, the subject of the survival of that company came up. It appears that Paul no longer has any executive authority whatsoever in the company, but he has worked hard in an effort to preserve the dealers' organization and to get the capital whereby the two companies could have a good line of long term credit while trying to get back into the competitive field on a better basis.

To me he talked very pessimistically, but I did urge him to keep trying.

The automobile market is very soft at the moment, largely because the big companies would not use sense in their production schedules last year. They -- and the economy -- are now suffering the consequences of their blind hard-headedness. If one company would go under, it might practically dry up the market for a while and we would suffer accordingly.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 11

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MA 77-71 #1
By J.V. Date 9-11-78

DIARY

March 28, 1956.

Memorandum from the Secretary of State, dated March 28, 1956, entitled "Near Eastern Policies", was brought to the White House at 4:30 on March 28, 1956, shortly after the President's return from White Sulphur Springs. Accompanying Mr. Dulles were: Herbert Hoover, Jr., George V. Allen, William M. Rountree, Reuben Robertson, Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford. Sitting in on appointment was Colonel Goodpaster, who will also prepare notes).

President dictated, after the meeting, as follows:

"This memorandum (attached) was brought to me by the Secretary of State in response to my request that he prepare a list of the things that might be done in the Middle East which could help stabilize the situation and give us a better atmosphere in which to work.

"I have authorized the State Department to start work on all of the attached points. A fundamental factor in the problem is the growing ambition of Nasser, the sense of power he has gained out of his associations with the Soviets, his belief that he can emerge as a true leader of the entire Arab world -- and because of these beliefs, his rejection of every proposition advanced as a measure of conciliation between the Arabs and Israel.

"Because of this, I suggested to the State Department that we begin to build up some other individual as a prospective leader of the Arab world -- in the thought that mutually antagonistic personal ambitions

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might disrupt the aggressive plans that Nasser is evidently developing. My own choice of such a rival is King Saud. However, I do not know the man, and therefore do not know whether he could be built up into the position I visualize. Nevertheless Arabia is a country that contains the holy places of the Moslem world, and the Saudi Arabians are considered to be the most deeply religious of all the Arab groups. Consequently, the King could be built up, possibly, as a spiritual leader. Once this were accomplished we might begin to urge his right to political leadership. (Obviously this is just a thought, but something of the nature ought to be developed in support of the other suggestions contained in this memorandum).

"We had a long conversation deciding upon the kind of person who could direct and coordinate the campaign visualized in the memorandum. He will need quite a staff and some field organization, and it will be a real job to find the right man."



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DJH 6/25/75

DIARY, March 21, 1956.

Additional notes made by acw during telephone conversation of the President with Mrs. Hobby. Her side of conversation could not be recorded.

Discussion about Minnesota primary. President said he agreed we ought to know what happened. Said that the Democratic candidates between them got about 400,000 votes -- but he thinks that some Republicans voted in the Democratic primary. He also said that the Republican vote in the primary does not mean a thing. He said he was shocked that the vote went the way it did in view of the fact that Kefauver without any responsibility, promised everything that anybody wanted. Such irresponsibility means more and more trouble and finally "the United States will rebel and throw all those laws overboard."

Suggestion of television talk by President. President said that he had, in fact, made same suggestion to Legislative leaders yesterday.

Sending Brad Mintener and others to Minnesota.

De-segregation. President said one thing worries him and that is that frequently in the South is heard the expression (about de-segregation) that it was a "Republican" decision in the Supreme Court. He pointed out that Justice Warren actually did not affect the decision a bit.

Billy Graham. President told Mrs. Hobby of his conversation with Billy Graham yesterday. Said Reverend Graham was convinced that the storm raised by the decision had set back the cause of integration, but he thinks it is bound to come eventually. He said that the political and morale values are plain for all to see -- but that the social values were different. The South has a fixed tradition -- that is compounded with fear and resentment. Reverend Graham is having four meetings throughout the South, and he is going to take the subject of integration and deal with it in about the same basis as the President has dealt with it at the press conference. "If there was ever a time for moderation and decency, it is now." Reverend Graham is going to try to do the same thing from the pulpit and get other preachers to do it.

Graduate schools. The President said he thought the South was wrong in one place. He believes that the graduate schools of the recognized universities should establish disinterested boards to decide by examination of the eligibility for entry of all students, and that the graduate schools should abide by such decisions.

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DIARY, March 21, 1956.

- 2 -

De-segregation in the Army. The President said that in 1946-47 he tried to bring partial integration into the Army and he was thought all out of bounds by many of the Army officials. It did not matter to him, since he knew he was going to leave and he fought the staff on the issue. Now, he said, it is accepted all over the Army without a ripple of trouble, and that is less than ten years ago.



February 13, 1956.

President talked a few minutes with Gabe Hauge, after signing two official papers dealing with Egyptian cotton and cigarette lighters. After he had done the necessary signatures, he said that in the Army he had always had a rule that he would never decide any question upon which he was not fully acquainted; that he made his aides make the decisions -- that is the person who saw the problem, realized its full extent, was responsible for the decision. Here is a different case; he must know, or pretend to know, everything about literally everything. He suggested that the two cases just handled might be something that the proposed Administrative Vice President could handle.



Gabe thought it was possible, but pointed out how touchy Congress was about tariffs and such things.

Then the President launched into the question of why should he be interested in trying to help elect Republicans to the Congress, that in many cases he is as satisfied to have the Democrats in control. Gabe pointed out the desirability of controlling the chairmanships, but admitted the chairmen, in some cases, were not particularly impressive.

The President then said that he did not believe many people understood that our political and economic life are so intertwined that we cannot separate them. He talked about the boards of directors of great companies, who are responsible in great measure for many of the economic facts of life -- the U. S. Steel which gives a price rise, etc. He said possibly great inflation could result from the decision of a Board such as U. S. Steel, a board perhaps representing only 2 per cent of the total stockholders of such a corporation. He pointed out the difference that had resulted in recent years. In former times a man really risked his business on his decisions. "There is something to be said for the tycoon age as against the directorship age." He said that the United States had entered into a political level that was not dreamed of by our forebears. Now you have a situation where the whole life of the United States can be affected by a corporate decision. He said in Detroit the life of the city was more influence by a decision of the General Motors Board than by the City Council. This sort of thing can be very dangerous unless people act with the greatest wisdom and concert for the nation. "I think that at times we are trembling on the brink of something we don't even see -- when do you think is going to be

the first time that a union will demand representation on a Board."

President switched to the gas bill currently in the White House. He said the present bill contained much of what he wanted, but now that he had it, he could not sign and defend it, surrounded as it was with an atmosphere of suspicion.

Gabe went back to the President's thesis about the power of directors, and said the question was when would the quality of human beings that make the decisions improve. How does a man on the Board of Directors of a large corporation fulfill his "duty" to the stockholders and his obligation to society.



The President also said he was greatly irritated with business (because of gas bill), but Gabe said quietly that business must have an honorable place. President said "I want to give businessmen an honorable place, but they make crooks out of themselves."

President said about the gas bill that they (the Congress) gave him last week a very bad week, he doesn't know when he has been so down.

Gabe said that Aiken said he had never seen a bill over'lobbied as this one was.

Wednesday, January 26, 1955.

Breakfast with a group (20?) of Republican women. The more I see of women in politics the more I am convinced that -- on the average -- they reflect a far more idealistic attitude toward political activity than do men. It's refreshing to visit with them.

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January 23, 1956.

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DIARY

January 23, 1956.

General George (retired from the Air Force), assisted by a staff group, made a presentation on net evaluation of the damage that would be anticipated in the initial stages of nuclear war between Russia and the United States. The date chosen was July 1, 1956.

The report was in two parts, each based on a particular assumption as to a condition under which the war might develop. The first anticipated no warning until our DEW line was reached. The second anticipated a month of strategic warning, although without specific information as to when an attack would be launched by the Russians.

I.

Under the first case, the United States experienced practically total economic collapse, which could not be restored to any kind of operative conditions under six months to a year. Members of the Federal government were wiped out and a new government had to be improvised by the states. Casualties were enormous. It was calculated that something on the order of 65% of the population would require some kind of medical care, and in most instances, no opportunity whatsoever to get it.

The limiting factor on the damage inflicted was not so much our own defensive arrangements as the limitations on the Soviet stock pile of atomic weapons in the year '58.

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Authority NLE 76-63, #111

By SL NLE DATE 4-18-77

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While these things were going on, the damage inflicted by us against the Soviets was roughly three times greater. The picture of total destruction of the areas of lethal fall-out, of serious fall-out and of at least some damage from fall-out, was appalling. Under such an attack, it would be completely impossible for Russia to carry a war on further.



For ourselves, it would be clear that there would be no shipping in and out of our country except some small or improvised vessels for many months. It would literally be a business of digging ourselves out of ashes, starting again.

II

Under the second case, it was concluded that the major effort of the Soviets would be made against our air bases rather than against the United States alone. Nevertheless, there was no significant difference in the losses we would take.

It was concluded that there was little we could do during the month of warning in the way of dispersal of populations, of industries, or of perfecting defenses that would cut down losses. The only possible way of reducing these losses would be for us to take the initiative some time during the assumed month in which we had the warning of an

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attack and launch a surprise attack against the Soviets. This would be not only against our traditions, but it would appear to be impossible unless the Congress would meet in a highly secret session and vote a declaration of war which would be implemented before the session was terminated. It would appear to be impossible that any such thing would occur.




~~TOP SECRET~~

August 1, 1953.

DDE/acw.

Senator Taft's death came so quickly after his first knowledge of any illness that I think it astonished even those of us who had some reasonably early warning of the nature of the illness.

He came to see me in Augusta where I was staying at the Augusta National Golf Club, on April 19th, and spent the night with me. At the conclusion of a golf game on ~~August~~^{April} 20th, he remarked to me that his hip hurt him a little bit -- that he had noticed some pain in the region of his hip for a couple of weeks. He said that he thought he possibly should see a doctor.



On May 20th he went to Walter Reed Hospital for preliminary examination; and on May 27th General Snyder told me that he had certain alarming symptoms of cancer.

On June 10th I was in Minnesota when I received word that the Senator had made public announcement that he would have to give up his leadership duties in the Senate.

On June 19th, I attended a conference in Mr. Shanley's office (actually it was in Governor Adams' office - acw) attended also, among others, by Senator Taft, Secretary Durkin, Mr. Shanley and Congressman McConnell. It was the first time I had seen Senator Taft using crutches and I thought he looked fairly badly.

August 1, 1953 - 2.

On June 24th he attended a Legislative breakfast, and on June 25th a Legislative luncheon at the White House.

On June 29th, a meeting of Legislative leaders was held in the Cabinet Room, which Senator Taft attended. Thereafter he came to my office for a short conference. He looked fine; with good color, and was very jovial. He was particularly delighted with his physical improvement, saying that although he had lost 25 pounds since he first became ill, he had, in the week just preceding my meeting with him, gained four pounds. He was quite sure he was well on the road to recovery.



On July 4th Senator Taft went to New York, and on July 8th an exploratory operation was performed. General Snyder had told me some time before that he was going to have such an operation and he thought the Senator had delayed it unnecessarily and unwisely.

On July 21st I called him on the telephone. He was feeling well and said that within one week he was going to leave the hospital and come back to Washington. We discussed a number of matters, including the appointment as Assistant Secretary of Labor of a man named Siciliano.

On July 31st he died, never having left the hospital.



July 24, 1953.

Numerous conferences and conversations of recent days brought out a few points interesting enough to make brief notations concerning them.

On Monday night, the 20th, I had the fourth of a series of bi-weekly stag dinners. (Guests listed on separate sheet). At this particular dinner the guests got to talking about gold standards, the value to the United States of the gold now buried at Fort Knox, and the value of the raw materials of many kinds now included in our stock piles as a war reserve.

As always, a small minority favored "return to a gold standard." When these people were pressed, they had no clear idea as to the method by which this should be done; indeed, they had no real idea of what they were talking about. It developed that what was really the unanimous hope was the achieving of a long-term stability in our dollar. This was expressed in terms of insurance policies. Mr. Schaefer (J. Earl Schaefer, Vice-President Boeing Airplane Company, Wichita Kansas) expressed the opinion that unless people could believe that insurance policies would be paid off in roughly the same kind of dollars as were put into them, we would finally find our investment needs far greater than the capital to fill them.

In any event, it was finally agreed that if all the gold at Fort Knox should sink into a bottomless pit -- and no one ever learned of this fact -- the disappearance would not have the slightest effect on any of us, so long as we did not have to ship out gold to pay for the excess of imports over exports. As of today, this seems to be a possibility only for the remote future. Consequently, the conclusion --

July 24, 1953.

that is of today -- is that we don't need the gold except psychologically.

If people knew it was gone, there would be a panic.

On the other hand, the materials in our stock piles represent insurance against disaster. They have a definite and concrete value to our economy. The obvious question is "Why are they not a better backing for a currency than gold?" Such questions as these were pursued the entire evening. As usual, everybody went away carrying with him the opinion with which he came.




A few days ago (Monday, July 20) I had luncheon with Governor Byrnes of South Carolina, my great friend a man in whose company I always find a great deal for enjoyment.

He came to talk to me about the possibility of a Supreme Court ruling that would abolish segregation in public schools of the country. He is very fearful of the consequences in the South. He did not dwell long upon the possibility of riots, resultant ill feeling, and the like. He merely expressed very seriously the opinion that a number of states would immediately cease support for public schools.

During the course of this conversation, the Governor brought out several times that the South no longer finds any great problem in dealing with adult Negroes. They are frightened at putting the children together.

July 24, 1953. - 3.

The Governor was obviously afraid that I would be carried away by the hope of capturing the Negro vote in this country, and as a consequence take a stand on the question that would forever defeat any possibility of developing a real Republican or "Opposition" Party in the South. I told him that while I was not going to give in advance my attitude toward a Supreme Court opinion that I had not even seen and so could not know in what terms it would be couched, that my convictions would not be formed by political expediency. He is well aware of my belief that improvement in race relations is one of those things that will be healthy and sound only if it starts locally. I do not believe that prejudices, even palpably unjustified prejudices, will succumb to compulsion. Consequently, I believe that Federal law imposed upon our states in such a way as to bring about a conflict of the police powers of the states and of the nation, would set back the cause of progress in race relations for a long, long time.




* * * * *

On a later date (July 21, 1953) former President Herbert Hoover, with a group of others, had lunch with me. We discussed the formulation of a new governmental commission, the real purpose of which would be to make a study of federal functions and organization, and in doing so, to expand the work and findings of the Hoover Commission of some four years ago. For my selections to the new Commission, I have chosen Mr. Hoover, Mr. James Farley,

July 24, 1953 - 4.

Attorney General Brownell and the Director of Defense Mobilization, Mr. Arthur Flemming. Mr. Hoover is delighted with the opportunity to get back into the middle of this big problem. However, I was a bit nonplused to find that the only individuals he wanted on the Commission were those whom he knew to share his general convictions -- convictions that many of our people would consider a trifle on the motheaten side. As quickly as I found this out, I tried to make my other three appointments from among individuals whom I knew to be reasonably liberal or what I call middle-of-the-road in their approach to today's problems.



* * * * *

The Bricker Amendment to the Constitution is being pushed by the Senator from Ohio as his one hope of achieving at least a faint immortality in American history. The purpose of the Bricker Amendment is to assure the American people that no provision of a treaty may over-ride, internationally, any portion of the United States Constitution. Beyond this, it provides that no part of a treaty that affects the domestic affairs of the United States can become the law of the land until proper legislation is enacted by Congress. Now up to this point there is no quarrel about the matter at all. A number of us believe that an Amendment to the above effect is completely unnecessary because we hold the present Constitution is perfectly clear on this point. Because we do so believe, we are quite willing to have an amendment specifically re-stating the proposition. But Senator Bricker wants to

July 24, 1953 - 5.

add (at the insistence of a certain fearful section of the American Bar Association) a provision to the second of the above purposes by saying that the Congressional law passed for the implementation of a treaty would be invalid unless it would have been completely valid in the total absence of a treaty. This I cannot accept and none of my advisers will accept. To do so would completely wreck the traditional and prescribed balance between the Executive and the Legislative branch in the making of treaties.

Senator Knowland has introduced a substitute Amendment containing only the parts of the Bricker Amendment of which the Administration approves.



* * * * *


It is almost hopeless to write about the Korea-Rhee situation. Both the Communists and the South Korean Government have raised so many difficulties in the prosecution of the negotiations intended to end the fighting that it raises in my mind a serious question as to whether or not the United Nations will ever again go into an area to protect the inhabitants against Communist attack. It has been a long and bitter experience, and I am certain in my own mind that except for the fact that evacuation of South Korea would badly expose Japan, the majority of the United Nations now fighting there would have long since attempted to pull out.

It is impossible to attempt here to recite the long list of items in which Rhee has been completely uncooperative, even recalcitrant. It is sufficient

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to say that the United Nations went into Korea only to repel aggression, not to re-unite Korea by force. The armistice was intended to stop the fighting after the United Nations had proven its ability to stop such aggression and was intended also to mark the beginning of political discussions which would hope to re-unite Korea and accomplish the evacuation of that country by both the Chinese and the allied troops.

There has been so much backing and filling, indecision, doubt and frustration engendered by both Rhee and the Communists that I am doubtful that an armistice even if achieved will have any great meaning. Certainly we must be extremely wary and watchful of both sides. Of course the fact remains that the probable enemy is the Communists, but Rhee has been such an unsatisfactory ally that it is difficult indeed to avoid excoriating him in the strongest of terms.



* * * * *

I have mentioned above the Commission on Government Reorganization and Functions, authorized by the Congress. I personally doubt the need for its organization, because of the simultaneous authorization of another Commission which will have to do with the division of functions, duties and responsibilities between the federal government and the several states.

It seems to me that this second Commission, in order to reach its answers, will have to cover almost the identical ground that the Organizational Committee will. Essential functions of the federal government can be specified and segregated only in the light of what it is proper for states to do. Nevertheless,

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and in spite of the fact that these views were carefully explained to Congressional leaders, two or three individuals on the Hill were so determined to have a new "Hoover" Commission that I had to accept the Hoover Commission in order to achieve the other one, from which I expect much.



A third Commission is to study the whole problem of foreign trade. Here again, if we succeed in getting a thorough study and unbiased analysis, we should have a very sound background for the programs that we shall have to present to Congress during the coming months. Pressure groups always want to establish new tariffs -- I believe that an increased volume of trade, with decreasing obstacles of all kinds, is absolutely essential to the future of the free world. Undoubtedly, at numerous places in this notebook, I have discussed the reasons for this. But this does not mean that the job of getting our people (particularly the ivory fringe of the Republican Party) to examine this matter dispassionately and intelligently and with the hope of serving the enlightened self-interest of the United States, is an easy one.

Daily I am impressed by the short-sightedness bordering upon tragic stupidity of many who fancy themselves to be the greatest believers in and supporters of capitalism (or a free competitive economy), but who blindly support measures and conditions that cannot fail in the long run to destroy any free economic system.

Lenin held, of course, that capitalism contains within itself what he calls "contradictions" which not only makes certain of its inadequacy as a basis of government, but which he claimed are certain to bring about revolution of the proletariat.



The first of these contradictions he called the capital-labor contradiction. He claimed that there were no restraints upon the power of the capitalists -- the great corporations and the syndicates -- to confront the masses with the choice between the extremes of abject acceptance of a condition of
on one hand
slavery/or bloody revolution on the other.

The second contradiction in the capitalistic system he described as the inevitable conflict between separate groups of capitalists each struggling for the sources of raw materials and other means of production. In essence, of course, this meant capitalistic wars between capitalistic states for the domination of the world's surface.

His third contradiction was the inherent conflict, as he argued, between the advanced, industrialized nations of the world and the dependent masses

of backward peoples. He saw in the unequal advances made by peoples in industrialization only opportunity for exploitation by the stronger and more advanced. This he regarded as inhuman, brutal, cruel, and another factor certain to cause world revolution.



Any material contemplation of the points raised by Lenin could easily show that his intentions had plausibility only when considered in terms of extremist. All human experience tends to show that human progress, where advanced numbers of people and intricate relationships are concerned, is possible only as extremes are avoided and solutions to problems are found in a great middle way that has regard for the requirements, desires, and aspirations of the vast majority. Consequently, the inevitability of the results of the so-called contradictions in capitalism is open to question. In fact, we flatly deny that they have to become so serious as to cause the destruction of competitive form of enterprise and a free government based upon it.

Of course, in an exhaustive study of some of the Communist writings, the kind of reasoning sketchily illustrated by the examples given above leads them to their fundamental conclusion that free systems of government cannot possibly exist in the world. Conflicts among pressure groups -- in short, the intimate selfishness of men -- are cited by the Communists as evidence that man is really incapable of self-government.



Indeed in Lenin's arguments it is interesting to note that he flatly rejected the theory of some of the early Communists -- those represented in the second internationale, that a majority of citizens in any country would necessarily be converted to Communism before the Communistic theory could be successfully applied in that country. He scorned such a doctrine and insisted that any circumstance or accident that gave a group of devoted Communists an opportunity to seize positions of power was really all that was necessary. Thereafter, the Communistic theory in its entire scope would and should be quickly applied to the entire country.

Of course, there have been happenings in history that would seemingly give a certain validity to some of these Communistic arguments. But I believe that, no matter what were the true basic causes of deterioration of democratic systems established among the citizens of ancient Athens and Rome, it is safe to say that the principal contradiction in the whole system comes about because of the inability of men to forego immediate gain for a long time good. I believe that the educational process has convinced the vast majority of Americans, for example, that the true interests of labor and capital within our society follow courses that are far more nearly parallel than conflicting. I believe that capitalistic -- that is to say, self-governing -- nations have long ago foreseen that any kind of war is too high a price to pay for the hope of a piece of additional territory. I believe, also, that, in the high average of cases, industrialized

countries approach the problem of relationships with backward areas on the basis of mutual benefit and advancement.

But when it comes to the making of decisions as between the immediate and selfish interest of a nation, a group, or an individual on the one hand, and on the other the long-term good of the world, the nation, or the individual, we do not yet have a sufficient number of people who are ready to make the immediate sacrifice in favor of a long-term investment.



Specifically, our country has depended for decades on a system of tariffs designed originally to protect infant industries and, in latter days, to protect an American industry against cheap labor to be found abroad. This doctrine was undoubtedly a good one to follow as long as we were a debtor nation; since we had to acquire currencies of foreign countries in order to pay for the imports we bought, it was to our interest to keep them of the lowest possible aggregate value. Otherwise, all our gold reserves have been gradually draining away, and with disastrous consequences on our own economy.

As the years and two World Wars passed across the stage, America became the greatest creditor nation the world has ever known. No longer is it to the interest of America to keep imports down and exports up just to preserve the financial soundness of our whole system. In certain

instances, it is possible that particular industries should be protected because of their importance to us in the event of war. For example, I suppose that there is no substitute for a small but competent watch industry in our country because, in time of war, the skills and facilities of such an industry would be available for the making of fine instruments of all kinds. Similar arguments can be made in the case of certain other industries. But, by and large, the case for lowered American tariffs is so generally valid that to see so many so-called enlightened people opposing such a trend leads me almost to repeat again the sentence with which I opened this memorandum.

Industries, big and little -- sheep growers, pipe makers, silk scarf manufacturers, miners of tungsten, and so on, and so on -- all these people are so concerned for their own particular immediate market and prosperity that they utterly fail to see that the United States cannot continue to live in a world where it must, for the disposal of its products, export vast portions of its industrial and agricultural products unless it also imports a sufficiently great amount of foreign products to allow countries to pay for the surpluses they receive from us.

Along with this main proposition go a number of corollaries. An important one springs out of the continuous struggle going on in the world between the Communistic theory and free systems of government. Since Communism is aggressive, it reaches out to absorb every area in which can be detected

the slightest discontent or other form of weakness. Where men and women and their children suffer the pains of hunger and exposure, Communism quickly makes great headway. Consequently, unless the free world espouses and sustains, under the leadership of America, a system of world trade that will allow backward people to make a decent living -- even if only a minimum one measured by American standards -- then in the long run we must fall prey to the Communistic attack.

Another item in this particular phase of the situation is the American complete dependence upon other areas for certain types of materials such as tin, cobalt, uranium, manganese, natural rubber and, increasingly, crude oil. There are countless others. Unless the areas in which these materials are found are under the control of people who are friendly to us and who want to trade with us, then again we are bound in the long run to suffer the most disastrous and doleful consequences.

The general conclusion of these meandering thoughts is that leadership must find a way to bring men and nations to a point where they will give to the long-term promise the same value that they give to immediate and individual gains. If we could produce clear and dispassionate thinking in this regard, if we could get today the questions of world trade and world cooperation studied and settled on the basis of the long-term good of all, we could laugh at all the other so-called "contradictions" in our system, and we could be so secure against the Communist menace that it would gradually dry up and wither away.



As it is, the danger is very real and very great that even the so-called enlightened areas of Western Europe, Britain, United States, and the other English-speaking peoples will, by stubborn adherence to the purpose of achieving maximum immediate gain, actually commit suicide.

In this situation, we find a reason to say that, even if the free government were not originally based upon some form of deeply felt religious faith, then men should attempt to devise a religion that stresses the qualities of unselfishness, cooperation, and equality of men.



In the facets of our resources -- material, scientific, human, and spiritual -- there is ample assurance not only of security but of continued advance for all the free world in living standards if only we have sense enough to learn to cooperate for the long-term benefit of all of us.

For diary

9/29/55

I'll try to set down here, for the President's use or perhaps John's, what little I can add to the chronology of his illness.



The President spent the four days, September 19th to the morning of the 23rd at Fraser. On the morning of the 23rd he got up at 5:00, cooked breakfast for the guests there (George Allen, Bob Biggers - who was an unexpected added starter by Bob Schulz - and of course Aksel Nielsen.) He told me that that morning he did not give them wheatcakes, only eggs and bacon. At 6:45 they left Fraser and drove to Denver. President stopped for a few minutes at the Doud house and came to the office at Lowry Air Force Base. I have never seen him look or act better - which is a flat statement made not in retrospect but made a few minutes after he left the office. He was delightful, patient with the pile of work, handed me a letter from Dr. Milton and said "see what a wonderful brother I have." He sat and talked for a little while after he got through the work before he went to the golf course. On the way out I screamed after him (George Allen was waiting downstairs in the car), "Tell Mr. Allen I shan't forgive him for not coming up to see me." He did so the minute he got in the car -- in other words his mind was not preoccupied with anything in particular.

He talked with the Secretary of State, and arrangements were made for the Secretary to call him off the golf course. This was done at about 3:00. For the record apparently he was called off the course, the call was not ready to go through, he went back, was called off again -- and was upset.

The next morning General Snyder called me at about 6:45 to say the President would not be in early -- he might be in ten o'clock or so. If Murray had to say anything, General Snyder said to call it a "digestive upset." I thought it was one of the periodic upsets he has had and was not in the slightest worried. Around 11 or so Bob Clark called (INS) and said that ~~th~~ because of Murray's reluctance to say it was not serious, the wires were blowing it up until some major illness. Could I call General Snyder and if it was not serious, ask him to tell Murray so. This was accomplished in approximately 45 minutes. General Snyder, for reasons of his own -- the President was still asleep -- said his digestive upset was not serious and this was carried on the wires. This I accepted face value -- of course it was not serious, it would not be serious.

Meantime, at the House, General Snyder was called about 2:00 because the President had a severe pain. As soon as he arrived he gave him morphine and shortly the President went to sleep, sleeping until some time after eleven. General Snyder says he suspected it was a coronary attack but believed it better to let the President sleep and his system get over the initial shock, rather than to wake him and get him to a hospital immediately. When he did wake, the General called examined him, renewed his suspicions that this was a serious thing and I believed called General Griffin and the experts at Walter Reed. I do know that they took an electrocardiogram at the Doud house before taking him to the hospital. When the decision was made that the President was to go to the hospital, General Snyder told him he thought he would be more comfortable there, they wanted to take tests but did not, I believe, tell him what it was. The General urged the President be allowed to walk, with support, down the stairs and to the car, again because of the morale factor and because it would have been extremely difficult to carry a stretcher down the Doud stairs. The President, supported heavily, did manage to walk, and chatted with General Snyder in the car on the way to the hospital. Once there he was put in a wheel chair and taken to the suite. Dick Flohr sensed the seriousness of the attack and told me later in the day.

At 1:45 Murray Snyder, Betty Allen, Ann Parsons and I had gone over to the Famous Chef for lunch. Murray got the first call, told us the diagnosis was "a mild anterior coronary thrombosis" and took one of the cars to beat it back to the field. I got the second call, with which we all paid for our uneaten lunch and left. General Snyder said the President wanted me to call the Attorney General for an opinion as to how he could delegate authority.

Meantime (this of course I found out later) apparently the first time the President knew that he had had a heart attack was when they put him in the oxygen tent at the hospital. General Snyder said his eyes filled with tears. Of course he knew it was serious -- he mentioned his wallet to General Snyder, and some money I have for him.

But the sequence of events makes me believe that at least we -- and perhaps the world -- knew that he had an attack of thrombosis before the President himself knew.

I called Bill Rogers, the Attorney General being out of town. Meantime Murray called Jim Hagerty, who called the Vice President. From that time

on (I brought Ann Parsons into the room to help) I was continuously on the telephone. As I remember it I called Dr. Milton first, then the rest of the brothers. (The telephone operators were wonderful - and I sometimes had five and six calls stacked up so it is difficult to know in what order they came through). I personally called the Secretary of State and of Defense, General Persons (whether he called me or I am I do not know) and I talked to the Vice President. I also talked to Secretary Weeks and Summerfield, to scores of friends, to Bern Shanley in Tokyo. At about eleven o'clock we quit and while I tried to meet the plane bringing Dr. Mattingly and Jim Hagerty out, I did not succeed. The plane was scheduled to land at Lowry -- it was a blinding downpour -- actually it had to land at Stapleton. I know I was on the phone several times during the night, to whom I do not know. I tried to get the President's best friends -- had great difficulty it being a Saturday afternoon and evening in the East. Finally I got through to Slat Slater and almost immediately to Cliff Roberts and Bill Robinson.

It was Mr. Roberts who insisted and arranged for a civilian doctor, Dr. Paul Dudley White, to come out from Boston on Sunday. His reasoning was that while the Army doctors were no doubt competent, we would be criticized for not bringing in civilian consultants -- he wanted three. He was upset when Dr. White left after two days here. But Dr. White's press conference is testimony itself of his conviction that everything was being done and that the President was coming along satisfactorily.

Sunday is already a daze -- mostly telephoning. Monday morning was the first sign of good news, and each morning thereafter it has been better. When the President woke up and said where's my breakfast, I cried. When it was reported to me that he asked about me, I cried. The first three days I was strong enough -- then I collapsed and still am.

Bill Robinson arrived without warning Sunday afternoon. He decided he had to come to see for himself. Personally I am glad he did, though it did upset Dr. Milton, whom we asked not to come.



Saturday, June 4, 1955

Called Dr. Milton

Suggests that when Kevin visits him Monday to go over Penn State speech, Dr. Milton work out with him a means of cutting down the part on research reactors, & talk about social & moral problems that will be created by these great advances we expect in science. For example, right now we are employing practically 1/3 of the U.S. population; if we get all these advances, employment will be cut to about 1/4 -- & what will the rest do? What are our educational institutions doing to make this leisure time operate & make humans happy? Kevin brings this in at end of speech, but not enough of it.

Dr. Milton said higher percentage of people will go to colleges. Hand-labor will be cut down, he agrees; but work with mind will be increased. President mentioned change in life expectancy, to be 80 whereas it had been 67. He would really like to give a boost once in a while in psychology & an effort to understand people, & not just pin our faith for a glorious future in the inventing of some new gadget.

Dr. Milton understands what the President wants: to have lots of general education to go along with the technical education.

There was some discussion on the Tom Nichols idea on education for the military. President thought Dr. Milton could ask Carter Burgess to come up & see him on it.



February 28, 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Al:

This will acknowledge your letter of February twenty-first. Of course I share your high opinion of the ability and qualifications of Leonard Heaton.

As far as the Formosan question is concerned, I wish it were as simple as drawing a line and saying in effect, "this far and no further." I assure you that there are a thousand and one complicated factors that prevent such an easy solution. I mention only one: It is of the utmost importance that we maintain, so far as possible, the morale of the Chinese Nationals, both military and civilians. In the current situation, their beliefs and decisions cannot be absolutely disregarded -- they must be persuaded. After all, if an all-out attack should ever develop, they are the ones who must do the land fighting. To this I am certain you would agree.

Thank you for telling me about Earl Schaefer; I had not known that he had had a stroke. As a matter of fact, he had written me saying that he expected to be at the Shriner breakfast last week, but apparently he was unable to make it. I have sent him a little note.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



General A. C. Wedemeyer
Vice President and Director
Rheem Manufacturing Company
477 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Declassified/Released on 5/25/82
By the National Security Council
under provisions of E.O. 12065

by DZK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 19, 1955

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR MR. KENNEDY
5/19/62

MESSAGE FOR TRANSMITTAL TO THE PRIME MINISTER



Dear Winston:

I greatly appreciate the message from you and Anthony. I have studied it long and carefully, as has Foster. Quite naturally, it distresses us whenever we find ourselves in even partial disagreement with the conclusions that you two may reach on any important subject. It is probable that these differences frequently reflect dissimilar psychological and political situations in our two countries more than they do differences in personal convictions based upon theoretical analysis. Nevertheless we clearly recognize the great importance to the security of the free world of our two governments achieving a step by step progress both in policy and in action.

~~At the same time~~ Diplomatically it would indeed be a great relief to us if the line between the Nationalists and the Communists was actually the broad Strait of Formosa instead of the narrow Straits between Quemoy and Matsu and the mainland. However, there are about 55,000 of the Nationalist troops on these coastal islands and the problem created thereby cannot, I fear, be solved by us merely announcing a desire to transplant them to Formosa.

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DECLASSIFIED	
9 CANBOLD WITH NYC	
Authority	PUB. IN BAYLE 10-19-98
By	DJH
NLE Date	6/14/91

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UNCLASSIFIED



Foster and I have been working very hard over recent months, and he has been in close touch with Anthony, in the attempt to lay a basis for what we have hoped may prove a gradual but steady solution.

There are two important points that must be considered at every step of any analysis of this exceedingly difficult situation. The first is that this country does not have decisive power in respect of the offshore islands. We believe that Chiang would even choose to stand alone and die if we should attempt now to coerce him into the abandonment of those islands. Possibly we may convince him in the future of the wisdom of this course, but to attempt to do more at this time would bring us to the second major point, which is: We must not lose Chiang's army and we must maintain its strength, efficiency and morale. Only a few months back we had both Chiang and a strong, well-equipped French Army to support the free world's position in Southeast Asia. The French are gone -- making it clearer than ever that we cannot afford the loss of Chiang unless all of us are to get completely out of that corner of the globe. This is unthinkable to us -- I feel it must be to you.

In order to make an express or tacit cease-fire likely, we have, with difficulties perhaps greater than you realize, done, through our diplomacy, many ~~difficult~~ things.

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1. We rounded out the far Pacific security chain by a Treaty with the Nationalists which, however, ~~only covered Formosa and the Pescadores~~ only covered specifically Formosa and the Pescadores, thus making it clear to Chiang and to all the world that we were not prepared to defend the coastal positions as Treaty territory.

2. We obtained from Chiang his agreement that he would not conduct any offensive operations against the mainland either from Formosa or from his coastal positions, except in agreement with us. Thus we are in a position to preclude what you refer to as the use of these offshore islands as "bridgeheads for a Nationalist invasion of Communist China", or as a base for "sporadic war against the mainland" or "the invasion of the mainland of China". Under present practice we do not give agreement to any such attacks unless they are retaliatory to related, prior, Communist attacks. In these respects we have done much more than seems generally realized.

3. Furthermore, we obtained an agreement from the Nationalists closely limiting their right to take away from Formosa military elements, material or human, to which we had contributed if this would weaken the defense of Formosa itself.

4. We made possible the voluntary evacuation of the Tachens and two other islands.

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5. Finally, we secured the acquiescence of the Chinese Nationalists to United Nations proceedings for a cease-fire, although the Chinese Nationalists were extremely suspicious of this move and felt that it could permanently blight their hopes.

All of this was done, as I say, in consultation between Anthony and Foster and in the hope that this would provide a basis for a cease-fire.



However, what we have done has apparently been interpreted by the Chinese Communists merely as a sign of weakness. They have intensified their threats against Formosa and their expressions of determination to take it by force. Also, they continue to hold, in durance vile, our airmen who were captured by them in the Korean War and who should have been freed by the Korean Armistice.


There comes a point where constantly giving in only encourages further belligerency. I think we must be careful not to pass that point in our dealings with Communist China. In such a case, further retreat becomes worse than a Munich because at Munich there were at least promises on the part of the aggressor to cease expansion and to keep the peace. In this case the Chinese Communists have promised nothing and have not contributed one iota toward peace ~~of the type~~ in the Formosa area. Indeed, they ^{there} treat the suggestion of peace ~~as~~ an insult.

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I am increasingly led to feel it would be dangerous to predicate our thinking and planning on the assumption that when the Chinese Communists talk about their resolve to take Formosa, this is just "talk," and that they really would be satisfied with the coastal islands. I suspect that it is the other way around. What they are really interested in is Formosa - and later on Japan - and the coastal islands are marginal. They do not want to have another Chinese Government in their neighborhood, particularly one which has military power and which poses a threat to their center if ever they attack on their flanks.

Therefore, I think that if the Chinese Nationalists got  out of Quemoy and the Matsus, they would not be solving the real problem, which is far more basic. I repeat that it would more likely mean that this retreat, and the coercion we would have to exert to bring it about, would so undermine the morale and the loyalty of the non-Communist forces on Formosa that they could not be counted on. Some, at least, might defect to the Communists or provide such a weak element in the defense of Formosa that an amphibious operation could give the Communists a strong foothold on Formosa.

You speak about our capacity to "drown" anybody who tried to cross the Formosa Straits. However, we do not and cannot maintain

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at that spot at all times sufficient force to cope with an attack which might come at any time both by sea and by air and which would presumably operate from several different points and be directed against several different points on what is a very considerable body of land. It took us two days to assemble the force necessary to insure the safety of the Chinese Nationalists evacuating from the Tachens. Now most of that force has returned to its normal bases which are the Philippines, Japan, and Okinawa. We must rely upon a loyal and dependable force of Nationalists on Formosa to deal with any who, for the reasons indicated, we might be unable to "drown" before ~~the attackers reached there~~ ^{the attackers reached that island.}

And if perchance there should be any serious defection on Formosa, that would be a situation ~~with~~ which we could not possibly meet by landing Marines or the like to fight the Chinese Nationalist defectors on the Island. Such a development would undermine the whole situation.

All of the non-Communist nations of the Western Pacific -- particularly Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and, of course, Formosa itself, are watching nervously to see what we do next. I fear that, if we appear strong and coercive ^{and seemed almost to} ~~hardly~~ toward our friends, to compel Chiang to make further retreats, the conclusion of these Asian peoples will be that they had better plan to make the best terms they can with the Communists.

The Chinese are past masters at the art of camouflage and, as bitter experience in Korea taught us, they can strike in force without detectable preparations.

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I know that your Government's intelligence sources are very good. But this is a situation which we have worked with and lived with very intimately. We do have considerable knowledge, and the responsibility. Surely all that we have done not only here, but in Korea with Rhee, amply demonstrates that we are not careless in letting others get us into a major war. I devoutly hope that there may be enough trust and confidence develop between our ^{two} peoples so that when judgments of this kind have to be made, each could, in the last analysis, trust the other in the areas where they have special knowledge and the greatest responsibility.

It would surely not be popular in this country if we became involved in possible hostilities on account of Hong Kong or Malaya, which our people look upon as "colonies" -- which to us is a naughty word. Nevertheless, I do not doubt that, if the issue were ever framed in this way, we would be at your side.

We are doing everything possible to work this situation out in a way which, on the one hand, will avoid the risk of war, and, on the other hand, preserve the non-Communist position in the Western Pacific, a position which, by the way, is vital to Australia and New Zealand. However, if the Chinese Communists are determined to have a war to gain Formosa, then there will be trouble.

I see I have made this as long, and perhaps as complicated, as a diplomatic note. For that I apologize!

With warm regard,

As Ever,

IKE.

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February 1, 1955

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Dear Al:

The past two weeks in Washington have been a period of tension -- reminiscent of the numerous "flaps" that used to plague us in the old War Department.

The principal cause has been the Administration's effort to clarify our people's understanding of the consequences of an attack by the ChiComs on Formosa and its neighboring islands, and to obtain their expressed support of the government's plans to defend those islands effectively. An added difficulty, as is always the case, has been the extreme care with which the public relations angle of this effort had to be handled.

In the present case, we have a Europe that, speaking generally, is fearful of what some Europeans consider American recklessness, impulsiveness and immaturity in the foreign field. In Red China we have a dictatorial regime which seeks every opportunity to develop among its own people and all other Asiatics a deeper and deeper hatred of the West, particularly of the United States. In Formosa we have the remnants of the Chinese Nationalists who are suspicious of any move in the Far East that does not involve an "immediate direct and destructive attack on Red China."

At home we have the truculent and the timid, the jingoists and the pacifists. Underlying the whole is the most important fact of today's life -- the irreconcilable conflict between the theories of the Communist dictatorship and the basic *principles* of free world existence.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 11

NLE 76-63, #118

By *J.W.*

Date *2-28-77*

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General Gruenther -- 2

Any military man can easily make clear distinction between the defense of Formosa and the defense of the so-called offshore islands. Not only are two different military problems presented, but in the one case we are talking about territories the control of which has passed from nation to nation through the years -- and in the other case, about territories that have always been a part of the Chinese mainland both politically and, in effect, geographically. So the political differences are almost as plain as the military differences when we talk about the defense of these two territories.

If there were no other factors than the military to consider, you and I, for example, would study the problem and would very quickly reach a decision that we would permit no advance by the Communists beyond the offshore islands, but that in any struggle involving only the territory of those islands, we would see no reason for American intervention.

Such a solution would infuriate the Chinese Communists because of their announced objective to take Formosa; it would infuriate the Chinese Nationalists because the retention of the offshore islands sustains their hope that one day they will go back to their homeland. It would more or less please our European friends because it implies to them a moderate attitude on our part, and the responsible officials in those countries can see the danger to all of us if Formosa should fall to the Communists. (Not that Red China, in her present state, would be a direct threat to the United States, but with international Communism having thus penetrated the island barrier in the Western Pacific and in a position to threaten the Philippines and Indonesia immediately and directly, all of us would soon be in far worse trouble than we are now.)

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General Gruenther -- 3

At home the hypothetical solution I mention would be accepted by most merely because it is simple to describe, although there is a certain pacifist element that wants us completely out of the Western Pacific. Some people seem to think that we can surrender to the Communists the Japanese productive capacity and all the richness of the South Pacific territories and still be perfectly safe in this country. There are people who did not believe Hitler's threats any more than they now believe those of Chou and the Kremlin.



Now, if the solution we adopt should state flatly that we would defend the principal islands of the offshore group (Quemoy and the Matsus), we would now please the Chinese Nationalists, but we would frighten Europe and of course even further infuriate the Chinese Communists. Not that I think this last particularly important, because they are going to be infuriated anyway.

By announcing this as a policy we would be compelled to maintain in the area, at great cost, forces that could assure the defense of islands that are almost within wading distance of the mainland. This defensive problem could be extremely difficult over the long term, and I think that the world in general, including some of our friends, would believe us unreasonable and practically goading the Chinese Communists into a fight. We could get badly tied down by any such inflexible public attitude.

On the other hand, as we consider the problem of defending Formosa, we understand how important to us is the morale of the Chinese forces on that island. Their willingness to fight and to keep themselves in a high state of readiness for fighting is one of the keys to the situation. Consequently, even though

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General Gruenther -- 4

we clearly see that our major concern, so far as territory itself is involved, does not extend beyond Formosa and the neighboring Pescadores, yet the economical and efficient defense of these islands involves a concern for the areas from which it could most easily be attacked.



You probably read the Resolution that was passed by the Congress, at my request. The wording, as to areas outside Formosa and the Pescadores, is vague. In view of what I have just said, you can understand why this is so.

The Resolution, then, is our publicly stated position; the problem now is how to make it work. The morale of the Chinese Nationalists still remains important to us, so they must have certain assurances with respect to the offshore islands. But these must be less binding on us than the terms of the Chino-American Treaty, now before our Senate for ratification. We must remain ready, until some better solution can be found, to move promptly against any Communist force that is manifestly preparing to attack Formosa. And we must make a distinction -- (this is a difficult one) -- between an attack that has only as its objective the capture of an offshore island and one that is primarily a preliminary movement to an all-out attack on Formosa.

I could go on and discuss a thousand different points, with shadings of each, that we have discussed and hashed over during the past two weeks. Basic conclusions were scarcely involved; there have never been any great differences within the Administration on fundamentals. Most of the talks centered around the question of "what can we say and how can we say it" so as to retain the greatest possible confidence of our friends and at the same time put our enemies on notice that we are not going to stand idly by to see our vital interests jeopardized.

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Of course, only time will tell how successful we have been. Every day will bring its problems and many of these will cause much more talking and haggling -- even some thinking! More and more I find myself, in this type of situation -- and perhaps it is because of my advancing years -- tending to strip each problem down to its simplest possible form. Having gotten the issue well defined in my mind, I try in the next step to determine what answer would best serve the long term advantage and welfare of the United States and the free world. I then consider the immediate problem and what solution can we get that will best conform to the long term interests of the country and at the same time can command a sufficient approval in this country so as to secure the necessary Congressional action.

When I get a problem solved on this rough basis, I merely stick to the essential answer and let associates have a field day on words and terminology. (I suppose that many of those around me would protest that even in this field I am sometimes something of an autocrat and insist upon the employment of my own phraseology when I consider the issue important.) However, I really do try to stay out of this particular job as much as my own characteristics, particularly my ego, will permit.

Whatever is now to happen, I know that nothing could be worse than global war.

I do not believe that Russia wants war at this time -- in fact, I do not believe that if we became engaged in rather a bitter fight along the coast of China, Russia would want to intervene with her own forces. She would, of course, pour supplies into China in the effort to exhaust us and certainly would exploit the opportunity to separate us from our major allies. But I am

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General Gruenther -- 6

convinced that Russia does not want, at this moment, to experiment with means of defense against the bombing that we could conduct against her mainland. At the same time, I assume that Russia's treaty with Red China comprehends a true military alliance, which she would either have to repudiate or take the plunge. As a consequence of this kind of thinking, she would probably be in a considerable dilemma if we got into a real shooting war with China. It would not be an easy decision for the men in the Kremlin, in my opinion.

In any event, we have got to do what we believe to be right -- if we can figure out the right -- and we must show no lack of firmness in a world where our political enemies exploit every sign of weakness, and are constantly attempting to disrupt the solidarity of the free world's intentions to oppose their aggressive practices.

Oddly enough I started out this letter with the complacent thought that I could point up, in one or two paragraphs, the salient features of my last two weeks' existence. Now I find that after all these words, I have only vaguely pointed out the biggest ones in this particular "can of worms."

When I see you in a couple of weeks, we can talk these things over more fully.

With love to Grace, and, of course, the best to yourself,

As ever,



General Alfred M. Gruenther
Supreme Commander
Allied Powers Europe
APO 55, c/o Postmaster
New York, New York

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DIARY - March 26, 1955.

Lately there has been a very definite feeling among the members of the Cabinet, often openly expressed, that within a month we will actually be fighting in the Formosa straits. It is, of course, entirely possible that this is true, because the Red Chinese appear to be completely reckless, arrogant, possibly over-confident, and completely indifferent as to human losses.

Nevertheless, I believe hostilities are not so imminent as is indicated by the forebodings of a number of my associates. It is clear that this gloomy outlook has been communicated to others because a number of articles in the papers state that the Administration is rather expecting hostilities within a month.

I have so often been through these periods of strain that I have become accustomed to the fact that most of the calamities that we anticipate really never occur. No period was more illustrative of this truth than the six months following upon the outbreak of our war in 1941. Every prophet in those days was one of gloom. Only two or three of the eventualities that sprung up in the mind or in the imagination came to pass.

(President had not a chance to finish this).

a.



April 12, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

Subject: Automotive and Related Procurement.

This refers to your March fourteenth informal report to me on progress in achieving an effective spread of governmental procurement in the automotive and related fields, so as to include continuing programs of work for the smaller, as well as the larger, companies. As you know, I am interested in this for several reasons:

- (a) I intend to do all in my power to see that no action of the government creates a tendency toward a monopoly;
- (b) I want to help in the preservation of a mobilization base dispersed among different companies and business leaders, as well as geographically; and
- (c) I want to see smaller companies on a comparative footing with others in the conviction that competition between big and little, as well as between the giants themselves, will certainly result to the benefit of our entire economy and of our people.

I am today leaving the city for a week. During my absence, will you please have prepared another brief progress report on what results have been achieved by the Defense Department in spreading this type of work, whether such spread is accomplished on a direct or on a sub-contracting basis.

I do not desire that a staff consume a lot of time in preparing a report in unnecessary detail. I want to know the certainty and magnitude of progress and to have the assurance that this matter is constantly engaging the attention of responsible officials. If such a report could be sent to my office by the twenty-first, that would be early enough.

D.D.E.

April 9, 1955

Personal and Confidential

Dear Bill:

I have just received your note of the sixth. I think it would be very unwise to repeat anything publicly that was said at a private dinner. While in this case I see the logic of your suggestion, still this could lead to the most dangerous of practices and would eventually eliminate informal personal affairs for any President.



In addition, your understanding is not quite what I think I said at the dinner. You say, "Efforts to persuade our Government not to permit the Russians to enter the Pacific War." Actually I think I said that I recommended strongly that we not ask the Russians to come into the Far Eastern War. One of the reasons I gave was that in my opinion it was impossible to keep them out of that war -- another was that they were not needed.

Another important factor that would make any release of such information entirely beside the point in the present public discussion of this matter is one that I think you have overlooked. It is that my suggestions, made to President Truman and to the Secretary of State verbally, were made toward the end of July, 1945, when these two officials landed at Antwerp. The present discussion apparently centers around the time of Yalta. At that moment I knew nothing whatsoever about the Far Eastern situation -- I was too busy fighting my own battles. But as we neared the end of the European war and during the weeks following thereon, my staff and I became convinced that the Japanese were on their last legs. (I assume that a lot of other people, by that time, believed the same thing.)

Personal and Confidential

Personal and Confidential

Ambassador Pawley - 2.

On the other hand, when I suggested to Secretary of War Stimson, who was then in Europe, that we avoid using the atomic bomb, he stated that it was going to be used because it would save hundreds of thousands of American lives. So that I suppose that as far as I was concerned I still believed in the difficulty of any assault against Japan. But you must remember that there had been many bloody battles in the Pacific and certainly you cannot blame anyone for wanting to save American lives.

All this is written without reference to existing records and, indeed, it is possibly doubtful that any recorded opinion of the kind I have just stated would appear in the official records of SHAEF. Also, we must remember that the Far Eastern subject was really none of our business. Any opinions we expressed on it were gratuitous. However, I am sure that General Smith -- possibly Governor Byrnes -- and I think one or two others of my wartime staff would find that their memories of these incidents substantially parallel what I have set down.

Give my love to Edna.

As ever,



The Honorable William D. Pawley,
204 Roper Building,
Miami 32, Florida.

Personal and Confidential

April 5, 1955

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Formosa.



Inspired by the enlightened self-interest of the United States, this country has committed itself, by treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government, to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. The treaty area does not include other islands held by units of the Chinese Nationalist forces. But it is only fair to say that during the course of the past several years, particularly since June 1950, the inter-mixture of warfare, negotiations, public statements and military understandings have given the Chinese Nationalists some right to assume that the United States would probably participate in an active defense of the Quemoy and the Matsu groups of islands.

To do so would commit United States military prestige to a campaign under conditions favorable to the attacker. Because the world generally regards the coastal islands as part of the mainland, our active participation would forfeit the good opinion of much of the Western world, with consequent damage to our interests in Europe and elsewhere. There is much opposition in our own country to becoming involved militarily in defense of the offshore islands, and in the event of such involvement our people would be seriously divided at the very time when increased risk of global war would underline the need for unity. Finally, even a successful defensive campaign would not stabilize the situation; a new attack could be expected

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By DJH Date 3/14/82

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at any time. But with American prestige committed to the success of the defense, a disproportionate amount of our disposable, mobile, reserves would be tied down indefinitely to this one spot.

On the other hand refusal to participate in the defense of the offshore areas might have equally disadvantageous results. First, most observers assert that it would dismay the ChiNats, whose morale and military efficiency are essential to the defense of Formosa -- and the security of Formosa is essential to the best interests of the United States and the Western world. Moreover, further retreat in front of the Chinese Communists could result, it is alleged, in the disintegration of all Asian opposition to the spread of Communism in that continent.

So, today, the Formosan situation presents a hard choice to American political and military leaders; the only logical course of action is to attempt to bring about reasonable changes in the situation rather than to remain inert awaiting the inevitable moment of decision between two unacceptable choices.

The Formosa problem cannot be considered in a vacuum; it is not isolated from the rest of the world. The Chinese Communists have repeatedly announced their determination to capture the island. Opinion in the free world appears to back the American determination to assist the ChiNats in the defense of the main position, that is, Formosa and the Pescadores. But, as stated before, world opinion most emphatically repudiates outside interference in any Communist attack on Quemoy and the Matsus.

As you know, for many weeks I have been devoting time and attention to this problem in the hope of finding some solution. Most of what follows we have often discussed.

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EXISTING SITUATION

Since last September, when the Formosan question first came before the National Security Council for intensive study, we have agreed that the defense of the offshore islands presented to the United States very unpalatable problems, both political and military. I have already alluded to some of these.

Geographically the islands are difficult to defend, and their location minimizes rather than maximizes the usefulness of our overwhelming sea strength, which strength would be particularly effective in defending Formosa against the ChiComs.

The offshore islands are subject to constant harrassing and concentrated destructive artillery fire from the mainland, and are so situated that an amphibious attack against them could be carried forward to the landing stages during the hours of darkness of a single day. In view of the overwhelming land forces available to the Red Chinese and the strength of the bombardment that could be brought to bear on the islands, any successful defense would necessarily require counter-action against the mainland of China itself.

We have ample forewarning of the adverse character of world reaction that would follow any such action on our part, especially if we felt compelled to use atomic weapons -- which we probably would in order to insure success. The Chinese Nationalists would share our loss of free world support through such an operation, while public opinion in the United States would, to say the least, become further divided. If conflict in that region should spread to global proportions, we would be entering a life and death struggle under very great handicaps.

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Even though a defensive effort might be temporarily successful, it would in no way remove the existence of the permanent threat; both governments would be led to immobilize more and more military strength for the single purpose of defending the offshore islands, because our prestige would have become involved, even though involuntarily. We would be isolated in world opinion, and this could affect very disadvantageously our treaties with Japan and in the SEATO region.

As long as Chiang has powerful forces deployed on these offshore islands, he is committed to full-out defense. He is gambling his whole position in Formosa and his future as a useful agent in helping to drive Communism from China against a local and possibly temporary success in a precarious defense of two island groups which are militarily weak.



All of these risks and disadvantages exist because of the calculation that for us to persuade Chiang to adopt any other plan would result in a collapse of morale on Formosa and the loss to the free world of that bastion of strength. In other words, the principal military reason for holding these two groups of islands is the estimated effect of their loss upon morale in Formosa.

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An added consideration is, of course, the psychological effect of such abandonment on other Asiatic nations. It is generally accepted among our associates that retreat from the Matsus and Quemoy -- if occasioned by any influence of ours -- might create consternation among our friends in Asia, particularly in Thailand, the Philippines, Laos and Cambodia. This, I suspect, is true, and such a result could, of course, counter-balance any gains we might make in winning to our side public opinion elsewhere in the world.



This circumstance, however, in no wise refutes the clear conviction that militarily and politically we and the ChiNats would be much better off if our national prestige were not even remotely committed to the defense of these islands, and if greater force, ready to take advantage of unforeseen opportunity, were concentrated on Formosa and the Pescadores. Moreover, if Chiang should develop a satisfactory alternative so that it would, under his leadership, be accepted in Formosa and in Southeast Asia as a shrewd move to improve his strategic position, his prestige should be increased rather than diminished.

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THE PROBLEM

The real questions to be answered are these:

- (a). What would be the characteristics of a situation that would appear most advantageous to us from the standpoint of treaty obligations in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, solidifying American and free world opinion behind us, sustaining the morale of Chiang and his forces on Formosa, and securing the approval and support of friends in Southeast Asia and in the neighboring islands?
- (b). What can we do to bring about, in cooperation with Chiang, the essentials of such a situation?

I believe that the situation best calculated to sustain the interests of ourselves and the free world, and to damage the Communists can be roughly described as follows:

- (a). Without abandoning the offshore islands, make clear that neither Chiang nor ourselves is committed to full-out defense of Quemoy and the Matsus, so that no matter what the outcome of an attack upon them, there would be no danger of a collapse of the free world position in the region. (Incidentally, there is room to suspect the sincerity of Chiang's contention that the retention or loss of the offshore islands would spell the difference between a strong and a destroyed Nationalist government on Formosa. If this is so, his own headquarters should be on the offshore islands.)
- (b). Initiate, immediately, the process of bringing to Chiang's attention the great advantages, political and military, that would result from certain alterations in his present military plans, as follows:

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(1). To regard the offshore islands as outposts and consequently to be garrisoned in accordance with the requirements of outpost positions. This involves vigilant reconnaissance and a maximum of protective works and with properly sited automatic weapons and light artillery, together with effective obstacles, defensive mine systems, and so on. All this should be reinforced by adequate stores of ammunition, of food and medical supplies, all thoroughly protected and available to the garrison as needed. Excess personnel (except such civilians as might decline to leave) should be removed from the islands.



(2). The Nationalist forces on Formosa should assist these garrisons by aerial and sea reconnaissance and fighting support. Plans for defense should be fully coordinated between the forward units and the mobile elements in Formosa.

(3). Adequate plans should be made for determined and persistent defense, and evacuation should take place (if this finally becomes necessary) only after defensive forces had inflicted upon the attackers heavy and bloody losses.

(4). The process of concentrating, equipping and training of troops on Formosa itself should be expedited. The United States could and would help in this process so as to give to Chiang the greatest possible strength in support of his outpost troops on Quemoy and the Matsus, and in preparing and sustaining the bulk of his forces as a weapon of opportunity, ready to take advantage of any political, military or economic circumstance on the mainland that would give to an invasion a reasonable chance of success.

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(5). To protect the prestige of Chiang and the morale of his forces, any alteration in military and political planning should obviously be developed under his leadership; above all, there must be no basis for public belief that the alterations came about through American intervention or coercion.

* * * * *

GENERAL COMMENT



The worldwide political advantages of such an arrangement would be incalculable. These advantages, I think, are so clearly implied in the earlier parts of this memorandum that I shall not attempt to enumerate them. But for ourselves one of the greatest advantages would be a practically solidified public opinion in the United States.

To bring about the desired situation in the Formosan area, the United States would be prepared to help materially. Such help could take any or all of the following forms:

- (a). Acceleration of all plans heretofore approved for the development of Chiang's forces on Formosa.
- (b). Stationing of certain elements of American forces on Formosa, particularly of the kinds useful in the protection of that island against external attack and to maintain internal morale. For example, the aircraft squadron we presently have there could be increased to a wing. This would allow Chiang's own air forces to devote their exclusive attention to the support of the forward positions. We could station some additional

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anti-air craft artillery for the protection of fields, allowing Chiang's units of this kind to be devoted to the protection of cities. We could also station there a couple of regiments of Marines. All of this would be supported by certain logistic formations. Such a layout should have a very fine internal effect, particularly in giving visible evidence to all that the United States is irrevocably committed to the defense of Formosa.

(c). The presence of these troops would likewise be of great assistance in speeding up the training of Chiang's forces, in making certain of prompt replacement of losses, particularly in the air force. Likewise, with this contingent of American forces on the island of Formosa, our own naval units would tend to take a more active part in defensive arrangements, allowing Chiang's forces to be devoted more to active support of the forward positions.

(d). As a final consideration, Chiang would be assured of a much firmer political support throughout the free world than he now enjoys.

While it is true under this system one or more of the forward positions might eventually be lost, such loss would occur only after the defending forces had exacted a fearful toll from the attackers, and Chiang's prestige and standing in Southeast Asia would be increased rather than decreased as a result of a gallant, prolonged and bitter defense conducted under these circumstances. His own losses would be inconsequential both in personnel and in material -- the losses of the Communists should be very great indeed.

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Finally, an essential ingredient of success will be the skill of the American negotiator picked to present the whole matter to Chiang. The crux of the negotiations must be that "Chiang must sell himself on the validity and value of the suggested program." This means that the negotiator must be a man whom Chiang trusts and who is himself convinced of the soundness of this program.

As you and I have fully agreed, there is no time for unnecessary delay.



D.D.E.

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July 27, 1955

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Now that the Four Power Conference has become a part of history, I want you to know how deeply I believe that our combined efforts during the past week produced an effect that will benefit the world. Good results should certainly spring from the solemn and repeated assurances by the leaders of both East and West that we intend, hereafter, to discuss our differences in conciliatory fashion and to seek in every case an answer that may satisfy the requirements of each side.

I do not minimize the gravity of the problems which must be solved before world tranquility can be achieved. In your opening statement at Geneva, you named some of the matters that so greatly trouble the Soviet Union. In turn, I specified others profoundly disturbing to the entire population of the United States. Only statesmanship of a high order and an unshakeable resolution not to revert again, on either side, to some of the practices of the past, will permit progress toward and final solution of these critical problems.

I personally feel that some of the world tensions, of which we so often spoke at Geneva, have been eased by the fact of our meeting face to face and, during that eventful week, giving to the world a record of long and meaningful discussions and debate without either side, in any single instance, challenging the sincerity of the other or resorting to invective.

Since last Saturday evening, I have been thinking over your farewell words to me, which were to the effect, "Things are going to be better; they are going to come out right." To you and to your associates, I renew my own expressions of



friendly interest and intent, and my lasting appreciation of the opportunities that were mine at Geneva for joining with you, Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Molotov and Marshal Zhukov in so many fruitful discussions.

If we can continue along this line, with earnest efforts to be fair to each other and to achieve understanding of each other's problems, then, eventually, a durable peace based on right and justice will be the monument to the work which we have begun. This is the profound hope of our Government.

Will you please convey my greetings to those who accompanied you to Geneva, and with best wishes to yourself,

Sincerely,



His Excellency

Nicolai A. Bulganin

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

January 25, 1966

The Supreme Court has said that segregation in the public schools is prohibited by the Constitution. Of course I favor the elimination of segregation, because I believe that equality of opportunity for every individual in America is one of the foundation stones of our system of Government. We have made great strides in this field, and will continue that progress. We must also make progress in reducing the critical classroom shortage, and I would be disappointed if any amendment dealing with segregation should produce a stalemate that would prevent any progress being made in school legislation.



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DJH 6/25/75

March 14, 1956.

Dear Ed:

Please tell your friend who is concerned about talk of "dumping" the Vice President that he reads columnists too much and news columns too little. I have never heard of anyone in a position of influence who has even suggested such a thing. I have gone out of my way on numerous occasions to express my extreme satisfaction in having Nixon as a friend and as an associate in government. I even stated at one press conference that he was highly acceptable to me as a running mate on a political ticket.

I trust that your own health and strength are improving steadily, and that you will soon be in circulation again.

My love to K, and warm regard to yourself.

As ever,



Mr. Edward Bermingham,
880 Fifth Avenue,
New York, New York.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 4, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Appointment of Senator Duff and Senator Saltonstall
with the President, April 4, 1956 (5:45 p. m.)

PRESENT: The President
Senator James H. Duff
Senator Leverett Saltonstall
General Persons



The President set forth his ideas in some detail on the matters of national security. He made it plain that he spends a great deal of time on these matters.

The President pointed out that the final decisions on national security are based on a careful judgment of national needs, with the full realization that we must expect these needs to continue indefinitely. Under these circumstances, it becomes extremely important to design and maintain a military program which avoids wide fluctuations. This can only be done if we maintain the strength and the solvency of our economy at the same time we are maintaining a strong defense establishment.

He pointed out that whether or not we had adequate air power should be based on the adequacy of our deterrent power and not on numbers alone. He made it clear that determination is necessarily a matter of judgment and cannot be worked out on a mathematical exact basis by any one. He further made clear that if in the judgment of responsible officials the United States had adequate power to deter the Soviet from making an attack, he felt that there was no justification for adding additional aircraft and other weapons just for the purpose of trying to match in numbers those of the Soviet.

The President pointed out that in any consideration of the adequacy of our security, we must take into account the striking power of our naval aviation as well as the location of our bases in close range of the Soviets. Furthermore, we have allies and the aviation of these allies must be taken into consideration in looking at the overall picture. He feels that there should be a close correlation between naval air power and the strategic air force and that he will instruct the Defense Department to insure this. He noted that in the public discussions of our air power, there is little or no mention of the tremendous air power which is in the hands of the Navy.

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Authority NLE 76-82, #26
By ARK NLE DATE 1/5/76

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The President further pointed out that our defense matters are under constant review and that he proposed to send up shortly to the Congress a supplemental appropriations request for the Fiscal Year 1957 -- roughly \$550 million -- these funds to be devoted primarily to increasing the numbers of B-52s on order and speeding up their delivery, additional bases for the dispersion of these bombers, and speeding up work on the expansion of the distant area warning lines.



The President discussed the matter of public release of classified information and emphasized that both the Defense Department and the Committee had responsibilities for this. He urged that these responsibilities be clearly brought out.

He discussed our guided missile program and emphasized the high priority which is being given to it. He pointed out that in his opinion current funds were adequate and that if a further examination by the guided missile "czar" indicates otherwise, he would promptly ask for the additional funds.

Senators Duff and Saltonstall entered freely into the discussion. They assured the President that they would do everything in their power to see that the investigation was conducted along the proper lines and that they would do what they could to prevent it from deteriorating into a partisan political affair.

The President further advised that he would take steps to insure that the Defense Department's presentation would be made on a comprehensive rather than a piecemeal basis.

The meeting lasted approximately one and one-half hours.



Wilton B. Persons
The Deputy Assistant to the President

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May 24, 1956

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
May 24, 1956; 10:30 AM

Others present: Admiral Radford
General Taylor
Colonel Goodpaster

The meeting was held at General Taylor's request. He started with the statement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1960 before them at the present time. Through it, the JCS will give guidance to the staffs which will serve as the basis for programs and funds. The paper is now split, with the Army and Marines following NSC 5602, as he understands it, and with the Air Force, the Navy and Admiral Radford taking the view that all planning must be based upon the use of atomic weapons. He stressed that the plan pertains to 1960, by which time both sides will have developed large stockpiles of thermonuclear weapons. A situation of mutual deterrence must be envisaged. He recognized that a big war, under such conditions, might come deliberately, but thought it was more likely that it would come through "backing" into it through a succession of actions and counteractions. In view of the tendency of thermonuclear capacity to deter both sides from a big war, any war that occurred would seem more likely to be a small war.



Two differences of view have developed within the Chiefs. The first relates to the definition of general war used as the basis for the plan. This is defined to be a war between the United States and USSR, using atomic weapons from the outset without restriction. The emphasis is on war starting with large-scale attack on D-Day, whereas the NSC has considered that it might arise step by step from smaller action. He said that the Air Force and Navy members regard this as the worst possible case, and therefore state that it would provide for all the others. He is inclined to disagree with this. He feels that this concept would leave us less flexible, and that the programs for fighting a big war would absorb all available funds.

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MR 77-71 DOCUMENT NO 3
By MLA/OTM Date 4/22/77

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The second difference arises in the firm commitment for the use of atomic weapons -- in every case in a general war, and also in local wars where required for military reasons. He thought that this contravened the principle of "flexibility" which has been worked into NSC papers, and that it would result in tremendous atomic forces and defenses against them, tending to freeze out all other types of military forces -- and that these latter are what would be needed to handle small war situations.



The President said he thought General Taylor's position was dependent on an assumption that we are opposed by people who would think as we do with regard to the value of human life. But they do not, as shown in many incidents from the last war. We have no basis for thinking that they abhor destruction as we do. In the event they should decide to go to war, the pressure on them to use atomic weapons in a sudden blow would be extremely great. He did not see any basis for thinking other than that they would use these weapons at once, and in full force. The President went on to say that he did not care too much for the definition of general war as given. To him the question was simply one of a war between the United States and the USSR, and in this he felt that thinking should be based on the use of atomic weapons -- that in his opinion it was fatuous to think that the U. S. and USSR would be locked into a life and death struggle without using such weapons. We should therefore develop our readiness on the basis of use of atomic weapons by both sides. He recalled that the United States had never been "scared" until these weapons came into the picture, and it is this type of war which justifies the great peacetime efforts we are now maintaining.

As to local wars, the President thought that the tactical use of atomic weapons against military targets would be no more likely to trigger off a big war than the use of twenty-ton "block busters." In his opinion, we must concentrate on building up internal security forces and local security forces of the regions themselves. We would give mobile support, with the Air, Navy and Army supporting weapons, and perhaps put in several battalions at truly critical points. He was very clear that we would not, however, deploy and tie down our forces around the Soviet periphery in small wars. He thought that the support forces we provide would use the most efficient weapons, and over the past several years tactical atomic weapons have come to be practically accepted as integral parts of modern armed forces.

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The President went on to refer to the ideas of movement of large numbers of divisions in the early months of an atomic war. He thought it was very unlikely that they could be moved, and thought that military planning is now emphasizing the forces immediately available, with much less interest in those following by months. The incorporation of new weapons such as rockets and missiles into the ground forces, with small mobile combat groups integrating their operations closely with them, should be stressed. General Gruenther had told him that he badly needs the two U. S. divisions shown to be sent to Europe in the first thirty days, but that when the President asked him how they could be gotten there, he simply said that was his (the President's) problem. The President did not consider that anything like ten or twelve additional divisions in the first six months could be moved. If we have been heavily attacked, there would be neither the planes nor the air bases needed to take them there. He added that he thought Europe had come a great way toward this same manner of thinking.



Referring now to general war (the President used this term and "war between the U. S. and USSR" interchangeably), the President said that prudence would demand that we get our striking force into the air immediately upon notice of hostile action by the Soviets. Massive retaliation, although the term has been scoffed at, is likely to be the key to survival. He reiterated that planning should go ahead on the basis of the use of tactical atomic weapons against military targets in any small war in which the United States might be involved.

General Taylor drew attention to deterrence as the key factor in our present situation. We need diverse types of forces to deter large wars, and small wars as well. If we proceed on the basis of needs for actually fighting atomic wars, the needs for atomic striking forces and for continental defense are open-ended -- practically limitless. He thought we should first calculate what is needed for deterrence and provide that (rather than what is needed for fighting an all-out thermonuclear war) should then provide the requirements for flexible forces useable in small wars, and finally put what remaining effort we have into the requirements for fighting an all-out war.

The President said he was very understanding that the position he had described did not leave the Army the same great role in the first year of war in relation to the other services as formerly. In his opinion, in the initial stages the Army would be truly vital to the establishment and maintenance of order in the United States. He went on to say that

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the Chiefs of Staff still thought much too much each in terms of his own service. He thought that each service should have what the corporate judgment of the Chiefs thought proper. He said that if the Chiefs can't develop corporate judgment on the great problems that are facing us, the system as we now have it will have failed and major changes must be made. He referred to recent criticisms of the capabilities of carriers. He said that even if these charges are right, they should not be made in public; it is a matter that should be thrashed out in deepest security within the JCS. We shouldn't tell an enemy our weaknesses -- if they are weaknesses -- and shouldn't damage the confidence of our people and our allies in these weapons if they are as effective as he thinks they are. Similarly, the public criticism of the Nike is damaging to our country. If it is not a good weapon, we should determine that privately, and not notify the enemy but make our own corrections. Again, if it is a good weapon, we are harming the confidence of our public and our allies through this type of criticism. He recognizes that there are going to be differences of view, but considers that they should be worked out by the JCS. All should be thinking of the good of the country rather than attaining gains for a particular service. The President said he would like to see a Nike test firing, but has felt unable to do so because of the need to give psychological support to peaceful rather than military things.



General Taylor said that the decision of the President will initiate fundamental and rather drastic changes. The President did not feel that they would be too drastic. He said that, in any case, we are going to keep forces in the Far East and in Europe (even though the concept in Europe had been to have them there for a short period only -- now it looks as though they must stay almost indefinitely). He felt that in the emphasis he has given on the atomic weapons lies the greatest safety and security for our country. He did not claim to be all wise in such matters, but he was very sure that as long as he is President he would meet an attack in the way indicated. With regard to the budget, while stressing the need to maintain the economic soundness of the U. S. -- and specifically to avoid tax levels which would prevent the building up of capital productive industry, the President said he has told everyone that we must have what we need for security. He anticipates a fairly stable estimate which might be of the order, in his opinion, of \$37 billion. Admiral Radford said that the decision of the President, in his opinion, supported the majority view, and General Taylor agreed. Admiral Radford said that the decision will have some far-reaching effects. For example, we should now

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tell our allies that support will be as the President described. If they can plan on that, they could cut down some of their forces. It might well mean that we would put into their country units such as Honest John and missiles with atomic warheads as support elements. The President said that these changes and others to be made would not necessarily be radical, but could be gradually applied.

Admiral Radford referred to additional requests coming in for programs that would run above the "maintenance level" the Chiefs had spoken of on their return from Puerto Rico. The Air Force will be coming in for an increase in strategic air units, partly needed because the problem of penetrating to targets will be becoming increasingly severe. The President thought that the development of higher, faster aircraft relates to this purpose. Admiral Radford said we still have a big program to carry out regarding Continental Defense, dispersal of airfields, and provision of guided missile air defense. He said there has never been complexity equal to this in terms of military planning.

The President thought there was need for a group like the advisory board he constituted while Chief of Staff. That produced no memos but concentrated on thinking about the major problems of the military forces. They were, with one exception, retired officers having no further assignments in view. Such a group under the Secretary of Defense or JCS composed of senior officers divorced from service, with a few scientists added, would be of the greatest value.




A. J. Goodpaster
Colonel, CE, U S Army

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May 2, 1956

Personal and Confidential

Dear Ed:

Contrary to your assumption, I had not seen the clipping that carried the story on your visit to Senator Bridges. The fact is that it is so tame or pale as compared to some things that are said about me, my family or Administration that the staff was not impressed sufficiently to call it to my attention.

I am interested in your statement, "I do think and have said so to you, that the Government is rapidly drifting into a socialistic state." A statement such as this seems indication to me that you are not studying the march of events with as clear an eye as you should; you are talking from impressions and prejudices without giving the important factors serious examination.

In 1948, '49, '50, '51 and early '52, many hundreds of people were urging me to go into politics. Scores of different reasons were advanced as to why I should do so, but in general they all boiled down to something as follows: "The country is going socialistic so rapidly that, unless Republicans can get in immediately and defeat this trend, our country is gone. Four more years of New Dealism and there will be no turning back. This is our last chance."

To all of these people I made the same reply time and time again:

- (a) It is silly to believe that any individual in the world -- or, indeed, any party -- can actually turn a whole population back from a course it has pursued in the belief that that course is assisting the majority of the

Personal and Confidential

Personal and Confidential -- 2

population. (Naturally, I am now speaking of a self-governing country.) Neither I nor anyone else can bring about the abandonment of projects supported by the government that are generally believed to help the social or economic welfare of vast portions of our population.



- (b) The most that anyone -- even if he is supported by a good majority in the Congress -- could do would be gradually to stop the trend in this direction, slowly to bend the rising curve toward greater socialism and eventually to flatten it out so that further advance in this dangerous direction would be prevented.
- (c) To bring about this result would not only take persistence and patience by the government, but it would require a maximum degree of understanding on the part of the so-called "standpatters." These people will have to recognize the truth of the statements made in (a) and (b), and must devote their efforts to helping stabilize the situation rather than criticizing efforts which recognize that you cannot return to the days of 1860.

Now just one or two more general comments. Shortly after I was elected, former President Hoover visited me in my office. He said something to me which I quote roughly as follows: "You have, from an economic viewpoint, the most difficult task that has ever faced any of our Presidents. All of us believe that there is great danger lying ahead in the direction we are now travelling. Yet you cannot go back. Your accomplishments will necessarily be confined to a gradual halting of that movement. As a result, the reactionaries will snarl at you, as well, of course, as the people that join the ADA and other so-called 'liberal' groups.

Personal and Confidential -- 3

Education of the entire people will be a task of the Party, and since so many people will misunderstand what is going on, that education will be a slow and laborious process."

My only other point is really a suggestion. Stevenson has lately been speaking in Oregon. Why don't you get copies of his talks and read them over? You will find that he is complaining bitterly because the Republican Party, under my leadership, is guided only by its devotion to the monopoly of money, to the service of the rich, and to the exploitation of the masses. Of course he makes different speeches in different States, but in Oregon he is applying these generalizations to my attitude about power development. Since I believe that the responsibility for power development should not reside exclusively in the Federal Government, he asserts that I am giving away to the rich the assets of the whole people. In other States he is quite capable of saying something entirely different.

Even the big fight in the TVA region came about because I refused to build more steam plants at Federal expense to produce power for that area. All of the hydroelectric capacity has been developed in the area and so many steam plants have been built by the Federal Government that already one-half of the power for that region is produced in that way. Yet I am called a reactionary because I believe that the Federal Government should not be building more steam plants in that region.

I am a little amused about this word "real" that in your clipping modifies the word "Republican." I assume that Lincoln was a real Republican -- in fact, I think we should have to assume that every President, being the elected leader of the Party, is a real Republican. Therefore, the

Personal and Confidential

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President's branch of the Party requires, for its description, no adjective whatsoever. I should think that the splinter groups, which oppose the leader, would be the ones requiring the descriptive adjectives. In any event, please look up sometime what Lincoln had to say about the proper functions of government.

As ever,



Mr. Edgar Eisenhower
Puget Sound Bank Building
Tacoma, Washington

Personal and Confidential

May 2, 1956

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Dear Monty

I have read your CPX address with the greatest interest. I was particularly intrigued by the way you approached the subject -- looking back rather than forward to a conflict.

I agree with much you have to say about the need for planning, for approaching our problems of today realistically. However, you have one thesis in your paper to which I take exception. It is that the Russians undertook this war knowing that they were going to lose, and that they did this in order to promote Communism. I think this is an unrealistic assumption. These Communists are not early Christian martyrs. The men in the Kremlin are avid for power and are ruthlessly ambitious. I cannot see them starting a war merely for the opportunity that such a conflict might offer their successors to spread their doctrine.

Another point I raise about your study is that you made no attempt to visualize the true nature of the holocaust that would result from the exchange of "eight thousand nuclear weapons." Presumably the warheads on a good number of these would be hydrogen bombs, and I believe you have far underestimated the degree of destruction that would result. I think also that you give more credit than I do to the estimated accuracy with which guided missiles of an intercontinental variety will be operating in another ten years. I believe the main part of the blow in any such hypothetical war would be delivered by the manned airplane, supplemented by guided missiles, rather than the reverse. For our side,

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 11

MR 76-82 #33

By J.W. Date 3-28-78

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this would be almost mandatory because of the great difficulty we have in getting the exact locations of interior targets in the Soviet Union.

Now with respect to the degree of damage, entirely aside from the material destruction you visualize, I believe there would be literally millions of dead after any such nuclear attack. In such circumstances what does a nation do; what can it do? I realize that the side suffering the lesser damage -- in this case the allies -- could achieve some restored capacity for action earlier than would the other, and so I do not quarrel with your description of later events.

All of this of course is just by way of giving you some observations that occurred to me immediately after going through your document. I do applaud you for your imagination in tackling the problem and for bringing into focus some of the great needs of our times; that is, intelligence, scientific development, plans and, so far as we can achieve it, central control of some of our forces.

As for next May -- please write to me about the turn of the year. It's impossible at this moment to say, on a scheduled basis, where we shall be or what we shall be doing at any given time. But, of course, we'll work something out; and we'll be truly glad to see you.

With warm regard,

As ever
D.E.

Field Marshal the Viscount
Montgomery of Alamein
K.G., G.C.B., O.M., D.S.O.
Deputy Supreme Commander
Allied Powers Europe
APO 55, New York

(copy of last paragraph sent to Mrs. McCaffree)

June 7, 1956

Dear Barbara:

It is always refreshing to hear from you, and it doesn't do me a bit of harm personally to have now and then a nod of approval from you on some particular talk or speech. Particularly I appreciate your kind words about the Baylor speech. I worked over it what seemed like endless hours, and at the end I was afraid I had tried to jam too much into too short a period of time.

If there is any way you can tell me how to convince people that our entire domestic life is based upon what we do in the foreign field and that, therefore, the current foreign aid bill is an absolute necessity and absolute minimum, I would welcome your thoughts. I have talked -- endlessly it seems to me -- on the subject -- and you know the mediocre success I have had, even with some of the Republican members of the Congress.

As one of your part time projects, why don't you put your idea for a radio serial into concrete form and see if you can't sell it commercially?

Thank you for writing and for giving me the chance to reply -- at least in part -- to the many interesting ideas I find in your letter.

With warm regard to you and Mr. Gunderson,

Sincerely,



Mrs. Robert W. Gunderson
Republican National Committeewoman
3625 Hall Street
Rapid City, South Dakota

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Authority W.H. 6V106445

By QSH NLE Date 7/8/97

DIARY

Former Senator Harry P. Cain -- June 7, 1956

The President said he was told that Senator Cain wanted to see him, so invited him to get off his chest whatever was bothering him.

Sen. Cain thanked the President, and went on as follows (almost verbatim):

For the better part of the last 2 years I have been working as best I could in concert with officials of both Parties, including obviously a good many within the Administration, to eliminate those expected defects in a system of almost total security, that of necessity was drawn together pretty rapidly. In the early part of 1953, probably the fault has been more mine than others, but I haven't been able to get as close to some within the Administration as would have been my wish, as continues to be my hope. But that requires making certain really basic



There was an injustice done, unintended perhaps, but an injustice nonetheless.

It happens that in the course of these last several years, working generally with others -- because they never came to me until they had gone as far as they could without my help -- I have been with them to put 20, 30, 50 human beings back on "Main Street" after they had been destroyed totally. The last such case was this young fellow Hatkins, whom I never before heard of. It took 24 months for those in authority to decide whether they were going to keep him or fire him. He had already been destroyed. He's now back on the job, but never will be worth anything again because of this long extended period of frustration imposed on himself.

I speak most frankly, Sir. You said in your Press Conference in connection with the case, that the Air Force Secretary was giving consideration to it -- that he was an honorable, fair-minded, decent man. I agree entirely with that. But the fault lies within the system that permits 24 months for the decision to reach the commander for his position.

I don't know what I would have done under the circumstances -- being without any money at all. The guy was living under unemployment compensation. But if I were approached by someone wanting me to do something within my endeavor, telling me what the American Aircraft industry is, & I needed the money ... well, I don't know what I would have done.

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Sen. Cain -- 2

He was faced with that. He took a retainer fee; he went to his attorney, & to the FBI. But that was some 6 weeks before the recommended decision reached the desk of the Secretary. In that recommended decision, there was not a positive reflection on this young man's life, who had 15 years of meritorious service with the government. There was a reference to the fact that he had belonged to the Washington Book Shelf in '41; to a Federal Labor Union, '43 to '48; & that his wife was said to have had something to do with a women's (?) conference in '46, which she had no knowledge of whatsoever.

I have some good common-sense & simple recommendations to make in these fields. The Hatkins case I used -- I was required to use it to wake people up a little bit.

But in that same speech in New York, I put in a table that included 416 Federal employees who were first charged, then heard, then suspended, then ultimately restored without prejudice to their jobs, with their money being paid back. And the average length of suspension was something better than 7 months, on the average.

On January 10th of this year, as a result of some of us taking the case to the press (we have no appeal system in internal security), we got the fellow back on his job. Charges were filed against him by State Department on May 6, 1952. The charges basically were that he had some association with some Communists while residing in Casablanca during the period 1926-41. He came to this country as a refugee, & was talked into taking a job in government, with the Office of War Information. When it was closed up, State Department took him on, and they thought well of him. There they preferred these charges.

To make a long story short, after he had been fired and separated for a year and a half, he and his attorney went to France and Casablanca, where they got French Government and French Police to say that of course this man was associated with the following named persons, & there wasn't a single Communist among the group -- they were all Social Democrats.

We could have, through an Executive Order without trouble at all, a requirement that, following a stated, reasonable but brief period, between the conclusion of a hearing board and the rendering of the decision, if it was going to take longer to render the decision there

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Sen. Cain -- 3

ought to be an accounting in writing by higher authority. Otherwise, the very nature of government lends itself, I think, Mr. President, to abuses of this character.

If I may proceed just a little bit -- When we came into office in 1953, there was a Public Law 733 requested by Defense Department and passed in 1950. (I was then a member of the Armed Services Committee and had access to the records.) That law gives no vacancies considered to be security departments of the government of summary power to suspend anybody they have serious questions about. The law went on to say that if an administrator exercises this rather terrible power, the employee should have certain stated rights. That law made a clear distinction between security on the one hand, and loyalty on the other. This law doesn't take the place of the loyalty program; they go side by side. When we came in under our first Executive Order, 10450, we merged the two. And therefore from that time on (it shouldn't be this way, Mr. President, but this is human nature), when someone leaves this government as a so-called security risk, it has undeniably a connotation that something is wrong with that man's loyalty.



And I am suggesting with all the conviction at my command ... I studied this thing thoroughly ... that sooner or later we are going to have to do two things: first, we are going to have to separate security from loyalty; and then, clearly and importantly (though people don't talk about this), separate stability from security.

Public Law 733 requires that an individual who is found to be a security risk should first be fired from his sensitive job, and then the hearing to be held.

(Some discussion followed as to responsibility of the department head to transfer the individual from sensitive to non-sensitive job; and afterwards, for Civil Service, if they clear him, to make him eligible for job in another agency.)

I am not criticizing anybody -- this problem is too important. But there is a regulation in this government since 1953 that when security risk charges are filed against an individual, that person must be summarily suspended.

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Sen. Cain -- 4

Now it happens that the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General in charge of Internal Security are recommending to the Congress that the law be so amended that the summary suspension provision can be done away with, just on the basis of discretion. But, Mr. President, there is nothing in the law that requires suspension under Public Law 733.

(Some mention of Cain's Spokane speech -- that he showed it to no one before delivering it, that no one had asked to see it.)

You have said many things that thoroughly stimulated me. In my speech in New York, I tried to say why I admired you, why ^{your} men loved you. But recently you said three things that just filled me with great excitement.

- (1) The individual is of supreme importance. (Now, we believe that administratively, or we don't.)
- (2) Government must have a heart as well as a head. (We believe that or we don't.)
- (3) We deny the fact that individuals are like serial numbers in the files.

(Senator Cain cited actual cases relating to the 3 points above. As for the 2nd, he concluded that individuals should be given opportunity to defend themselves. On the 3rd point, he concluded with two suggestions: that copy of the decision should be given to the employer; & that a statement of reasons which justify recommendation by hearing board shall be provided to the employee.)



The President:

What I think you ought to do for us, in view of all this, is to give a list of the type of thing -- not necessarily going back over all the cases -- that you need justified. I don't believe it is always possible to confront the men, particularly if it is in a very sensitive place. And I agree there could be a substitute for that. Let's get the complaints, then the record, and then we'll check up first against the workers. Let's take some specific case.

The Attorney General is the one you deal with at the moment -- after you get the case together.

Sen. Cain again:

Lots of things have been said about Mr. Brownell and myself that are not true. My feeling is that he is a very much busier man than I.

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Sen. Cain -- 5

If you could please give me one minute for another reflection.

In Seattle, I learned of the case of a young man who had been a platoon combat leader in Korea, served as a draftee in World War II, was engineer on secret clearance with Boeing Airplane Company, and finally was invited by Red Cross to go on an overseas mission. Routine security clearance therefore had to be requested of the Army. (This is new rule, since 1947; but it actually goes back to February 1942 Executive Order.) It took 9 months for the Army Department to reach its decision. They wrote to the boy, aged 29, saying examination was completed, with results to withhold him.

I think he is entitled to know what he is charged with, and be entitled to protect himself. He sat down and wrote long letter (to Cain - ?); then 4 days later, he addressed a letter to you, enclosing his combat infantry badge which he regards as the best token in his life. He said it's an ironic thing to be eligible for this award, and now to be rejected by the Army. His letter was not acknowledged by any member of the White House staff, but was referred to the Department of the Army. In due time, Army acknowledged with 2 paragraphs saying, in effect, "This is to acknowledge your letter of 9 April 1956 to the President. We have no concern in your plight, because we are not going to assign you overseas. Whether the Red Cross fires you or keeps you is their business and not ours, so you make your appeal to them."

I don't know what utterly callous person would so respond. The matter isn't very important, but I did think you would be willing to find out where the combat badge is, & have it returned.

(Here, the President interrupted to ask Ann to look up the correspondence.)

The Army officer who wrote the letter mentioned a General Order, but didn't explain it.

Wherever this boy goes to seek employment commensurate with his ability, he will be asked if he has ever been denied security clearance. His answer would have to be yes, but he would not know why.

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(NOTE: Jerry Morgan sat in on discussion.)

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July 31, 1956

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
July 31, 1956; 9:45 AM

Others present: Secretary Dulles
Under Secretary Hoover
Mr. Phleger
Deputy Secretary Robertson
Assistant Secretary Gordon Gray
Admiral Burke
Secretary Humphrey
Mr. Allen Dulles
Colonel Goodpaster

Secretary Dulles, Mr. Hoover and Mr. Phleger had been with the President about fifteen minutes when the larger group came in. They and the President had read a message (London 550) which the President then had handed to the others to read. In essence it stated that the British had taken a firm, considered decision to "break Nasser" and to initiate hostilities at an early date for this purpose (estimating six weeks to be required for setting up the operation).

In opening the discussion, the President said he considered this to be a very unwise decision on their part. Military support from us would require Congressional action, and a request for such action on the basis of the British decision would not be well received. He felt that the British were out of date in thinking of this as a mode of action in the present circumstances. To take such action without having made a "counterproposal" to the Egyptian action would be an extremely serious matter for us. The Middle East oil would undoubtedly dry up, and Western hemisphere oil would have to be diverted to Europe, thus requiring controls to be instituted in the United States. He thought Secretary Dulles had better go to London at once and make clear how impossible it would be to obtain Congressional authorization for participation

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MR 81-12741

By DJH Date 12/10/81

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by the United States in these circumstances. ~~also to~~ ^{(we must} recognize that our participation would be essential if order and access to oil were to be restored).

The President asked Allen Dulles what he estimated the reaction to a British action of this kind would be in the Arab world. Mr. Dulles said that if the move were made now, i.e., without a conference or a counterproposal, the whole Arab world would "unite in opposition in all likelihood. If, however, a conference were held, the situation might be considerably different, and the opposition be much less widespread and intense. Today action would arouse the whole Arab world. The President enlarged this to the whole Moslem world.

Secretary Dulles said that he thought there was better than an even chance that, if a conference were held by calling in all of the countries involved, unanimous backing for an international regime to operate the Canal could be obtained. If a proposal of this kind were made to the Arabs with world backing (including Asian backing which seems reasonable to expect) it would then be possible to take armed action if it became necessary with a good chance of retaining a large measure of world support. The British seem to have dropped the idea of a conference in favor of an ultimatum, and want us to join in a communique which is designed to cause a breach. Mr. Allen Dulles suggested that Nasser might not come to the conference, but Secretary Dulles thought that if the conference is one of signatories to the Treaty he probably would come.

Secretary Humphrey asked, with regard to the British proposal, what end was in sight -- what the final situation might be toward which they would be working. Secretary Dulles said it could only be a return to the situation in the Canal Zone that had existed a few years ago in which terrorist attacks by the Egyptians were unceasing, with nearly 90,000 British troops present there. Secretary Humphrey said it looked as though they were simply trying to reverse the trend away from colonialism, and turn the clock back fifty years. It did not seem that the action could lead to a solution in the area.

Secretary Dulles referred to the proposed communique for the meetings currently in progress in London and stressed the lack of any mention of a conference in the British draft. It appeared that they wished to associate the United States with the first phase of their operations, with the result of tending to commit us to their

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whole course of action or leave us in the position of letting them down. He thought that unless the British are ready to have a genuine conference, we should not take the first step with them, i.e., joining in the communique they propose. He read off the U. S. proposed text for the communique.

In response to a question, Admiral Burke said the JCS are of the view that Nasser must be broken. They thought this should be accomplished with economic and political means. If, however, these are tried and prove insufficient, the United Kingdom should then use armed force, and we should declare ourselves in support of their action. (He did not indicate the U. S. should participate with armed force) The President felt that it was wrong to give undue stress to Nasser himself. He felt Nasser embodies the emotional demands of the people of the area for independence and for "slapping the white Man down." He said we must consider what the end could be. It might well be to array the world from Dakar to the Philippine Islands against us. Admiral Burke said the suggestion is to search for and try to develop means of splitting off Egypt from other Arab and Moslem groups. If Nasser retains power, he will spread his influence progressively, to the detriment of the West through the Middle East. The President recalled that we have been trying to find means of doing just this for several months.

Secretary Dulles thought we could make Nasser disgorge what he has seized, and agree to internationalize the Canal. He recognized that this action would not serve the French and British interests in the Middle East and Africa so dramatically, and understood why, in their circumstances, they felt a bolder action was necessary. Such did not necessarily represent our interest, however. Secretary Humphrey cited, as a danger in negotiation, that we might be pressed into the position of agreeing to finance the building of the Aswan Dam in return for Nasser's giving up the Canal. Such action could only build up his prestige. Secretary Dulles said he would not agree to such a proposition. Nasser must be made to disgorge his theft. Mr. Humphrey said all the rest of the world would press us to build the dam. Secretary Dulles said such action would simply be one of rewarding theft.

The President said that Nasser has an exaggerated idea of the income from the Canal. In the discussion that followed, Secretary Dulles

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brought out that he can pay off the shareholders very largely with accumulated reserves, and would then have somewhere between \$30 and 50 million a year clear. We must try to make him disgorge by international means -- not by force. After such a try, if it is then necessary to act, world opinion would give greater support.

Secretary Dulles brought out that if Middle Eastern oil were lost to the West, rationing of oil in the United States would be an immediate result, with curtailment of automobile production, and a severe blow to the United States economy. Secretary Humphrey said there would be great anger against the U K on the part of the people of the United States if such a result came from unilateral British action.

Secretary Dulles said the British action would be likely to provoke Israeli attack on Jordan, with the result of inflaming the whole Arab world. He recalled that the British went into World War I and World War II without the United States, on the calculation that we would be bound to come in. They are now thinking they might start again and we would have to come in again. Mr. Allen Dulles said that initial military opposition by the Egyptians would be light, but that the problem of pacifying the area would be extremely difficult.

The President said we must let the British know how gravely we view this matter, what an error we think their decision is, and how this course of action would antagonize the American people despite all that could be done by the top officials of the Government. He felt it was essential to try other measures. Mr. Allen Dulles said that public opinion has flared up strongly in Britain. There is a demand for more than "calling a conference" on Eden's part. Secretary Humphrey reported that there had been wild cheers for Eden at his mention of using the British Navy. The British people are extremely worked up over this situation.

The President said that, thinking of our situation in Panama, we must not let Nasser get away with this action. Secretary Dulles said we want to base whatever is done on this Treaty. The President added, "and on the operation of the Canal." Mr. Dulles said that we want to stick to the Treaty since, if we ever get away from it, we might be pried away from our status in Panama. Mr.

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Allen Dulles said we should consider what might have to be done to protect Persian Gulf oil -- sources in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc. In response to a question, Admiral Burke said the Navy has four destroyers on station in the Persian Gulf or immediately available to it.

Secretary Dulles turned to subsidiary problems of an economic and financial nature, such as keeping hold of Egyptian assets in the United States for at least another forty-eight hours. By doing so we would be able to have added effect with the British and French. Press reports say that the Egyptians have subjected United States funds to license in Egypt. Mr. Humphrey said we could ~~freeze the~~ Egyptian funds and subject them to license. He said there are about \$60 million worth of Egyptian government funds in the U. S. (Mr. Hoover said there are also perhaps \$50 million in private Egyptian funds here) and the Egyptians are trying this morning to move some \$10 million in treasury bills. Mr. ~~Hoover~~ ^{Humphrey} said he had issued instructions to catch this operation and hold it up for the moment. Secretary Dulles thought that freezing and licensing would have value, indicating that ordinary commercial transactions could go forward. We would thus keep some cards to play. Secretary Humphrey said that yesterday he had not wanted to do this, but in light of the British message he was now inclined to think we should freeze these funds and then soften the controls. Mr. Allen Dulles said that the repercussions in Egypt and throughout the world would be very severe. Secretary Dulles said we could be careful not to interfere with normal transactions, and asked what the Egyptians have done about American assets in Egypt. Mr. Allen Dulles thought they might retaliate by seizing all American assets in Egypt.

Secretary Dulles said he had suggested Byroade ^{forward} ~~forward~~ his views regarding commencing evacuation of American nations, and Byroade had advised against that action. Secretary Dulles thought that the Egyptians if inflamed would attack Americans along with Europeans. He thought we should quietly move to get women and children out of the country. Mr. Hoover said that the first stage as planned has been to encourage personnel to volunteer for evacuation, with the U. S. paying the way. Byroade had agreed that planning for this action should go forward. Secretary Dulles asked how many private citizens and their families are in Egypt, and Mr. Hoover said that there were not many. Mr. Allen Dulles said in response to a question that the British have made no move thus far to remove their people. Secretary

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Dulles summed up by saying that we should get ready to move our people at once.

Secretary Humphrey thought that with regard to both the freeze and the evacuation, it might be better to wait until Secretary Dulles has talked to the British. Mr. Hoover thought that a formula on the freeze might be "since Egypt is freezing U. S. funds, we are freezing theirs while the matter is considered." Mr. Humphrey thought that such action will start money movements throughout the world, to Switzerland, for example, and telegraph that something extremely serious is developing. The President pointed out that the French and British have already frozen funds. Mr. Humphrey commented that British funds were already blocked, so that the effect was not so great. Mr. Hoover brought out that the British had in effect prohibited the use of sterling in Egyptian trading. The President thought an announcement indicating that the situation is cloudy and that we are holding matters in the status quo while investigations are going on, but that normal commercial transactions could continue, might be considered. He thought the language of the announcement itself might serve to allay repercussions.

Mr. Dulles said that if he goes to London that action telegraphs that something serious is on. The President said that if Mr. Dulles can't persuade the British from their course, the news of the rift would come out right away. Secretary Dulles said that if separate communiques were issued, indicating a rift, the effect would be spectacular.

The President commented that the British apparently believe the pipelines from the Middle East would continue to run. Secretary Dulles recalled that they are reportedly extensively mined and that the Syrians could blow them immediately. The President thought the British should be told that we regard this as startling, that Secretary Dulles is coming over to explain how thoroughly and in what ways we disagree. He recognized the intensity of British feeling -- specifically their feeling that they have been going down and down in the Middle East and that they have now reaching a point where they must strike back. Mr. Allen Dulles said that British comment is full of references to Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland. A number of differences were cited.

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Secretary Humphrey asked what the repercussions would be if Secretary Dulles comes back with an obvious split of views between us and the British. The President said such an event would be extremely serious, but not as serious as letting a war start and not trying to stop it. Secretary Dulles said the situation would be almost as serious if we were simply to have Murphy disassociate himself from the communique; in that case we would be criticized for not having the Secretary of State go over to work the matter out. He said he thought there is a chance -- just a chance -- that he can dissuade them, perhaps a bit at a time, gradually deflecting their course of action. The President noted that the British have not yet taken the matter up with Parliament.


The President then said he wanted "not a whisper about this outside this room."

Mr. Hoover recalled that the British had mentioned needing six weeks to mount the offensive they had in mind.

Mr. Humphrey said he would like to study how to carry out a freeze-- how to frame the announcement in the best possible way.

Secretary Dulles said he would plan to leave for London in two or three hours, and would call to ask that they keep the conference going until he got there.

The President said he would write immediately to Anthony Eden.


A. J. Goodpaster
Colonel, CE, U S Army

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August 28, 1956


Personal and Confidential

Dear Dr. Milton:

You asked for a note from me concerning how the President's official time is occupied. Here, with some misgivings and the hope that I have not overlooked too many things, is the picture as I see it.

Regular weekly meetings:

1. The National Security Council seems to be the most time-consuming, from the standpoint of the number of hours in the actual meeting, the briefing before the meeting that has seemed to become a routine, and the time that the President must give, occasionally, to be sure that the minutes of the meetings reflect exactly the decisions reached.



I would think the briefings could be cut out entirely in some instances, or limited to a very few minutes in others. The President has in many cases gone over the material several times previously -- with State or Defense, or both -- and he himself complains that he knows every word of the presentations as they are to be made. However, he feels that to maintain the interest and attention of every member of the NSC, he must sit through each meeting -- despite the fact that he knows the presentations so well.

2. The Cabinet meetings are not usually so long as NSC, but the President feels in some instances that to fill out an agenda, items are included that are not necessarily of the calibre that should come before the Cabinet. Little briefing, if any, is required for these meetings.

3. The Press Conferences. These meetings are preceded by a half to three-quarter hour briefing by staff members. Especially in the last year or so, it has seemed to me that the President knows

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full well how he is going to answer any given question, without assistance from the staff. The meetings do serve the purpose of letting him know how the various members of the staff are thinking, to urge the staff members to be a little more definite and not always to beg the issue (as so many want to). They also occasionally serve to remind the President of the more obscure items in the news that otherwise he might have forgotten or overlooked.

4. Legislative Leaders meetings. When the Congress is in session, these are held weekly but do not last, on the average, more than an hour and a half, and only about five minutes' preparation is required.

5. The President usually has a weekly meeting with the Secretary of Defense. I shall speak to you ~~verbally~~ about that.



6. The President usually has a half-hour meeting with Dr. Burns and Dr. Hauge. I think he finds these meetings valuable, and I do not believe that the sessions are unduly prolonged.

Other items that occupy his time:

1. State Department matters. The meetings with the Secretary are irregular, based upon the urgency of the particular crisis of the moment. In the present setup, I do not believe they take up an undue portion of the President's time, in view of the unique responsibility he bears for foreign affairs.

2. The President has to see, as you know, all Ambassadors newly accredited to this country and, I believe, usually sees departing Ambassadors. The individual interview is brief, but taken together these meetings represent quite a lot of time. Under existing protocol, however, I do not know how they would be eliminated.

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3. Foreign dignitaries. A lot of time, official and social, is consumed by such visits, as you well know. Of course each one of the visits is arranged on an individual basis, and I am sure that in each case the President carefully weighs the advantages to be gained.

4. Defense matters (other than the regular meetings with the Secretary). Here is a great time-consuming area. I can't always see why some of the inter-Service problems cannot be resolved before they come to the President, but apparently, as matters stand, they cannot. Budget, manpower, etc., take an enormous length of time, either with the Chiefs of Staff, or with the Chiefs and their civilian superiors.

5. Atomic Energy Commission. As far as I can judge, the President has only to make the top decisions in this field, and they take a minimum amount of time compared to their vital nature.

6. Other Cabinet matters. The President is available at all times to any Cabinet member for consultation. Agriculture took a lot of time this past year; Treasury must operate in consultation with him; the Postmaster General consults with him fairly frequently on Post Office and other problems; the Attorney General must take up pardons and other matters with him. Labor; Interior; Health, Education and Welfare; Commerce, seem to take a minimum amount of time.

7. Independent Agency matters in general take little time.

8. Personnel, appointments, domestic matters. I haven't any way to judge the amount of time that Governor Adams needs for such things, though my general impression is that on all such items the problems have been pretty well digested before they reach the President, and that only his final judgment is required.

9. Daily briefings on intelligence, foreign affairs, etc., take perhaps a half hour a day. Whether or not this is too much, only the President can judge. Colonel Goodpaster handles such things.



10. Appointments with Senators and Congressmen. This last year such things have been drastically curtailed; whether such curtailment worked disadvantageously or not, I do not know.

11. Appointments with groups. Generally speaking, though the President sometimes rebels, I think he enjoys meeting with groups, especially groups of young people, and I think he gets a great charge from such encounters.

12. Appointments with key American figures, the head of the American Bar Association, the head of the Chamber of Commerce, etc. Such appointments have been standard, and I don't know how they can be avoided. In general, too, if they can be limited to a minimum amount of time, I think they are helpful to the President.

13. Speeches. The President spends a great deal of time personally on his speeches, but I don't think that routine can ever be changed. I think only by the process of editing and reworking does the speech become truly his own; and I think the hours -- and I guess he spends 20 to 30 on each major speech -- are inevitable.

14. State dinners. I don't know how much of the President's time this year will be taken up with these dinners. Last year, all of them were cancelled.

15. Signatures. Here is where we have tried, not too successfully, to reduce the volume. Broken down, the signatures fall into the following categories:

a. Bills (and this year some of the private relief bills were lumped together).

b. Commissions, appointments. Better brains than I have tried to eliminate some of the items requiring Presidential signatures.



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c. Official documents -- disaster appropriations, etc. There seems no way to avoid the President's signature. Such matters are well staffed before they reach him, and though occasionally he may be annoyed by them, he has to know about them.

d. Messages. We have managed to send a number of the less important messages by telegram, thus avoiding signatures, and with Governor Adams' approval. But the more important ones still go to the President for his personal signature; and since you know what a stickler he is for everything being right that does bear his signature, a lot of time is demanded by this chore. I shall never forget the time a phrase "consumer demands have not changed in 2000 years" got by everybody, up to the President -- but of course he caught it!

e. Important official letters. These are always worked over by staff before the President sees them, but as with messages, he must read to be sure that his real meaning is conveyed, as well as sometimes to insert his own "feel" to such documents.

f. Gift letters. If the President were to approve, these could in the main be handled without his personal attention, but with his signature. I don't think anything disastrous would come about.

g. Personal letters to friends. He must either see the draft or dictate these letters; I see no alternative.

h. Photographs. We try to keep down inscriptions, but the President is the most generous of men, and feels very strongly that if people in government and elsewhere have been helpful, and ask for a picture, he must take the time personally to inscribe them.

* * * *

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I have written you with all the frankness I can command, on a personal basis, in the hope that you will "feel" the situation as I see it. I believe, however, that it would be better if this document went no further. I'm sorry it turned out to be so long.

Sincerely,



Ann Whitman.

Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower
Pennsylvania State University
University Park, Pennsylvania

Personal and Confidential

August 13, 1956

Dear Jacqueline:

It was good to see you last week. As always, a visit with you is a refreshing experience.

Mamie and I vividly remember your day with us at NATO four years ago on behalf of the Citizens for Eisenhower committee. I recall that the committee had just formed. Your film of its first public rally made a deep impression on both of us.

I am delighted that you are running for Congress. Your war service was outstanding. The initiative you showed then, backed by your knowledge of our nation's domestic and international concerns, will be valued in the Congress -- as I mentioned to you on several occasions.

That you have come up the hard way is also good, for it will keep you warmly responsive to the human problems of our people throughout your public service.

From my pleasant visit there, I have some appreciation of the District you will represent, and especially its potential for growth. No doubt your constituents know full well the importance to them of having your vitality and ability in their service.

I look forward to your coming to Washington, once again vigorously advancing our country's good as you did during the war.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,



Mrs. Jacqueline Cochran Odum
Cochran-Odum Ranch
Indio, California

DIARY -- August 8, 1956

The current Suez crisis.

The Suez affair has a long and intricate background and at this moment the outcome of the quarrel is so undetermined that it would be difficult indeed to predict what will probably happen.



Unlike the Panama Canal, which was built as a national undertaking by the United States under the terms of a bilateral treaty with Panama, the Suez Canal was built by an international group. There seems to have been felt the need for clarifying rights and privileges of the several nations in the use of the Canal, and so in 1888 a Convention or Treaty was signed, among a group of nations (about 10, I think) and which was left open for the purpose of permitting other nations to sign later should they so choose. That Treaty, among other things, made the waterway an international one forever, open to the shipping of all countries both in peace and war.

The Canal was originally constructed under a concession from Egypt, which expires in 1968, but the 1888 Convention specifically provided that the international character will continue no matter what the future ownership or concession arrangements might be.

Originally, I believe the stock was held largely by Egypt and by Frenchmen, but during the course of the years Egyptian rulers sold theirs. In any event a large block was acquired by the British Government. I am

not certain, but it is possible that the British Government may have owned some of the original stock. In any event, as of today the British own about 400,000 shares.



On the morning of July 27th, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the President of Egypt, made a very inflammatory speech, in which he announced the nationalizing of the Canal Company. This meant that the Egyptian Government took over the entire resources of the Suez Canal Company wherever they might be located. He also issued an extraordinary order to the effect that all people working for the Canal would be required to continue in their present employment under penalty of imprisonment. A further statement indicated that he expected to realize something on the order of one hundred million dollars profit a year out of the Canal and this undoubtedly meant a steep increase in Canal tolls since today after the payment to Egypt of the normal ground rental of some seventeen million dollars, there is only about thirty-five million dollars' profit. Another point in this connection is that the volume of traffic and the size of vessels is increasing so rapidly that very soon an extra three-quarters of a billion dollars must be spent to deepen and widen the Canal.

Nasser said he was doing these things because of the refusal of the United States to help him build the Aswan Dam.

When we made our first offer, I think more than a year ago, to help build the Aswan Dam, it was conceived of as a joint venture of ourselves and the British, which, once accomplished, would enable the World Bank to go in and help Nasser to completion of the work. It was felt that under this basis, the project would be feasible but would require all the resources that Egypt could donate to public affairs.

Egypt at once did two things:

(1) They sent back to us a whole list of conditions that would have to be met before they would go along with this plan and some of these conditions were unacceptable.

(2) They began to build up their military forces by taking over equipment provided by the Soviets, and they went to such an extent that we did not believe they would have a sufficient balance of resources left to do their part in building the Dam.

We lost interest and said nothing more about the matter.

Suddenly, about a month ago, Nasser sent us a message to the effect that he had withdrawn all of the conditions that he had laid down, and was ready to proceed under our original offer. Since conditions had changed markedly and we had thought the whole project dead, we merely replied we were no longer interested.



MEMORANDUM OF APPOINTMENT

August 26, 1957

The President had breakfast with the Majority Leader of the Senate,
Senator Lyndon Johnson.



The Senator presented to the President several papers to show that the 85th Congress had been at least more active than the 83rd Congress. He showed: hours per day spent, more days in session, more bills passed, etc. He also presented lists of 10 most important and 25 most important bills passed. Papers were given to General Persons. The Senator is sensitive, apparently, in this respect.

Senator Johnson is very anxious that the Administration get Republican support in the House for the amount the Senate will vote for the foreign aid appropriation. Johnson is very anxious that after he supports the amount -- whatever is passed -- he not get a "slap on the wrist" from the House.

The Senator suggested that the President see Dick Russell off the record. Russell is very anti-economic aid, but goes along down the line of appropriation for military aid. He is shy, reticent, sensitive personally. Also he thinks the Administration way way so much on civil rights bill, he might possibly be inclined to be helpful with respect to mutual aid appropriation. General Persons, to whom the President was talking, suggested that he prepare to show how much foreign aid goes to Korea, Formosa, Viet Nam, Pakistan, Turkey and Greece. He should also be prepared to talk to him about reduction in military, about closing military installations in Georgia. Also to defend "backlog" money.

Johnson hopes to get the Senate out by Saturday. Hopes also that the 12 Republican Senators who voted against the Administration on previous civil rights bill will now vote for the compromise. (General Persons wants to check -- does not think too much trouble about that). Four democrats will go along with Johnson. Johnson wants Executive to do best it can to enlist House support -- continues to insist it is a bipartisan measure.

In this connection General Persons said we had an heroic job to do before next year (1) in selling mutual aid to the country, (2) to get a closer line on actually what is being done on economic expenditures. Senator Johnson told the President that McElroy and Smith were very popular appointments with the Democrats and that they should be gotten before the public as much as possible.

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Volume XX Pages 754-755

By DTH Date 3/5/47

TOP SECRET

I was visited by Professor Rabi, Admiral Strauss, Gordon Gray, and one or two others. The purpose was to bring to me certain conclusions reached by Professor Rabi's Committee, called the Scientific Advisory Committee to the Director of Defense Mobilization.

Briefly, their conclusion was that we now enjoy certain advantages in the nuclear world over the Russians and that the most important of these gaps can be closed only by continuous testing on the part of the Russians. Professor Rabi's Committee has therefore reached the conclusion that we should, as a matter of self-interest, agree to a suspension of all tests subject only to the installation of inspectional systems that would almost surely reveal the occurrence of a test. Scientists differ as to whether certain nuclear tests can be conducted without any knowledge reaching the outside world, but the Rabi Committee believes that with a half dozen or so properly equipped inspectional posts inside of Russia, any significant explosion could be detected.

While the Rabi Committee agreed that certain advantages in our weaponry could be realized by advancement of testing, they say that the expected advantage would be as nothing compared with maintaining the particular scientific gap that exists in the design of the Russian H-bomb as compared to ours.

The nature of this gap is that Russian bombs are unshielded against certain types of ~~all~~ radio activity that could be placed around them as they approach. The effect of this would not be to destroy the bomb but to reduce its effect by something like 99%.

Admiral Strauss and his group of scientists do not believe some of the assumptions made by the Rabi Committee. They are keenly afraid that should we discontinue our tests, the Russians would, by stealing all of our secrets, equal and eventually surpass us. So Admiral Strauss and his associates believe we should continue all of our experiments and testing out in the open, refusing to be victimized by Russian duplicity. They are quite firm in their belief that we could not protect ourselves adequately against that duplicity.

The outcome was that Gordon Gray, Admiral Strauss and General Cutler are going to try to get (if possible) an agreement of scientific opinion in this whole matter to see what we should do about it.

Incidentally, I learned that some of the mutual antagonisms among the scientists are so bitter as to make their working together almost an impossibility. I was told that Dr. Rabi and some of his group are so antagonistic to Drs. Lawrence and Teller that communication between them is practically nil.

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October 9, 1957

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
October 8, 1957, 8:30 AM

Others present:

Secretary Quarles
Dr. Waterman
Mr. Hagen
Mr. Holaday
Governor Adams
General Persons
Mr. Hagerty
Governor Pyle
Mr. Harlow
General Cutler
General Goodpaster



Secretary Quarles began by reviewing a memorandum prepared in Defense for the President on the subject of the earth satellite (dated October 7, 1957). He left a copy with the President. He reported that the Soviet launching on October 4th had apparently been highly successful.

The President asked Secretary Quarles about the report that had come to his attention to the effect that Redstone could have been used and could have placed a satellite in orbit many months ago. Secretary Quarles said there was no doubt that the Redstone, had it been used, could have orbited a satellite a year or more ago. The Science Advisory Committee had felt, however, that it was better to have the earth satellite proceed separately from military development. One reason was to stress the peaceful character of the effort, and a second was to avoid the inclusion of materiel, to which foreign scientists might be given access, which is used in our own military rockets. He said that the Army feels it could erect a satellite four months from now if given the order -- this would still be one month prior to the estimated date for the Vanguard. The President said that when this information reaches the Congress, they are bound to ask why this action was not taken. He recalled,

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however, that timing was never given too much importance in our own program, which was tied to the IGY and confirmed that, in order for all scientists to be able to look at the instrument, it had to be kept away from military secrets. Secretary Quarles pointed out that the Army plan would require some modification of the instrumentation in the missile.

He went on to add that the Russians have in fact done us a good turn, unintentionally, in establishing the concept of freedom of international space -- this seems to be generally accepted as orbital space, in which the missile is making an inoffensive passage.

The President asked what kind of information could be conveyed by the signals reaching us from the Russian satellite. Secretary Quarles said the Soviets say that it is simply a pulse to permit location of the missile through radar direction finders. Following the meeting, Dr. Waterman indicated that there is some kind of modulation on the signals, which may mean that some coding is being done, although it might conceivably be accidental.


The President asked the group to look ahead five years, and asked about a reconnaissance vehicle. Secretary Quarles said the Air Force has a research program in this area and gave a general description of the project.

Governor Adams recalled that Dr. Pusey had said that we had never thought of this as a crash program, as the Russians apparently did. We were working simply to develop and transmit scientific knowledge. The President thought that to make a sudden shift in our approach now would be to belie the attitude we have had all along. Secretary Quarles said that such a shift would create service tensions in the Pentagon. Mr. Holaday said he planned to study with the Army the back up of the Navy program with the Redstone, adapting it to the instrumentation.

There was some discussion concerning the Soviet request as to whether we would like to put instruments of ours aboard one of their satellites. He said our instruments would be ready for this. Several present pointed out that our instruments contain parts which, if made available to the Russians, would give them substantial technological information.



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A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

DIARY

Notes dictated by the President on October 8, 1957 concerning visit of Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas to Little Rock on September 14, 1957.

Interview was held in the President's tiny office at the Naval Station at Newport. At the beginning of what was approximately a two hour session, the President and the Governor were alone in the President's office for about twenty minutes. They then adjourned to acw's office, which was larger.

"What he had to say was pretty well represented in the press releases given out that day (attached). Governor Faubus protested again and again he was a law abiding citizen, that he was a veteran, fought in the war, and that everybody recognizes that the Federal law is supreme to State law. So I suggested to him that he go home and not necessarily withdraw his National Guard troops, but just change their orders to say that having been assured that there was no attempt to do anything except to obey the Courts and that the Federal government was not trying to do anything that had not been already agreed to by the School Board and directed by the Courts; that he should tell the Guard to continue to preserve order but to allow the Negro children to attend Central High School. I pointed out at that time he was due to appear the following Friday, the 20th, before the Court to determine whether an injunction was to be issued. In any event, I urged him to take this action promptly whereupon the Justice Department would go to the Court and ask that the Governor not be brought into Court. I further said that I did not believe it was beneficial to anybody to have a trial of strength between the President and a Governor because in any area where the Federal government had assumed jurisdiction and this was upheld by the Supreme Court, there could be only one outcome -- that is, the State would lose, and I did not want to see any Governor humiliated.



"He seemed to be very appreciative of this attitude and I got definitely the understanding that he was going back to Arkansas to act within a matter of hours to revoke his orders to the Guard to prevent re-entry of the Negro children into the school.

"He told me of his war experiences and vigorously asserted his deep feelings of loyalty and dedication to the Federal government, and repeated several times that he had shown respect for the law in all his actions.

"After some 20 minutes of personal conference, we invited Governor Adams and Brooks Hays, and later, the Attorney General, to join us. The ensuing conversation was generally along the same lines as he had talked to me in private."

ACW - Admin

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Maine
NASA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 5, 1958

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
March 5, 1958

Others present: Dr. Killian, Director Brundage
Mr. Rockefeller, General Persons
Mr. Harlow, General Goodpaster

The meeting was concerned with organization for the conduct of civil space programs. Dr. Killian reviewed a memorandum on this matter. He stressed the need to make use of existing facilities and competence, the limited scope of military applications of space activity as presently foreseen, the need for a civilian agency to handle the civil aspects, with Department of Defense (ARPA) handling the defense aspects. He indicated the recommendation, to use the NACA, substantially reconstituted and made responsive to Presidential direction. ARPA would be the coordinating point in Defense for contact with NACA in this matter.



He brought out that there have been other proposals, which have not been so favorably regarded. One involves the use of the AEC; a second is the constitution of a new agency consolidating both Defense and non-Defense activities; and a third is to center the operation in the Defense Department. He mentioned that a committee will be needed to coordinate the work of the NASA ("National Aeronautics and Space Agency", the reconstituted NACA) and the work of Defense (ARPA).

The President said he had several comments. Since 1947 we have used committees in many areas to effect coordination. These have failed badly to give necessary control of activities, including control of money. He said he has asked himself how we should use space activities for our national purposes. It seems to him that military activity on space projects is acceptable in the area of application of knowledge. He feels certain, however, that discovery and research should be scientific, rather than military. He felt that there is no problem of space activity (except ballistic weapons) that is not basically civilian, recognizing that application of findings may be made to serve military purposes.

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Authority: NASA, 12/2/76

By: [Signature] NLE DATE: 12/2/76

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Dr. Killian thought it would be important to arrange that both ARPA and NASA will bring projects to the President for approval. The President confirmed that NASA should report to the President while indicating that broad responsibility will have to be carried by the director of that organization.

Dr. Killian made two final points. It will be essential that the Department of Defense make facilities (such as missile test facilities) available for NASA use. Second, NASA must be in the dominating position with respect to space activities.

There was some suggestion that a better name than "agency" might be found for the NASA -- "institute."



A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. WHITMAN

10:14 a.m. - 10:25 a.m. Wednesday, May 21, 1958

General Persons and I accompanied Secretary Seaton in to see the President about the Alaska Statehood Bill scheduled for action in the House today. The Secretary indicated that he had had an inquiry from Congressman Saylor of Pennsylvania with respect to the President's current attitude toward this legislation. He also told the President that Joe Martin had come out publicly against the bill and that we did not expect either Arends or Halleck to support it.

The President is not enthusiastic about the legislation but said that we could indicate to Saylor that he stands squarely behind the Republicans' 1956 Platform statement on both Alaska and Hawaii. He finds it hard to understand why the House should act first on Alaska rather than Hawaii which is preferable as far as he is concerned. I explained that we were confronted with a condition and not a theory as the Alaska Statehood Bill was ready for consideration, whereas, the Hawaii bill has not even been reported by the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

When we left the President's office we were not even sure that the House would vote to consider the Alaska Statehood Bill. However, since then, the House voted 217 to 172 to consider the Bill. 85 Republicans voted in the affirmative.

J. Z. A.
Jack Z. Anderson



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May 15, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

The following met with the President in the Trophy Room of the White House at 6 PM on May 13th: Secretary Dulles, Mr. Allen Dulles, Secretary Herter, General Twining, General Gruenther, Mr. Rountree, Jack Irwin, General Goodpaster.



Secretary Dulles summed up the situation in Lebanon for the President, concluding with a report that the Lebanese had asked us, the British and the French whether we would intervene in their support if requested. Mr. Dulles thought we and the British should answer, but the French should stay out of the answer because of their current difficulties and complications with Israel. The President agreed.

In discussion regarding deployment of our forces in the Mediterranean, the President indicated agreement that the Marines should start moving eastward.

Secretary Dulles then said there is a basic question as to the mission of any forces if they intervene -- on what theory would intervention be based. Our forces could act to protect American life and property. In addition, we could send in military elements to engage in military assistance to the Government of Lebanon, in order to help them preserve their independence and integrity. The President suggested we might give a warning of some kind, stating that the crisis requires us to help the Lebanese, and that we must also protect American lives and property. Secretary Dulles said that if we should go in, we must expect a wide reaction -- the pipe lines to be blown up, the Canal denied to us, and a wave of feeling against us throughout the Arab world. A key question is whether we can expect help from Iraq and Jordan. Even if their governments wished to help, they might be swept away should they try it.

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The President suggested we have our Ambassadors inform Arab countries we have asked as to our position in this matter. He thought we should put a price on our action -- if the Arab countries think we should intervene, they must join in requesting us to do so.

There was next some discussion concerning the activity of Radio Cairo in inciting disorder. The President said we should have stations in other countries friendly to us for broadcasting or jamming purposes.



Secretary Dulles said he did not feel we should back a second term for President Chamoun. The President agreed we must ask Chamoun for what purpose he is seeking help.

Mr. Allen Dulles thought we should not take overt action immediately. He said the situation might collapse within twenty-four hours, or General Chehab might move in to bring the situation under control. Mr. Rountree said that Chehab's price to restore order will probably be that Chamoun must give up any idea of a second term.

Secretary Dulles suggested that U. S. forces could operate with two missions -- the protection of life and property, and the provision of assistance to the Lebanese Army. General Twining said that they would of course automatically have the mission of protecting themselves against attack. Mr. Irwin pointed out that the troops would have to go in as combat units and would have to be clear as to their mission.

The President pointed out that, while there are difficulties and dangers in taking action, we must think of the difficulties and dangers of not doing anything. Secretary Dulles said he thought we were at a very fateful point in our affairs in the Middle East. The Communists, he said, are stirring up trouble in area after area. He cited Venezuela, Indonesia and Burma as examples. In many cases we are obstructed from responding to the need, but here is a case where we can clearly respond on the basis of a call for help. The President thought perhaps he should ask Congress for authority to intervene -- as a warning. Mr. Dulles recalled that many senators had felt that the Middle East

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Resolution was not needed, and that the President had sufficient inherent powers. The President then suggested perhaps laying the matter before them as a report of what we are going to do. Mr. Allen Dulles again suggested that it would be better to move our troops quietly. This action might remain secret for another twenty-four hours, and by that time we might know the pattern of the situation much more clearly.


The President thought we should send out warning orders to our forces, including the three battle groups in Europe, the Marines and the carriers so as to get them into better position.

Secretary Dulles asked that General Twining have Admiral Holloway talk to the British about these missions. The President said there should be a single commander for all operations. General Twining said the United States would want the command; the President said it would be much better to give it to the British, but Secretary Dulles thought that the commander must be an American, because of resentment toward Britain throughout the Middle East. General Twining said he felt we should also line up our forces behind the task force to which orders are initially given.

Secretary Dulles then said that we must think of the possibility of Soviet reaction. The President said he considered it doubtful if we stay in Lebanon. If we were to have to hit Syria, however, that would be something else again.

General Gruenther asked how it was contemplated to report to the United Nations, and Secretary Dulles said the Lebanese proposed to tell the United Nations of the threat to their security and independence coming from the UAR. They would do this in the form of a statement so as to put the item on the agenda, probably without requesting any action.

The President said the key to the situation is how many Arab countries we could get to join Lebanon in asking for help (others had pointed out that otherwise we would find ourselves unable to disengage our forces after order had been restored).


A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA



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DIARY

Week of May 4, 1959



This will be all about Sir Winston Churchill -- little inconsequential things that happened during his visit. To me, I might explain, it was the most historic and memorable event of all the years at the White House, simply because to me Churchill symbolizes Anglo-American unity, and statesmanship in every sense of the word, and gallantry and courage. And I can never forget his voice as I used to listen to it at 4:00 A.M. coming from beleaguered Britain in the early days of the war. That grand, that wonderful voice, and that eloquence.

People here say that he is merely the master of showmanship. Master of showmanship or not -- and I grant that he is (witness the ten gallon hat, the bow ties of this visit -- he has taken me in completely and totally.

I honestly did not think he would be able to make the trip, despite all the minute plans we made. We -- and I mean Lord Lennox and I -- talked about bell beside his bed, who would make the toasts, what kind of food he liked, guests lists at great length, etc.

As to the guest lists the ZPresident, who was not in a particularly good mood in the weeks prior to the visit, was seemingly indifferent to who was invited and what type of dinners were arranged. He finally agreed on the plan of having one small one for war time associates and one larger one for top government people, a few of the war time associates not quite as closely connected, and some six or eight of the President's closest friends. The actual lists -- because we had to switch several people because of prior commitments were 17 for the first stag dinner on the fifth, and 51 for the second one.

Some of the results of invitations were: Unfortunately, Generals Clay and Bradley were going to be in Europe (as were Bob Anderson, John McCloy, etc.) The President asked President Truman, who refused (in all fairness his invitation was sent late.) But Truman had also been invited to the British Embassy and had refused that much in advance. The newspapers made a great business of the "quarrel" between the two Presidents, but President Eisenhower handled it in the press conference when he said that he worded invitations to informal affairs in such a way that people could always refuse if they had other engagements.

The seating of the two dinners presented a great problem as Sir Winston is so deaf that sitting next to him was a particular difficulty. At the first dinner he was flanked by Beldell Smith and Mark Clark, whom the President said were favorites of his in war days. At the second dinner he was seated on the President's right, with Henry Cabot Lodge next to him. The second dinner produced some memorable toasts, copies of which I shall attach to these small comments.

For posterity I want to add that Tom Stephens called the President and Sir Winston, in his own inimicable way, the "Playboys of the Western World" because you never could be quite sure what they would be up to. The first afternoon after lunch the President took Sir Winston out to see the azaleas at the Arboretum (when Secretary Benson heard about it he was crushed -- he thought he was going to be included in the party), and then they went out to the hospital to see Secretary Dulles and General Marshall. Pictures were taken of the meeting with the Secretary showing how dreadfully he has declined in the last week or so. He was in a wheel chair, for the first time the press has known. It was, I know, a particularly painful experience but something Sir Winston wanted very much to do. I am told that General Marshall understood who was there to see him, but could not respond. Apparently he cannot talk and looks very bad indeed.

The second afternoon the President (with just a little warning) called for the helicopters and took Sir Winston to Gettysburg. The scene I shall always remember, from the newsreels, was Sir Winston hanging on for dear life as the President took him across the bumpy terrain in a golf cart. The photographs (which I shall also attach to this) tell much more graphically than I can the story. One of the newspaper men said that Sir Winston was not at all interested in the cattle, but did seem to be interested in the Gettysburg battle ground.



Sir Winston is feeble and has difficulty in talking, so much so that communication is at times practically impossible. But little things show that, as his secretary said, he takes everything in, even though he sometimes cannot comment on it. For instance, he noticed a picture of Field Marshall Montgomery in the President's trophy room. He simply looked at it and shrugged his shoulders with a gesture that implied more than a thousand words.

Another story: when he and Bernard Baruch took off in the COLUMBINE to go to New York, Baruch, who is deaf also but who does wear a hearing aid, said to him, "for God's sake Winston, say something, anything, in front of the cameras. " Winston thereupon said "bow wow, bow wow, bow wow!"

I wish I could get the President to dictate something of his talks with Sir Winston. Perhaps I shall be able to later. Montague Browne, his secretary, was a wonderfully gentle and nice man, and interprets what Sir Winston is thinking and doing. All in all, I do think the visit went off nicely, and I know the President was gratified and pleased that such a great and old and feeble man would come all this way to renew his friendship. To see Sir Winston is to look upon history - history that is heroic and great.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION,
BIPARTISAN LEADERS BREAKFAST
WITH THE PRESIDENT, HELD IN THE
STATE DINING ROOM, THE WHITE
HOUSE, THURSDAY, MAY 26, 1960,
AT 8:45 A.M.

The President started the discussion by telling his guests that he had invited them in for a round table discussion of the events in Paris of the preceding week. He said that he thought they might want to ask questions of him or Secretary Herter or Secretary Gates who were also present. The President also added that he heartily approved of the inquiry which was being started in the Senate and that the Administration people, of course, would fully cooperate.

The President said that he specifically wanted to bring up two questions at the start.

The first was what happened to the U-2 plane. He said that the Soviets had claimed they had shot it down by rocket, but that he did not believe this. The Soviets had known about these flights for some time and were not able to interfere with any of the other flights because of the high altitudes at which the planes were flying. He pointed out that a picture of the plane released by the Soviets showed bullet holes in the wings. No Soviet fighter could get up to 70,000 feet so it is obvious that those holes must have been put in the wing at a lower altitude. He said it is the present theory that the plane's engine had flamed out, and that the pilot had to come down to below 70,000 feet to get the plane working again. It is possible that at that level Soviet planes could have attacked the U-2 and that their bullets could have damaged the plane's control and made it possible for the pilot to destroy the plane.

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The second point the President said he wanted to raise was that of intelligence and espionage. He said that intelligence and espionage were distasteful for many Americans, but that he as President from the very beginning of his Administration had to make decisions based on what was right for the United States concerning the fundamental intelligence knowledge that we had to have. In this field, of course, one had to weigh the risks and the serious consequences that would result if one were caught. The decision of such espionage is something that the President, and the President alone, has to decide. The President fully knows that if anything goes wrong, there will be criticism

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
BIPARTISAN LEADERS BREAKFAST
MAY 26, 1960 - Page 2

not only abroad but here at home. Nevertheless the President has to accept responsibility for these decisions and also keep the knowledge of such activities in the fewest possible hands. Only a few people in State, Defense and CIA knew of this, and there had been no spreading or leaks of the information. The President said that he was responsible for the directive for the U-2, that the wisdom of the decision lay with the President. "There is no glory in this business," he said, "If it is successful, it can't be told."

The President said that he did his best to put everything he could on the record in his speech last night, but that he was worried that the members of Congress in conducting the inquiry would try to dig into the interior of the CIA and its covert operation. Such attempt would be harmful to the United States and he was sure that the leaders of the Congress would realize this. He repeated that the Administration people would cooperate with the inquiry -- he called it "investigation" several times.

Senator Dirksen said that he was in G-2 during World War I and had some idea about intelligence and that he agreed with the President that intelligence operations by the Government should be held very tightly.

The President continued that it was also his decision to suspend flights. He said that he was sure that the leaders of Congress would be able to see some photographs of the Soviet installations taken by the U-2 and that they would see how tremendous they were. He pointed out that these flights had to be done from friendly bases and that when the U-2 incident occurred, there was a question of embarrassing our allies, and that was one of the reasons he made the decision to suspend the flights.

Senator Bridges interrupted to ask why some of our allies protested about use of bases on their soil. The President responded that the leaders should remember that some of these nations are fairly weak militarily and are close to the borders of the Soviet Union. He said that the Scandinavian countries particularly were afraid of the Bear, that they were perfectly willing to participate if the projects and missions could be concealed but that when they were uncovered, the Scandinavian countries felt that they must disown them.



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
BIPARTISAN LEADERS BREAKFAST
MAY 26, 1960 - Page 3

Secretary Herter said that the Pakistan reaction was very good -- that they had registered a protest with us for their own protection but that they were not going to publish such a protest and were merely going through the motions. Norway also made a protest, but again Secretary Herter said those nations had to go through the motions for home consumption.

The President said that Ayub of Pakistan was a fine and staunch ally and dwelt for a few minutes on Ayub's plan of basic democracies where first the localities, then the provinces and finally the nation will be given the right to vote.



Senator Mansfield said he was glad to hear that the President would support the "investigation" but that he and his colleagues preferred the word "inquiry", that it would not be an investigation in the ugly sense of the word.

He then said that he wanted to ask one question. What would the President think if there were to be established in the Congress a joint Congressional Committee which would oversee the activities of the CIA.

The President responded that his own feeling was that the operation of the CIA was so delicate and so secret in many cases that it must be kept under cover, and that the Executive must be held responsible for it. He said that he would agree to some bipartisan group going down occasionally and receiving reports from the CIA on their activities, but that he would hate to see it formalized -- indeed would be against the proposal made by Senator Mansfield.

Senator Russell supported the President in this viewpoint and said that they do have a Congressional group that periodically went over reports. He said that they knew the U-2 planes were under construction a long time ago. The Senator added that he was not afraid of the Senators on security matters but that he was afraid of staffs and that he would not want to be responsible for staff leaks. He put it quite bluntly when he said that any leaks of this nature from staffs would endanger the lives of men going into Russia and that he did not want it on his conscience.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
BIPARTISAN LEADERS BREAKFAST
MAY 26, 1960 - Page 4

Congressman Vinson said that he was in complete disagreement with Senator Mansfield, that he supported Senator Russell, and that indeed in the House they had the same system as in the Senate.

Senator Hayden also agreed with Senator Russell and Congressman Vinson -- and Senator Mansfield's suggestion therefore was rapidly knocked down.

Senator Fulbright then said that he looked upon the work his Committee would do as a study or inquiry and that he hoped the word "investigation" would not be used in connection with it. He said he was glad to hear that the President approved of the inquiry and that he would do his best to keep it on the track and not let it stray. He also said that he would like to raise this question -- that there was a tendency to revive political dialogue between the parties on who was soft on Communism. He said that if this continues, it would be disastrous, that it would get into the political campaign and that in the end, both parties might find themselves in the position where it would be impossible to renew contacts or continue them with the Soviets.

The President agreed with Senator Fulbright on this point and said that such a situation was easy to develop unless both political parties were careful of their language and their charges. He said that this was one of the things that Khrushchev was trying to do, to inject this matter into the American campaign, that he as President had refused to even recognize it and that he was sure the United States had leaders who had the sense to remain bipartisan in the international field. As for himself, the President said he would have no part of any such political activities.

Senator Fulbright said that his Committee would follow the same pattern as the Russell Committee had in the past, and that a transcript would be issued after the private meeting. The transcript, however, would be subject to censorship as far as security matters were concerned.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
BIPARTISAN LEADERS BREAKFAST
MAY 26, 1960 - Page 5

Senator Fulbright said that he would like to raise another point, and that was whether it was wise for the President to take responsibility for the U-2 flights. He said that he himself thought that disavowal would probably have been better.



In response the President said that when the plane was first missing, no one knew what had happened. It had been thought that if the plane got into trouble it would be destroyed, all material on board would be destroyed, and that the pilot would be free of any such material. On this assumption the story of a weather plane would have been able to stick. But, he added, the assumptions were incorrect. Within a few days the balloon was up. Senator Fulbright said that he still didn't think it was wise to take full responsibility. President Eisenhower responded that he thought it was, that if he didn't take responsibility someone else would have had to. He said he agreed that Khrushchev had tried to give him an out on this, but that he looked upon it as his responsibility, and he assumed it.

"Incidentally," he said with a smile, "if anyone were punished they should punish me first." He said that anyone sitting in his chair wouldn't want to put the CIA on the spot, and would not want to disown the CIA or its Director. He said that in addition to being President, he was also Commander-in-Chief, and he didn't see how he could duck this responsibility. He said he would be interested to see what the majority opinion of Fulbright's Committee would be on this point.

At this point Congressman Vinson leaned over and whispered to me that the President was dead right, that Fulbright was all wrong on his thesis, and that he, Vinson, thought the President had acted quite right in assuming responsibility. He said - "That's the kind of a man he is anyway.")

Senator Johnson then asked whether our intelligence would suffer by the discontinuance of the U-2 flights.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
BIPARTISAN LEADERS BREAKFAST
MAY 26, 1960 - Page 6

The President responded that when our friends were on the spot he had no alternative but to cancel out the flights. But he added that it was quite clear that with the advance of techniques these flights are not going to be as useful as they were in the past.

Senator Johnson then asked why they weren't stopped before the Summit Meeting.

The President said again that this was a decision that had to be made. The previous flights had been successful. The ill-fated flight had to take advantage of the weather to get the needed information that would not be available later on, and the decision was to go ahead. It was just bad luck that the flight had failed.

Speaker Rayburn interjected that as far as he was concerned, he had kept quiet about the whole thing.

The President responded that the people closely associated with the flight were sure that their cover story would hold and that that was the only reason he told them to put it out. He said that on reflection it would have been a good idea to count to ten, but that that was crying over spilt milk and that nothing could be done about it. It was then that the President said that he would study any recommendations that Senator Fulbright's Committee might make.

Secretary Herter said that the whole matter was a question of alternatives -- that the flights in the past had been successful, that the information they had collected was remarkable but that when the flight failed it was decided to make a frank and full story of the incident.

The President jocularly said that as far as punishment was concerned, the only way he could be punished would be by impeachment. Speaker Rayburn also replied jocularly that "you haven't got long enough to go for that." But then on a serious vein the Speaker told the President that whether mistakes had been made or not, "we are all in this together."



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
BIPARTISAN LEADERS BREAKFAST
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The meeting then broke up with the President thanking all the participants for coming to the White House.

* * * * *

The President then came to his office at the White House, and Bryce Harlow and myself worked up the following statement which the President approved:

At the breakfast meeting with Congressional leaders of both parties, President Eisenhower discussed various aspects of the Paris meeting and the U-2 incident. The President told the leaders that he personally welcomed the bipartisan inquiry which will start tomorrow.



In turn, the entire group agreed that the inquiry should be conducted on a completely non-partisan and truly bipartisan basis. The President said that Administration officials concerned would cooperate fully and added that, of course, he would consider any recommendations such an inquiry might make. There was a frank and general discussion lasting over an hour.

Jim Hagerty

DIARY - telephone calls

November 9, 1960

About 12:25 the Vice President called from California, where he had been for election day and election night returns. He seemed controlled, not downcast particularly. Said he thought they were still going to take California -- he also felt that Illinois would go in his column with absentee ballots -- he still thought Minnesota would be won. He said they might close the then difference of 400,000 in the popular vote.

The Vice President said to the President "You were magnificent, as far as I am concerned." The President urged him to concede (the V. P. said he just had) and added if by some miracle the vote could be upset, conceding would not be harmful.

The Vice President pointed out that he had run some 7% ahead of the Republican Party and Kennedy a little more behind the Democratic Party. He said that basically the trouble was the weakness of the Republican Party.

The President urged the Vice President to take a good rest -- sent his love to Pat -- and said "we can be proud of these last eight years." The Vice President said "You did a grand job."



January 18, 1961

Dear Daphne:

As one of my last letters from the White House I am, as I promised, replying to the questions you brought to me on behalf of the History Class of Montclair High School.

Won't you please convey to all your classmates my greetings and best wishes for the future?

Sincerely,



Miss Daphne Moaney
Montclair High School
Montclair, New Jersey

Enclosure - two pages of answers to questions
submitted by the History Class, Montclair
High School

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Answers to questions submitted by the
History Class, Montclair High School

1. We have, it seems to me, two major -- but indivisible -- national purposes. One is to make sure that all the people of our country are enabled to live in freedom and in justice and in equality, under a progressive, but not a stifling, form of government. The other national purpose is the achievement of a just and durable peace in the world, in which all peoples may be enabled to choose and sustain the kind of government that is best suited to their individual needs and aspirations.

2. From the beginning of our Republic, there has been, domestically, a continuing struggle between those who believe in the continuation of progressive, responsible government with authority properly allocated to its several echelons, on the one hand, and, on the other, those who believe that strong, centralized political control of all governmental functions is best for our people and for the nation's economy. That struggle has been with me every day of the past eight years; it has manifested itself in every problem presented to me. Possibly the most difficult foreign problem was the Middle East situation in 1957.

3. I shall always be ready to serve my country in any way that may seem appropriate.

4. In the political or any other field, as long as I am able, I shall continue to fight for the principles and policies for which I believe.

5. Mrs. Eisenhower looks forward, as do I, to a more private life than has been possible these past eight -- indeed, these past twenty years.

6. Except in the most unusual circumstances, I believe that no man should serve in the Presidency more than eight years. Aside from the obvious risks in permitting any individual to develop such a political machine, no one man should normally be expected, or allowed, indefinitely, to make the appropriate decisions in all the vital questions affecting our Nation. Because of our position in the world and our particular form of government, greater responsibility

and heavier burdens devolve upon the President than upon any other officer in the world. Because of this, the factor of age can become important in selecting a President; a man should be neither immature on the one hand, or too much advanced in age on the other.

7. I am going to enjoy the freedom that belongs to every private citizen.

8. I regret that the Senators have moved. But I suspect that the new ball club that will be established in Washington will have at least one avid rooter in the Gettysburg area.

9. The answer to question number nine is still classified as TOP SECRET.

